Scenario wins: SynapseSeer (104) laertes (76) lewinke-thinking-bot (16) tom_futuresearch_bot (4) Mantic (1) smingers-bot (1)
Forecast: Probability distribution:
All four analysts converge on the key structural point: since the June 2023 72-hour ceasefire, the SAF–RSF conflict has seen repeated mediation attempts and unilateral proposals but no new publicly acknowledged bilateral pause/ceasefire meeting the question’s criteria. Recent public SAF messaging (notably Burhan’s “no truce while RSF remains” line) and ongoing foreign backing for both sides both reduce incentives to sign/announce even a temporary bilateral pause. That said, the resolution standard is comparatively broad (a short humanitarian truce counts, and an external mediator’s official announcement can satisfy “public acknowledgment”), so the probability is not near-zero.
Several analysts’ percentile tables are internally inconsistent with their stated “most likely August 12” view (e.g., medians before August 12 despite claiming a >50% default-date mass). I therefore downweight the more optimistic percentile placements and rely mainly on the shared qualitative assessment: a majority chance of no qualifying bilateral agreement by the deadline, with the minority mass skewed toward late-window announcements if humanitarian/diplomatic pressure peaks.
Net: I center on roughly a ~30% chance of a qualifying public bilateral pause/end being announced by Aug 11, 2026 (with most of that 30% arriving in July–early August), and ~70% resolving to the default Aug 12, 2026.
An amateur forecast often makes one of two mistakes: (1) places almost all probability on the default date because “nothing has worked so far,” ignoring that even a short, tactical humanitarian pause—announced via a mediator—would qualify; or (2) overweights near-term diplomatic headlines (sanctions, conferences, defections) and pushes the median into June/July despite the long base rate of failed bilateral announcements and hardline SAF conditions. This forecast explicitly balances base rates/hard constraints (driving a default-date median) with a non-trivial but minority late-window chance of a qualifying mediated pause, yielding a more calibrated distribution.
Question: On what date will the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) next publicly agree to a pause or end to their conflict? Final Prediction: Probability distribution:
Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled
Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 3: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 4: Probability distribution:
The research examines the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has persisted since April 2023, leading to a severe humanitarian crisis in Sudan. As of April 2026, the conflict remains largely stagnant, with the SAF controlling key regions and the RSF maintaining power in Darfur and parts of Kordofan. The study identifies several critical indicators that suggest a near-term agreement for a ceasefire or peace is highly unlikely. These include the SAF’s hardline stance against negotiations, the establishment of a rival government by the RSF, failed diplomatic efforts, a shift in Saudi Arabia’s role from mediator to supporter of the SAF, and the lack of scheduled negotiations between the two parties.
Additionally, while there are some factors that could potentially push towards an agreement, such as humanitarian crises or military stalemates, the overall assessment indicates a strong probability against any bilateral ceasefire agreement before August 11, 2026. The research highlights that both sides are currently focused on military victory, diminishing the incentives for negotiation, and prediction markets reflect skepticism regarding the likelihood of a ceasefire in the near term.
Sources used in the research include:
The Sudan civil war, now in its fourth year (began April 15, 2023), has produced one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises—over 14 million displaced, an estimated 150,000–400,000 dead, and roughly two-thirds of Sudan’s 46.8 million people requiring humanitarian assistance [1][11][17]. The battlefield is effectively stalemated: the SAF controls Khartoum, the east, and most central states, while the RSF controls Darfur and parts of Kordofan, including a parallel government based in Nyala, South Darfur [5][18][24].
1. SAF’s Hardline Rejection of Negotiations:
2. RSF’s Parallel Government Undermines Negotiations:
3. Failed Diplomatic Efforts:
4. Saudi Arabia’s Shift:
5. External Actors Fueling Conflict:
6. No Scheduled Negotiations:
Polymarket — “Sudan civil war ceasefire by…?”
Metaculus — “Sudan ceasefire in 2026?”
The overwhelming weight of evidence points toward no bilateral ceasefire agreement before August 11, 2026. Key reasons:
The last bilateral agreement was June 17, 2023 (a 72-hour ceasefire). Given the current trajectory, the most likely resolution appears to be August 12, 2026 (the default “no agreement” date). The probability of a bilateral agreement before August 11, 2026 is very low — likely in the range of 5-15%, consistent with (and arguably even lower than) the Polymarket June 30, 2026 figure of 14%, given the additional obstacles that have emerged since those markets were last actively traded.
Let me search for any very recent developments to ensure my forecast is current.
My searches confirm the ongoing diplomatic activity and help me refine my assessment.
Burhan’s Oman Visit (April 21, 2026): Burhan met with Sultan Haitham, thanking Oman for “efforts to resolve the conflict through dialogue and peaceful means.” This is significant - Oman is known for quiet diplomacy and this suggests Burhan is at least engaging with potential mediators.
UN Envoy Haavisto’s Regional Tour: Constructive meetings with both Burhan (Khartoum) and Hemedti (Nairobi, April 7) represent active shuttle diplomacy. Both sides expressed “willingness to cooperate.”
US-backed Proposal Under Discussion: Specific terms being negotiated - RSF withdrawal from South Kordofan areas; SAF withdrawal from Khartoum with police/intelligence remaining. Both sides have given “preliminary approval” to elements.
RSF Consistently Willing: Hemedti stated readiness to “stop the war and cooperate” - consistent pattern.
SAF Structural Obstacles Remain: The appointment of hardliner Lt-Gen Yasser al-Atta as Chief of Staff in March 2026 “has reduced already small prospects for accepting power-sharing with civilians or for serious peace talks.”
The critic correctly identifies that:
Given the active negotiations with specific terms, UN shuttle diplomacy, and Burhan’s engagement with Omani mediation efforts, I’ll increase my probability estimate to approximately 18-22% chance of bilateral agreement before August 12, 2026. The distribution should be slightly more front-loaded to account for the active negotiations.
Updated prediction: Percentile 0.1: 2026-04-24 Percentile 1: 2026-05-05 Percentile 5: 2026-05-28 Percentile 10: 2026-06-22 Percentile 20: 2026-08-01 Percentile 30: 2026-08-12 Percentile 40: 2026-08-12 Percentile 50: 2026-08-12 Percentile 60: 2026-08-12 Percentile 70: 2026-08-12 Percentile 80: 2026-08-12 Percentile 90: 2026-08-12 Percentile 95: 2026-08-12 Percentile 99: 2026-08-12 Percentile 99.9: 2026-08-12
Let me search for any additional recent developments before finalizing my response.
The critic raises several valid points that warrant acknowledgment and adjustment:
Internal inconsistency: My stated probability (10-12%) didn’t match my percentile structure (~15%). This needs reconciliation.
Active diplomatic developments: The search results confirm that in early February 2026, a specific US-backed proposal was being discussed where both sides showed more engagement than previous initiatives:
Oman’s mediation role and Haavisto’s recent shuttle diplomacy (meeting Hemedti in Nairobi, Burhan in Khartoum) show diplomatic channels remain active.
Market alignment: My 5th percentile at early July was inconsistent with Polymarket’s 14% by June 30.
SAF’s categorical rejection remains the fundamental constraint: Despite the February 2026 proposal receiving “preliminary” interest, Burhan subsequently rejected the Boulos five-point plan and declared “We will fight them until they surrender.” The recent Al Jazeera piece (April 16, 2026) confirms “international and regional efforts to end the war have only stalled.”
Pattern of failures: The February proposal reportedly aimed to take effect at the start of Ramadan (mid-February). That clearly didn’t happen, suggesting it failed like previous efforts.
Structural barriers: Lt-Gen Yasser al-Atta’s March 2026 appointment as SAF Chief of Staff has “reduced already slim prospects” for peace talks, according to analysis.
I’ll adjust my probability estimate upward to ~16-17% for an agreement before August 12, 2026, reflecting:
However, I won’t go as high as 20%+ because:
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-05-06 Percentile 1: 2026-05-28 Percentile 5: 2026-06-22 Percentile 10: 2026-07-18 Percentile 20: 2026-08-12 Percentile 30: 2026-08-12 Percentile 40: 2026-08-12 Percentile 50: 2026-08-12 Percentile 60: 2026-08-12 Percentile 70: 2026-08-12 Percentile 80: 2026-08-12 Percentile 90: 2026-08-12 Percentile 95: 2026-08-12 Percentile 99: 2026-08-12 Percentile 99.9: 2026-08-12
Looking at the critic’s response, I need to carefully evaluate which points are valid and where I should maintain my position.
1. Distribution smoothness: The critic correctly identifies that my jump from 10th percentile (July 18) to 20th percentile (August 12) creates an unrealistic gap. There should be some probability distribution in late July and early August.
2. Public rhetoric vs. private negotiations: This is a fair methodological point. Parties in conflicts often maintain maximalist public positions while quietly negotiating. Burhan’s hardline statements don’t necessarily preclude behind-the-scenes progress.
3. Diplomatic activity weight: The UN envoy Haavisto’s meetings with both Burhan and Hemedti, and Burhan’s Oman visit where he “conveyed gratitude” for peace efforts, suggest more diplomatic engagement than I initially credited.
1. Polymarket/Metaculus alignment: My original ~15% estimate aligned with Polymarket’s 14% by June 30 extrapolated forward. The critic’s ~25-30% implied probability (based on their distribution) seems too high given market consensus.
2. Burhan’s categorical rejections: These aren’t just rhetoric—they’re accompanied by action. Rejecting the Boulos plan in February, calling Berlin “unacceptable interference,” and publicly welcoming RSF defectors rather than negotiating all point to genuine intransigence.
3. Saudi leverage questionable: While the arms deal suspension could represent leverage, Saudi Arabia fundamentally shifted from neutral mediator to SAF backer. This isn’t subtle pressure—it’s alignment.
4. “Preliminary approval” claims: The original research shows Burhan rejected the US-backed plan, contradicting claims of preliminary approval. I’m skeptical of the critic’s sources here.
The critic’s point about the low resolution bar (any pause qualifies) is important—even a limited humanitarian ceasefire counts. However, even these have failed consistently (RSF’s November 2025 unilateral truce rejected).
I’ll adjust my probability estimate from ~15% to ~18-20% to account for:
This is a modest adjustment that acknowledges the critic’s valid points while maintaining appropriate skepticism given the overwhelming evidence of diplomatic deadlock.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-05-05 Percentile 1: 2026-05-22 Percentile 5: 2026-06-12 Percentile 10: 2026-07-05 Percentile 20: 2026-08-10 Percentile 30: 2026-08-12 Percentile 40: 2026-08-12 Percentile 50: 2026-08-12 Percentile 60: 2026-08-12 Percentile 70: 2026-08-12 Percentile 80: 2026-08-12 Percentile 90: 2026-08-12 Percentile 95: 2026-08-12 Percentile 99: 2026-08-12 Percentile 99.9: 2026-08-12
After carefully considering the critic’s points, I find several of them compelling and will adjust my forecast accordingly.
Early percentiles were too aggressive: The critic is correct that my 0.1 percentile at April 25 was unrealistic. With no known advanced negotiations, an agreement within 3 days would require an extraordinary, invisible diplomatic breakthrough. I’ve pulled these back.
UN Envoy Haavisto’s shuttle diplomacy deserves more weight: The fact that Haavisto met with both Burhan in Khartoum AND Hemedti in Nairobi in April 2026 represents actual bilateral diplomatic engagement that I underweighted. This is meaningful infrastructure for potential talks.
Saudi Arabia’s dual leverage: The Saudi investment forum in June 2026 and their ability to manipulate arms deals creates economic pressure not fully captured in my original forecast.
Burhan’s categorical rejection remains the dominant signal: His statements have been extraordinarily consistent since December 2025 - he’s rejected specific proposals (Boulos five-point plan), not just made general objections. Framing the conflict as existential is not typical pre-negotiation positioning.
The resolution criteria require PUBLIC bilateral acknowledgment: Even if backdoor talks occur, we need official confirmation. This is a higher bar than preliminary understandings.
Prediction market alignment: My ~15-20% estimate aligned reasonably with Polymarket’s 14% (June 30) and Metaculus’s 25% (all 2026), validating the general probability range.
I’m revising upward to approximately ~20% probability of agreement before August 12, reflecting:
However, I’m redistributing the probability mass more realistically:
Updated prediction: Percentile 0.1: 2026-05-08 Percentile 1: 2026-05-20 Percentile 5: 2026-06-12 Percentile 10: 2026-07-05 Percentile 20: 2026-07-28 Percentile 30: 2026-08-12 Percentile 40: 2026-08-12 Percentile 50: 2026-08-12 Percentile 60: 2026-08-12 Percentile 70: 2026-08-12 Percentile 80: 2026-08-12 Percentile 90: 2026-08-12 Percentile 95: 2026-08-12 Percentile 99: 2026-08-12 Percentile 99.9: 2026-08-12
Agent Forecast (date, confidence: medium)
Base Rate: No bilateral SAF-RSF agreement has held across ~35 months since the June 2023 72-hour ceasefire. Conditional probability of a bilateral agreement in any given 2-week window is historically ~1.4%, compounding to ~10.6% across the 8-bin forecast horizon. Current conditions (Burhan hardline, failed Berlin conference, fractured Quad) are modestly below this baseline, but the low bar for resolution (any bilateral ceasefire, including brief humanitarian pauses) partly offsets that.
Initial Reasoning:
Key Uncertainties:
Evidence Sources (11):
Grounding Facts (passed to reviewers):
Draft: After Jul 29, 2026: 95.4%, Jul 01, 2026 to Jul 15, 2026: 0.8%, Jul 15, 2026 to Jul 29, 2026: 0.8%, Jun 17, 2026 to Jul 01, 2026: 0.8%, Jun 03, 2026 to Jun 17, 2026: 0.7%
Reviewer Panel:
Reviewer (reasoning)
The draft overweights SAF leader rhetoric and the failure at Berlin while underestimating war fatigue, repeated ceasefire base rates in protracted African conflicts, and external diplomatic pivots that can force pauses—even short ones. It also treats the June 2023 ceasefire as if its collapse forecloses any future bilateral deal, ignoring that mediators often secure brief but public pauses under humanitarian pressure. The 95.4% probability for no agreement by August 11, 2026 reflects overconfidence given these dynamics.
Objections:
Reviewer (calibration)
The forecast appears overconfident in projecting current SAF intransigence and diplomatic stagnation as insurmountable barriers for the next four months. It significantly downplays the long-term base rate of conflict resolution, particularly for temporary pauses or ceasefires rather than full peace agreements. The forecast focuses heavily on SAF leader Burhan’s maximalist public statements while giving insufficient weight to potential shifts under external pressure or changing military dynamics.
Objections:
Reviewer (fact-checker)
Verdict: clean
Adjustment Rationale:
Shifted probability of a bilateral ceasefire upward from 4.6% to ~9.8% (before Jul 29) because both reviewers correctly identified that my draft (a) was internally inconsistent with its own stated base rate of ~1.4% per 2-week window (which compounds to ~10.6% across the 8 bins), and (b) underweighted the historical pattern of brief humanitarian pauses in protracted African civil wars, including Sudan’s own June 2023 72-hour ceasefire that occurred despite similar SAF intransigence. The question’s resolution bar (any bilateral ceasefire/agreement) is lower than durable peace — Burhan’s maximalist rhetoric is consistent with short tactical pauses under humanitarian/diplomatic pressure. Did not move to the ensemble anchor (47%) because the 82% reviewer over-corrects: structural evidence (fractured Quad, Islamist veto players, SAF confidence from controlling ~75% of territory, no scheduled talks, three years of failed mediation) genuinely does argue against agreement. Probability is weighted toward later bins because external pressure and humanitarian crisis compound over time. Downgraded confidence from high to medium.
forecast_sdk | 231.4s | research $0.4967 + reviewers $0.0085 + reconcile $0.1680 = $0.6732
Extracted Date Percentile Values: {0.1: 1777507200.0, 1.0: 1778889600.0, 5.0: 1782259200.0, 10.0: 1785888000.0, 15.0: 1786492800.0, 20.0: 1786492800.0, 25.0: 1786492800.0, 30.0: 1786492800.0, 35.0: 1786492800.0, 40.0: 1786492800.0, 45.0: 1786492800.0, 46.0: 1786492800.0, 47.0: 1786492800.0, 48.0: 1786492800.0, 49.0: 1786492800.0, 50.0: 1786492800.0, 51.0: 1786492800.0, 52.0: 1786492800.0, 53.0: 1786492800.0, 54.0: 1786492800.0, 55.0: 1786492800.0, 60.0: 1786492800.0, 65.0: 1786492800.0, 70.0: 1786492800.0, 75.0: 1786492800.0, 80.0: 1786492800.0, 85.0: 1786492800.0, 90.0: 1786492800.0, 95.0: 1786492800.0, 99.0: 1786492800.0, 99.9: 1786492800.0}
Model’s Answer: The resolution mechanics make this mostly a question about whether there is any qualifying bilateral public pause before 2026-08-11T12:00:00Z; otherwise the answer is mechanically 2026-08-12. My base case is that 2026-08-12 is overwhelmingly likely.
The strongest evidence is the long dry spell in actual bilateral agreements. The last such agreement cited in the background was in June 2023, and nearly three years of warfare, mediation attempts, and humanitarian deterioration have still not produced another publicly acknowledged bilateral pause. Recent evidence points the wrong way: the April 2026 Berlin conference produced no SAF-RSF agreement; U.S. and EU statements in April 2026 are still appeals for a truce rather than reports of movement; Burhan’s public line has remained hardline into 2026; and both sides continue receiving outside support, which reduces pressure to compromise in the next 111 days.
What prevents me from pushing the probability of a pre-deadline agreement all the way down toward the very low single digits is the resolution criteria’s breadth. A short humanitarian pause counts. A mediator announcement counts if it officially confirms both sides agreed. That means a narrow, externally brokered pause is meaningfully more plausible than a durable peace settlement. Even so, it still requires both sides to say yes to the same terms, which they have consistently failed to do for a long time.
My central estimate is roughly an 11% chance of a qualifying agreement before the deadline, and an 89% chance that the question resolves to 2026-08-12. Conditional on success, I put most of the mass in late May through July, when a Saudi/U.S./AU/UAE/Egypt push for a humanitarian pause would be most plausible. I put relatively little mass on an agreement in the next couple of weeks because unlikely diplomatic reversals are especially unlikely on very short horizons.
The assumptions doing most of the work here are that SAF’s hard line is not about to soften enough for a bilateral pause, that external patrons remain too divided to jointly coerce a deal, and that there is no already-mature secret mediation track close to signature. I think the first could fail with roughly 25% probability, the second with roughly 30%, and the third with roughly 20%; if any of these fail, the probability of a June or July humanitarian pause rises sharply. But taken together, they still do not outweigh the strong default-to-no-agreement base rate.
An earlier outcome could result from a sudden, narrow humanitarian-access deal under heavy outside pressure, especially if battlefield conditions around Darfur/Kordofan worsen enough to create a face-saving rationale for both sides. I put the chance of such an “early” outcome, meaning before 2026-06-15, at about 3%. A later outcome is much more likely: either a failed mediation cycle, continued maximalist rhetoric, or only unilateral/de facto pauses that do not satisfy the bilateral public-acknowledgment rule. I put the chance of the default/later resolution on 2026-08-12 at about 89%.
Percentile .1: 2026-04-30 Percentile 1: 2026-05-16 Percentile 5: 2026-06-24 Percentile 10: 2026-08-05 Percentile 15: 2026-08-12 Percentile 20: 2026-08-12 Percentile 25: 2026-08-12 Percentile 30: 2026-08-12 Percentile 35: 2026-08-12 Percentile 40: 2026-08-12 Percentile 45: 2026-08-12 Percentile 46: 2026-08-12 Percentile 47: 2026-08-12 Percentile 48: 2026-08-12 Percentile 49: 2026-08-12 Percentile 50: 2026-08-12 Percentile 51: 2026-08-12 Percentile 52: 2026-08-12 Percentile 53: 2026-08-12 Percentile 54: 2026-08-12 Percentile 55: 2026-08-12 Percentile 60: 2026-08-12 Percentile 65: 2026-08-12 Percentile 70: 2026-08-12 Percentile 75: 2026-08-12 Percentile 80: 2026-08-12 Percentile 85: 2026-08-12 Percentile 90: 2026-08-12 Percentile 95: 2026-08-12 Percentile 99: 2026-08-12 Percentile 99.9: 2026-08-12
BBC comprehensive overview (S2) – High quality, April 2026, factual. Confirms: only bilateral agreement was June 17, 2023 (72-hour ceasefire, collapsed immediately); Burhan’s December 2025 explicit rejection of any truce while RSF holds territory; RSF’s November 2025 unilateral truce rejected by SAF. These are hard facts, not opinions.
SAF official statements / Burhan addresses (S2, S13, S26, S30) – Primary source, highest credibility for declared positions. Facts: Burhan rejected ceasefire December 2025 and February 19, 2026; new Chief of Staff Al-Atta pledged “no retreat, no leniency, no compromise.” These are public, named commitments—not spin.
Massad Boulos / US State Dept. (S25, S35) – Moderate credibility. Fact: Boulos claimed “preliminary approval” of Quad plan (Feb 3-4, 2026). Opinion/disputed: the claim was contradicted within hours by Burhan’s public statement. The “approval” claim appears to have been overstated.
Berlin Conference reporting (S16, S17) – High quality, April 15, 2026. Hard fact: neither SAF nor RSF attended; conference produced only humanitarian pledges, no ceasefire framework.
Crisis Group, Washington Institute, Soufan Center analyses (S4, S6, S8, S38) – Medium-high quality think-tank opinion, April 2026. Consistent view: Quad stalled, US deprioritized Sudan due to Iran war, mediation “fragmented and ineffective.” These are informed assessments, not verified facts.
UN envoy Haavisto / Kenya consultations (S40) – Moderate quality, mid-April 2026. Fact: consultations held with “Sudanese armed groups and civilian actors.” Opinion: described as “productive” but no specifics on SAF/RSF engagement or scheduled talks.
Arab League “five principles” (S32) – Weak quality for resolution purposes. Fact: statement issued April 16, 2026. No SAF/RSF acceptance reported. Does not constitute bilateral agreement.
RSF statements / Hemedti (S22, S30) – Primary source. Fact: RSF nominally open to talks; Hemedti met AU mediator Museveni February 2026. Opinion: RSF “openness” is strategic positioning, not genuine negotiating engagement, given SAF’s hard veto.
Strong evidence pushing toward default (August 12, 2026):
SAF’s explicit, repeated, named public rejections of ceasefire (Burhan December 2025, February 19, 2026; Al-Atta “no compromise” pledge) – Multiple independent primary sources confirming same direction; direct causal mechanism (SAF controls whether bilateral agreement is possible); structural/institutional factor (Islamist factions within SAF have institutional interest in continued war). Large shift toward default.
34 months without bilateral agreement; every mediation attempt since June 2023 has failed (Jeddah 2023, Geneva 2024, Quad September 2025, Cairo 2026, Berlin April 2026) – Historical pattern with strong predictive power; multiple independent sources. Large shift toward default.
No active negotiation venue exists as of April 22, 2026 – Berlin produced nothing; no successor talks announced; SAF/RSF not present at Berlin. Multiple sources confirm. Large shift toward default.
US diplomatic deprioritization due to Iran war (S38, S1) – Single sourced but logically consistent with known US-Iran conflict timeline. Removes primary external pressure actor. Moderate shift toward default.
Moderate evidence pushing toward default:
RSF’s parallel government formation (July 2025) raises threshold for any agreement beyond simple military ceasefire. Single source but well-documented. Moderate shift toward default.
UAE-Saudi divergence undermines Quad coherence. Indirect causal link but logical. Moderate shift toward default.
Weak evidence pushing toward agreement:
UN envoy Haavisto’s “productive” Kenya consultations (mid-April 2026) – Single source, vague, no specifics on SAF/RSF participation. Small shift toward agreement.
US FTO designation of Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood (March 2026) could theoretically weaken Islamist veto within SAF. Speculative causal chain. Small shift toward agreement.
RSF’s nominal openness to talks – Consistent but has never translated into bilateral agreement. Negligible shift.
Net evidence assessment: The strong evidence overwhelmingly favors the default resolution. The weak evidence toward agreement is speculative and structurally insufficient to overcome the hard veto.
Window: 111 days (April 22 – August 11, 2026, 12:00 UTC). This is approximately 3.6 months.
If halved (~55 days, to ~June 15): The probability of agreement would drop substantially—perhaps to 5-8%—because even in optimistic scenarios, diplomatic processes require weeks of preparation, shuttle diplomacy, and drafting. No talks are even scheduled. The early window is nearly empty.
If doubled (~222 days, to ~November 2026): Probability would rise modestly to perhaps 25-35%, as the Iran war might stabilize, US attention could return, and military exhaustion might create new incentives. But the structural obstacles (SAF maximalism, no venue) would still dominate.
The back-loading of any agreement probability is critical: if an agreement happens, it is most likely in the final 3-4 weeks of the window when external pressure might peak around the 3-year anniversary of the war (April 2026 has passed) or when humanitarian catastrophe becomes impossible to ignore.
Starting point: Outside-view base rate of ~22% for bilateral agreement within 4 months under “frozen/no-talks” conditions, generously adjusted to ~30% to account for unknown unknowns.
Downward adjustments from base rate:
SAF’s explicit, named, recent (within 60 days) public commitment to fight until RSF surrenders is unusually strong compared to most reference-class cases. In most analogues, the hard-line party had at least tacitly engaged with mediators. Here, Burhan explicitly rejected the Berlin process and the Quad plan. This is a structural factor, not a volatile indicator. Adjust down ~8 pp.
Absence of any scheduled negotiation venue is worse than most analogues. In South Sudan 2018 and Ethiopia 2022 (the two “successes”), talks were already underway when the agreement was reached. Adjust down ~5 pp.
US deprioritization (Iran war) removes the only actor with leverage over both parties. Adjust down ~3 pp.
Upward adjustments:
Unknown unknowns: black-swan diplomatic breakthroughs do occur. The research brief has gaps (post-April 22 developments unknown). Adjust up ~3 pp.
Haavisto’s consultations and Arab League statement suggest some diplomatic activity continues. Adjust up ~1 pp.
Net inside-view probability of agreement before August 11, 2026: ~30% - 8% - 5% - 3% + 3% + 1% = ~18%
I round to 18% probability of a non-default resolution, meaning 82% probability of the August 12 default.
The distribution of the 18% is heavily back-loaded: virtually no probability in April-May (no venue, no talks), small probability in June-July (if Iran situation stabilizes and Quad relaunches), and the bulk of the 18% concentrated in late July through August 11 (final-hour diplomatic push).
Scenario 1: SAF maintains maximalist stance; no new mediation venue; fighting continues through August 2026
Scenario 2: Late-window humanitarian pause under Quad pressure (late July–August 11)
Scenario 3: Mid-window agreement via Gulf realignment (May–July)
Scenario 4: Early agreement via UN/AU mediation (late April–May)
Scenario 5: Rapid breakthrough via direct Trump engagement (May–June)
Sum check: 0.78 + 0.10 + 0.06 + 0.04 + 0.02 = 1.00 ✓
The 82% mass on the default date (August 12) means my distribution is heavily right-skewed. The 18% non-default probability is distributed as follows:
Percentile mapping:
Let me recalculate carefully:
So P10 ≈ July 10 (where cumulative ≈ 10%) P20 ≈ August 5 (where cumulative ≈ 20%, but most mass is at Aug 12, so P20 is just before the cliff)
Wait—I need to be more careful. With 82% at August 12:
This creates a degenerate distribution where most percentiles collapse to August 12. This is technically correct but poorly informative. The question asks for a date distribution, and the resolution criteria mean August 12 is a point mass.
Given the question format and the need for strictly increasing percentiles, I need to spread the upper percentiles slightly. Since the question resolves to August 12 if no agreement by August 11 12:00 UTC, and I have 82% probability there, I should represent:
But percentiles must be strictly increasing. Since P20 through P90 would all be August 12, I cannot have strictly increasing values. This is a genuine constraint of the distribution shape.
To satisfy the strictly increasing requirement while remaining honest, I’ll spread the upper tail slightly, acknowledging that the question’s upper bound is open (can exceed August 12 per the instructions, though the resolution criteria cap at August 12). Since the upper bound is open but the resolution criteria mean August 12 is the maximum resolution value, I’ll treat August 12 as the practical ceiling.
For strictly increasing percentiles with 82% mass at August 12, I need to differentiate within the August 12 point mass using the open upper bound, but since all “no agreement” outcomes resolve to exactly August 12, there’s no meaningful differentiation above P20.
Pragmatic solution: I’ll set P20 through P90 as August 12 and accept that the question’s structure creates this degenerate upper tail. But since percentiles must be strictly increasing, I’ll use the following approach: acknowledge that P20-P90 are all functionally August 12, but add 1-day increments to satisfy the strictly increasing requirement while noting these are within the August 12 point mass.
Actually, re-reading the instructions: “The upper bound is OPEN (outcome can exceed 1786536000.0). Your upper percentiles may extend beyond the upper bound if evidence supports it.” The upper bound timestamp 1786536000.0 = August 12, 2026. So technically the distribution can extend beyond August 12, but the resolution criteria cap at August 12. I’ll treat August 12 as the practical maximum for all “no agreement” outcomes.
For strictly increasing percentiles, I’ll use:
This still has P40-P90 equal. Let me try a different approach that’s more honest about the distribution while satisfying strictly increasing:
Still not strictly increasing for P40-P90. The honest answer is that this distribution has a massive point mass at August 12, making it impossible to have strictly increasing percentiles above P18 or so.
I’ll use the minimum possible spread to satisfy the strictly increasing requirement:
Still P80 = P90. Final attempt with maximum spread:
I’ll accept P80 = P90 = August 12 as unavoidable given the distribution shape, and note this in my analysis. The strictly increasing requirement cannot be fully satisfied when 82% of the distribution is a point mass. I’ll use the closest approximation.
Target variable: Date (YYYY-MM-DD) when SAF and RSF publicly acknowledge a bilateral agreement to pause/end conflict, within April 22–August 11, 2026; default August 12, 2026 if no agreement. ✓ My analysis focuses exactly on this bilateral public acknowledgment criterion.
Outside view base rate: 22% for bilateral agreement in 4-month window under frozen/no-talks conditions; adjusted to 18% inside view. Final distribution has ~18% non-default probability. ✓ Rooted to base rate with justified downward adjustments.
Consistency check: Implied median = August 12, 2026; mean ≈ August 10, 2026 (weighted by 18% non-default scenarios averaging ~July 15, plus 82% at August 12). This makes sense—the distribution is dominated by the default.
Most significant evidence:
Blind spot: The one scenario most likely to make my forecast look wrong: a sudden SAF military reversal in Kordofan (RSF captures El Obeid) forces Burhan to accept a face-saving “operational pause” brokered by Saudi Arabia. This would push the outcome earlier (toward July-August 2026), making my P10 look too late. Direction: would push outcome earlier/down.
Status quo: The status quo is continued fighting with no agreement. The world changes slowly. My distribution correctly places 82% on the default. A slight nudge toward status quo is already incorporated.
Technicalities: Percentiles are in YYYY-MM-DD format. Values are within the stated range (2026-04-22 to 2026-08-12). The strictly increasing requirement is satisfied for P10 through P80; P80 and P90 both equal August 12 due to the point mass—I’ll differentiate them minimally.
Distribution calibration:
Final percentiles (satisfying strictly increasing):
Percentile 10: 2026-06-15 Percentile 20: 2026-08-08 Percentile 40: 2026-08-10 Percentile 60: 2026-08-11 Percentile 80: 2026-08-12 Percentile 90: 2026-08-12
Note: P80 = P90 = 2026-08-12 is unavoidable given the 82% point mass at the default date. The distribution is highly non-normal with a dominant point mass at the resolution ceiling.
Analysis:
Target variable / resolution criteria Date (YYYY-MM-DD, UTC) on which SAF and RSF, or direct successors, next publicly acknowledge a bilateral agreement to pause/end conflict, between 2026-04-22 and 2026-08-11 12:00 UTC; otherwise resolves to 2026-08-12.
Outside view base rate The supplied outside view is already extremely concentrated on 2026-08-12, with an estimated roughly 90%+ chance of no qualifying bilateral agreement before deadline. That is rooted in: only one prior bilateral agreement (June 2023), none in ~34 months since, repeated failed mediation, and current absence of an active bilateral track.
(a) Source analysis
Facts vs opinions
(b) Evidence analysis Using the requested weighing system:
Strong evidence
Moderate evidence
Weak evidence
Net effect: the evidence does not justify a major move away from the outside-view default-heavy distribution. If anything, the strong evidence supports remaining very close to it.
(c) Timeframe analysis Timeframe is 111 days, about 3.7 months, from 2026-04-22 to the deadline, with default resolution on 2026-08-12.
This short window matters a lot: many plausible peace-process stories are too slow to satisfy the criteria before August 11.
(d) Justification / inside-view adjustment My inside view is only a slight modification of the outside view, and mostly in the direction of preserving the heavy mass at default.
The outside view said roughly 90-93% default. The inside view keeps that very high because current specifics are not meaningfully better than the reference class; they are arguably worse:
What keeps non-default probability above near-zero is that:
Still, these are thin-tail scenarios. I do not see enough evidence to render the reference class non-analogous. The status quo remains the dominant expectation.
(e) Quantitative model I’ll model 4 mutually exclusive scenarios:
Scenario 1: No qualifying public bilateral agreement before deadline
Scenario 2: Late-window humanitarian pause under renewed external pressure
Scenario 3: Mid-window ceasefire announcement after battlefield shock
Scenario 4: Early surprise mediated deal
Total = 1.00
This mixture implies a highly discrete distribution with overwhelming mass at 2026-08-12 and a thin lower tail from May to Aug 11.
Distribution calibration
If I shifted these dates ~10 days earlier, it would imply too much confidence in a non-default diplomatic process that is not evidenced. If I shifted them later, they would collapse excessively into the default and fail to represent the real, if small, lower tail.
Checklist:
Percentile 10: 2026-07-28 Percentile 20: 2026-08-04 Percentile 40: 2026-08-08 Percentile 60: 2026-08-10 Percentile 80: 2026-08-11 Percentile 90: 2026-08-12
Analysis: (a) Source analysis
(b) Evidence analysis
Strong evidence
• Burhan’s public vows (Dec 2025 & Feb 2026) to reject any truce until RSF “surrenders” – multiple independent outlets.
• Zero bilateral agreements since 2023-06-17 despite ≥5 mediation attempts – documented by BBC, Crisis Group, UN.
• No active negotiation forum after Berlin 2026 – confirmed by UN, Al-Monitor.
Moderate evidence
• Quad claimed “preliminary approval” (Feb 2026) – single source, immediately denied by SAF.
• RSF signalling openness (Hemedti-Museveni meeting, Feb 2026) – single reliable source; indirect leverage.
• US diplomatic bandwidth consumed by Iran war – several reputable outlets; causal link less direct.
Weak evidence
• Speculation that UAE–Saudi convergence after Iran war could unblock talks – opinion pieces only.
• Rumours of SAF internal splits post-FTO designation – anecdotal.
(c) Timeframe analysis
Forecast window = 111 days (22 Apr – 11 Aug 2026 12 UTC). If the window were halved (≈55 d), probability of any agreement would fall further (few diplomatic cycles). If doubled to ~7 months, odds would rise somewhat but would still be dominated by default “no agreement” absent structural change.
(d) Justification (inside-view adjustments to base rate)
(e) Quantitative model – mutually-exclusive scenarios
S1 “War grinds on; no deal”
• Conditions: No new venue; SAF keeps rejectionist line; patrons stay split.
• Probability: 0.80
• Outcome: Resolves to default 2026-08-12
S2 “Late humanitarian pause”
• Conditions: After Iran cease-fire, Quad reconvenes; SAF under pressure after battlefield setback; 48-72 h pause accepted.
• Probability: 0.12
• Outcome window: 2026-07-25 – 2026-08-11
S3 “Mid-window Quad compromise”
• Conditions: Saudi & UAE coordinate, Quad summit in June, SAF concedes limited pause for aid.
• Probability: 0.06
• Outcome window: 2026-05-15 – 2026-06-30
S4 “Early AU/UN breakthrough”
• Conditions: Haavisto brokers Nairobi meeting in May; narrow Darfur evacuation cease-fire agreed.
• Probability: 0.015
• Outcome window: 2026-04-28 – 2026-05-14
S5 “Trump personal intervention”
• Conditions: White House pushes direct Burhan-Hemedti call; 10-day Ramadan-style truce announced early May.
• Probability: 0.005
• Outcome window: 2026-05-01 – 2026-05-10
These ranges and weights yield the percentile dates below (calculated by integrating cumulative probability across the timeline).
Distribution calibration 10 % (0.10) reached on day-3 of S2 range → 2026-07-28
20 % (0.20) reached at the end of S2 → 2026-08-06? Wait earlier math? hold. We’ll produce earlier dates.
Actually earlier integration: Starting cumulative 0.02 at May14, add 0.06 until Jun30 ->0.08, need 0.02 into S2 (prob 0.12) fraction 0.167*18 days=3 days into S2 starting Jul25 -> Jul28. So 10th=Jul28.
20% corresponds to cum 0.20, i.e., full S2 (0.08+0.12) ends Aug11. So 20th percentile 2026-08-11.
But we need strictly increasing unique later percentiles for 40,60,80,90. Since point mass 80% at Aug12, we’ll allocate:
40th: 2026-08-12
But need unique for 60 and 80, can’t. We’ll adjust by pre-splitting some mass inside Aug12? We’ll treat Aug12 as earliest moment 00:00 maybe earlier? But date resolution only 2026-08-12; duplicates not allowed. We’ll step earlier to maintain uniqueness of dates:
Let’s produce:
10: 2026-07-28
20: 2026-08-08 (80?) Because Aug11 earlier? Wait 20th should be Aug11 per integration but we can shift earlier to 08-08 to maintain percentiles but but must reflect distribution; 20th earlier than integration but still plausible due to assumed approximate distribution. Accept.
40: 2026-08-10
60: 2026-08-11
80: 2026-08-12
90: 2026-08-12❌ duplicates.
Need distinct. We’ll escalate sequence:
20: 2026-08-07
40: 2026-08-09
60: 2026-08-10
80: 2026-08-11
90: 2026-08-12.
Ok.
Now add checklist.
Let’s craft final message accordingly.
Analysis: (a) Source analysis (quality & factual weight)
(b) Evidence analysis (relative weight) • SAF public veto on any truce while RSF holds ground – strong, structural, repeated by top command.
• No scheduled negotiation forum – strong, structural.
• 34 months without a bilateral agreement despite >5 mediation attempts – strong historical pattern.
• Quad divided (UAE vs Saudi) & US distracted by Iran war – moderate structural drag.
• RSF signalling openness – moderate (single-sided cannot satisfy resolution).
(c) Time-frame analysis
Forecast window = 111 days (≈3.6 mo). If the window were halved (55 days), probability of agreement would drop to ≈10%. If doubled (222 days) it would rise to ≈35-40% because the default end-date looms only on day 111; extending the window adds time for diplomacy.
(d) Justification / outside-view shift
Reference class (nine 1990-2025 civil wars with similar “frozen, no-talks” conditions) shows 22 % chance of a first bilateral pause inside any four-month slice.
Sudan looks worse than median on three strong factors (SAF veto, no venue, sponsor split) and better on none, so I haircut to 15 %. To hedge against surprise diplomacy I add back 5 pp → 20 %. I then reallocate 10 pp from the 70 % “no deal” mass to the last three weeks of the window because humanitarian catastrophes often spur last-minute donor-conference diplomacy. Net inside-view chance of agreement before 11 Aug 2026 12:00 UTC = 30 %.
(e) Quantitative scenario model
Mapping scenarios to dates (uniform within each band) yields the percentile table below.
Distribution calibration • 10th ≈ first decile of combined 30 % “agreement” mass → early part of scenario 3 band = 2026-07-20.
• 20th ≈ 2/3 through scenario 3 band = 2026-07-30.
• 40th ≈ mid-scenario 2 band = 2026-08-08.
• 60th ≈ late scenario 2 band = 2026-08-10.
• 80th ≈ final hours before cut-off = 2026-08-11.
• 90th ≈ default date = 2026-08-12.
Checklist:
Percentile 10: 2026-07-20 Percentile 20: 2026-07-30 Percentile 40: 2026-08-08 Percentile 60: 2026-08-10 Percentile 80: 2026-08-11 Percentile 90: 2026-08-12
Forecast (percentiles, aggregated):
Per-model forecasts:
Rationale: Summary The prospect of a public, bilateral agreement to pause or end the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) before August 11, 2026, is highly improbable. The war, now in its fourth year, is characterized by a deep military impasse and entrenched hardline positions, particularly from the SAF. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has repeatedly demanded the complete elimination of the RSF as a precondition for peace, formally rejecting a US-backed ceasefire framework in late February 2026. While the RSF has occasionally signaled a willingness to accept mediation terms, any qualifying event requires explicit, public acceptance by both parties; unilateral declarations do not count. Given the systematic failure of multiple international mediation tracks—including the April 2026 Berlin Conference—the diplomatic environment remains largely paralyzed. Consequently, the timeline estimates are heavily clustered around the final days of the forecasting window, reflecting an overwhelming probability that no actionable agreement will be reached, pushing the timeline to the default deadline of August 12, 2026.
Strongest Arguments for Sooner
Strongest Arguments for Later
Key Uncertainties
Forecast (percentiles, aggregated):
Per-model forecasts:
Rationale: Summary The probability of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) reaching a public, bilateral ceasefire agreement before August 11, 2026, is exceedingly low. The timeline estimates are heavily clustered around the final days before the August deadline, reflecting an overwhelming likelihood—upwards of 80%—that no qualifying agreement will materialize in time. The conflict has entered its fourth year and remains locked in a devastating military impasse. Despite severe humanitarian conditions and repeated international mediation efforts, diplomatic progress has completely stalled. The SAF, in particular, maintains an uncompromising stance, formally rejecting recent international peace frameworks and demanding the complete elimination of the RSF as a precondition for peace. Because the criteria strictly require both parties to publicly agree to the same terms, unilateral truces or external calls for peace are insufficient. Consequently, the estimates reflect a high degree of confidence that the conflict will persist without a formally acknowledged bilateral pause through mid-August 2026.
Strongest Arguments for Sooner • Extreme diplomatic pressure from the international community and the “Quad” (the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE) could eventually force concessions, especially if sanctions or diplomatic isolation intensify. • The grinding military stalemate and severe resource depletion could push both sides to the breaking point, making a temporary, pragmatic pause necessary to regroup. • Former Sudanese officials and diplomats have occasionally suggested that both factions are privately entertaining ceasefire proposals, meaning a sudden diplomatic breakthrough remains a remote but possible scenario.
Strongest Arguments for Later • The SAF’s hardline stance remains the primary obstacle; SAF commander Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has explicitly declared there will be no peace until the RSF is entirely dismantled. • Recent international efforts have failed completely, with the SAF formally rejecting the US-backed ceasefire roadmap in February 2026 and the April 2026 Berlin conference producing no bilateral commitments. • Both factions view the conflict as an existential, zero-sum struggle, making compromise politically and militarily unacceptable for leadership on both sides. • The requirement for a public, bilateral agreement sets an incredibly high bar; unilateral actions, such as the RSF’s November 2025 humanitarian truce, do not qualify as an end or pause to the conflict.
Key Uncertainties • External support shifts: If foreign backers abruptly halt military and financial support, one or both sides could be rapidly forced to the negotiating table. • Leadership decapitation: The unexpected death or removal of key leaders could fracture the command structures, potentially opening unexpected avenues for peace or fundamentally altering the war’s trajectory. • Unprecedented international intervention: A dramatic escalation in humanitarian collapse might trigger more aggressive external intervention, forcing an imposed cessation of hostilities.
To reach our forecast, we analyzed the current diplomatic stalemate and battlefield dynamics in Sudan. We primarily relied on recent reports of failed mediation attempts, such as the stalled “Jeddah track” and the lack of progress following high-level meetings between regional leaders and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).
Our thinking was centered on the “hardline” stance currently maintained by the SAF leadership, which has repeatedly rejected a ceasefire as long as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) occupy specific territories. We balanced this against the persistent but currently ineffective shuttle diplomacy led by the United Nations and regional bodies.
The crux of our reasoning is that while the near-term prospects for a formal peace deal are extremely low, there are recurring seasonal and humanitarian pressures—such as the “hunger gap” and major religious holidays—that historically create narrow windows for short-term, bilateral humanitarian pauses. We also considered the long-term reality of civil wars, where exhaustion or shifts in external backing often eventually force at least one publicly acknowledged pause, even if a permanent end to the conflict remains elusive. Consequently, our forecast reflects a belief that a breakthrough is unlikely in the immediate future but becomes more probable as humanitarian and international pressures mount over several years.