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Question: will CENTCOM report, by Aug 11, a cumulative integer for “Iranian vessels damaged or destroyed” that resolves above the current Epic Fury fact-sheet count? Forecasters agree the crux is adjudication of official CENTCOM wording, not raw combat damage: the clean Epic Fury fact sheet of Apr 6 gives “155+” (resolving as 155), while a later CENTCOM posture statement for Adm. Cooper says “we destroyed 161 vessels,” which teams judge plausibly resolution-relevant and is the most likely accepted anchor absent a new cumulative update. The July 7–8 strikes (CENTCOM/DVIDS reported “more than 60 IRGC small boats struck” plus ~90 other maritime targets) are the main upside trigger; if CENTCOM folds those strikes into a qualifying cumulative BDA/fact-sheet before Aug 11, expect a jump into the low- to mid-200s (roughly 215–230). Forecasters put most probability mass on no new qualifying cumulative update in the ~33‑day window, splitting between 161 (more likely) and 155; smaller probabilities cover modest revisions (folding in disabled/commercial vessels) and a thin upper-tail for major escalation pushing counts much higher. Recommended monitoring: CENTCOM Epic Fury page, CENTCOM press releases/DVIDS, and posture/statement pages for precise cumulative wording.
Forecast: Probability distribution:
Key facts surfaced by the team: (i) the most recent cumulative metric clearly shown on CENTCOM’s Epic Fury materials is an April 6 fact sheet reporting “155+” Iranian vessels damaged/destroyed (resolves as 155 under the “+” rule); (ii) multiple analysts found a later CENTCOM figure of ~161 vessels in an official posture statement / testimony context; (iii) a July 7–8 CENTCOM release reportedly described strikes hitting “more than 60” IRGC small boats, which could drive a large jump if (and only if) CENTCOM publishes a new cumulative Epic Fury vessel total before Aug 11.
Thus the dominant uncertainty is not battlefield arithmetic but reporting/definition: whether a qualifying CENTCOM update before Aug 11 provides a newer cumulative “Iranian vessels damaged or destroyed” number, and whether it incorporates the July small-boat strikes into the same cumulative vessel metric. I model a mixed outcome space: a non-trivial chance the last clearly-on-metric cumulative figure remains 155 (no qualifying cumulative update), a substantial chance the highest qualifying cumulative figure is in the low-to-mid 160s (if the 161-type number is deemed the latest qualifying cumulative report), and a meaningful chance of a jump into ~210–250 if CENTCOM publishes an updated cumulative metric that rolls in the July small-boat strikes. I keep an upper tail for renewed escalation plus an updated tally, but with only ~33 days remaining this tail is limited.
An amateur forecast is likely to (a) anchor on the April 6 “155+” and ignore the possibility of later qualifying CENTCOM figures, or (b) mechanically add “155 + 60” from the July strike release even though the resolution requires a highest cumulative number explicitly reported by CENTCOM for the Epic Fury vessel metric. My forecast explicitly separates (1) operational events from (2) whether CENTCOM publishes a qualifying cumulative update in the narrow remaining window, producing a calibrated mixture rather than a single-anchor extrapolation. Confidence: moderate, with most uncertainty coming from what CENTCOM will publish (and how it will be worded) before Aug 11.
Forecast rationale (numeric):
— Iteration 1 — Across the forecasts, the reasoning is anchored by the same official starting point: CENTCOM’s report of roughly 140 Iranian vessels damaged or destroyed by March 25, 2026. From there, the models extrapolate forward to August 11 by assuming additional losses or retrospective battle-damage updates, but at a much slower pace than in the opening phase of the operation.
The collective view is that CENTCOM’s reported total should continue to rise from the March baseline, but at a slowing rate, with the most plausible August figure landing around the low-to-mid 200s. The key uncertainty is not whether the number increases, but whether the reporting cadence and operational tempo remain strong enough to push the total materially above that range.
— Iteration 2 — Across the forecasts, the reasoning is broadly consistent:
Overall, the shared logic is: start with the March anchor, add moderate but tapering losses from continued strikes, then constrain the result with ceasefire-limited activity and reporting ambiguity.
— Iteration 3 — The forecasts converge on a common storyline:
Strong baseline anchor: All of the reasoning starts from the same point: by late March 2026, CENTCOM had already reported over 120 vessels damaged or destroyed. That figure is treated as the floor for the August 11 total.
Expected upward drift over time: The main driver of higher estimates is the assumption that Operation Epic Fury continued for several more months, allowing additional Iranian vessels—especially smaller IRGC fast-attack craft and other small boats—to be hit or destroyed. This supports a material increase beyond the March count.
Constraints on the upside: The forecasts also assume the rate of new losses would taper over time as targets become scarcer and operational tempo fluctuates. This keeps the estimate from rising too sharply despite continued activity.
Reporting and measurement effects: A recurring theme is that CENTCOM’s public reporting may be conservative, delayed, or rounded, meaning the official count could lag behind real-time damage assessments and then update in jumps. This creates uncertainty around the exact number and helps explain why estimates cluster in a broad range.
The collective reasoning suggests that CENTCOM’s reported total as of August 11, 2026 is most likely an expanded cumulative count in the low-to-mid 200s, driven by continued strikes on Iranian naval assets, especially smaller craft, but tempered by diminishing targets and the possibility of conservative official reporting.
Question: How many Iranian vessels will CENTCOM report as damaged or destroyed in Operation Epic Fury as of August 11, 2026? Final Prediction: Probability distribution:
Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled
Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:
The research summarizes that Operation Epic Fury began on Feb 28, 2026, and that CENTCOM’s April 6, 2026 fact sheet stated “more than 155 Iranian Navy ships and submarines have been damaged or destroyed cumulatively” to that date. CENTCOM later reported on July 7 that it destroyed “more than 60 IRGC small boats” during a large strike on ~80 targets, and conducted a July 8 strike on ~90 targets described as against “naval capabilities” without a specific vessel-count; combining the April baseline (155) with the explicit “60+” from July 7 yields an observable floor of 215 vessels. The research notes the July strikes sharply accelerated the prior average destruction rate (about 4 vessels/day over Feb 28–Apr 6) and that CENTCOM may publish an updated cumulative fact sheet before the Aug 11, 2026 resolution date.
The research also reports there were no active, liquid prediction markets found for the exact vessel-count (Polymarket and Manifold checked), and cites macro indicators of escalation (Brent crude > $126/bbl, shipping disruptions, naval blockade). Base-rate context given includes IRGC naval doctrine (hundreds of small fast attack craft, commonly estimated 300–500+), historical precedent (Operation Praying Mantis), and the operational window (33 days remaining until Aug 11) as factors increasing the likelihood of additional reported vessel damage.
Sources cited in the provided research (no URLs were included in the text): CENTCOM Fact Sheet (April 6, 2026); CENTCOM press releases / Epic Fury page (including July 7 and July 8, 2026 releases); Polymarket; Manifold; news reporting on attacks on commercial vessels and Brent crude; historical accounts of Operation Praying Mantis. Also cited inline as references: [1] [4] [5] [6] [11] [16] [20] [23] [48] [51] [54] [56] [57].
Greetings! I would be glad to help you and the superforecaster prepare for this Metaculus question on Operation Epic Fury. Here is a detailed rundown of the most relevant news, reporting metrics, prediction markets, and base rates to help anchor the forecast.
Operation Epic Fury began on February 28, 2026, as a massive U.S.-led military campaign aimed at dismantling Iran’s military and security apparatus [51][54]. Following a brief ceasefire, hostilities violently reignited earlier this week after Iran was accused of attacking three commercial vessels (including Qatari and Saudi tankers) in the Strait of Hormuz [1][5].
In response, CENTCOM launched a massive new wave of retaliatory strikes:
Current Cumulative Track: Prior to the recent ceasefire, an official CENTCOM Fact Sheet dated April 6, 2026, explicitly stated: “More than 155 Iranian Navy ships and submarines have been damaged or destroyed cumulatively during the operation” [51].
Because the resolution criteria specify that a “+” sign resolves to the base number, the April baseline anchors the count at 155. If we add the explicitly reported “60+” IRGC small boats from the July 7 press release [11], the current observable floor is 215 vessels. Keep a close eye on CENTCOM’s official Epic Fury page, as they are likely to release an updated “Fact Sheet” synthesizing a new cumulative total before the August 11 deadline.
A search across major prediction markets, including Polymarket and Manifold, did not yield any active, liquid markets predicting the exact number of Iranian vessels destroyed in Operation Epic Fury. This is common for newly opened, highly specific military metrics. However, macro-indicators reflect extreme escalation: Brent crude has surged to over $126 a barrel, and global shipping has been severely disrupted as Iran attempts to block the Strait of Hormuz [1][48]. The high stakes suggest continued kinetic engagements at sea are highly likely.
To provide an outside-view anchor for the forecaster, we can look at historical frequencies, military doctrine, and the recent operational momentum of the current war:
I hope this rundown gives your forecaster a strong, data-driven foundation. Let me know if you need any further analysis on specific CENTCOM releases or regional developments!
Conditioning on not annulled.
I think the Round 4 critic’s core point is compelling: this is now primarily a stale-publication / resolver-wording question, not a “how many boats did the U.S. probably hit?” question. I verified that the official Epic Fury page still mainly points to the April 6 fact sheet and shows old Epic Fury updates rather than a live campaign tracker. That April 6 fact sheet’s clean metric is “Iranian Vessels Damaged or Destroyed: 155+”, which would resolve as 155 under the plus-sign rule. (centcom.mil)
I still think the best no-new-update anchor is 161, not 155. CENTCOM’s SASC posture statement has an Operation EPIC FURY section, frames it as 38 days of major combat operations, and says: “At sea, we destroyed 161 vessels in total across 16 classes of warships.” That is official, OEF-specific, and uses “destroyed,” so if no newer countable update appears, I expect Metaculus is more likely to accept 161 than stick to the older 155+ fact-sheet number. (centcom.mil)
The critic is right that my earlier ~221 cluster was too arithmetic-driven. The July 7 CENTCOM/DVIDS release says U.S. forces struck more than 60 IRGC small boats, but it does not say those boats were “damaged or destroyed,” and it does not present a new cumulative OEF vessel total. Under this question’s fine print, that is a real problem, not a semantic nitpick. (dvidshub.net)
The strongest new insight is that later Iran-related actions appear to be framed as ceasefire response / blockade enforcement / follow-on strikes, not necessarily as a continued Epic Fury cumulative campaign. For example, CENTCOM’s June 27 release describes strikes on surveillance infrastructure, communications, air defense, drone storage, and minelayer capabilities, but gives no vessel-damage tally; the May 8 release describes disabling Iranian-flagged tankers under blockade enforcement, which is vessel-relevant but not a clean OEF “Iranian vessels damaged or destroyed” cumulative metric. (dvidshub.net)
Where I still disagree slightly with the critic: I do not want to collapse too much onto 161. The July 7 strike is large, official, vessel-specific, and close to market open; there are still 33 days until August 11. A politically useful CENTCOM success-summary could still roll up July/August activity into a fresh 250+, 300+, or 350+ figure. The upper tail remains live, especially if further Hormuz attacks generate more small-boat attrition and CENTCOM chooses to publicize it.
My revised mixture is roughly:
So I am moving the median back into the 161 atom, while keeping a meaningful right tail.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 151.2
Percentile 1: 154.7
Percentile 5: 155.25
Percentile 10: 160.85
Percentile 20: 161.05
Percentile 30: 161.2
Percentile 40: 161.35
Percentile 50: 161.49
Percentile 60: 223
Percentile 70: 280
Percentile 80: 335
Percentile 90: 405
Percentile 95: 520
Percentile 99: 780
Percentile 99.9: 1100
I agree with the critic’s central point: this is a CENTCOM-reporting question, not a battlefield-damage-estimation question. The April 6 fact sheet gives the clean cumulative metric as 155+ Iranian vessels damaged or destroyed, which resolves as 155 under the “+” rule, while the strongest later exact official wording is the posture statement saying CENTCOM destroyed 161 vessels at sea. (centcom.mil)
The biggest update from checking current official sources is that the Operation Epic Fury page still does not show a refreshed cumulative vessel metric; it links to the fact sheet and March/April-era material rather than a live dashboard. The official public-release page currently shows the July 7 strike release as the latest relevant CENTCOM release, not a new “vessels damaged or destroyed” fact sheet. (centcom.mil)
The critic is also right that the July 7 release says U.S. forces “struck” more than 60 IRGC small boats, not that CENTCOM reported them as damaged or destroyed, and it is not framed as a cumulative metric. So I reject the “current floor = 215” framing; 215/221 is a plausible future-reporting outcome, not yet the resolving number. (centcom.mil)
That said, I still think the critic may slightly underweight the chance of a new qualifying update. July 7 was a very salient maritime strike, preceded by June 26–27 Iranian attacks on commercial shipping and U.S. responses against maritime-threat infrastructure. CENTCOM has already shown it is willing to publish cumulative campaign metrics, and a new synthesis before August 11, 2026 would naturally fold in July small-boat battle damage if the BDA supports it. (centcom.mil)
My updated model, conditional on non-annulment:
So I am moving down from my initial median of 252 toward the critic’s mixture view, while keeping a fat right tail.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 154.6
Percentile 1: 155.3
Percentile 5: 160.7
Percentile 10: 161.1
Percentile 20: 161.3
Percentile 30: 161.49
Percentile 40: 219
Percentile 50: 239
Percentile 60: 266
Percentile 70: 296
Percentile 80: 329
Percentile 90: 366
Percentile 95: 435
Percentile 99: 625
Percentile 99.9: 900
Modal: 151-176 (55.3%) • frontier aggregate • 6m55s
Resolution sources/checks:
Edge cases:
frontier_1 - Modal: 176-201 (28.0%)
frontier_2 (revised) - Modal: 151-176 (62.0%)
frontier_3 - Modal: 151-176 (88.0%)
frontier_4 - Modal: 151-176 (82.0%)
frontier_5 (revised) - Modal: 151-176 (40.0%)
Material notes
Guidance
Revision
| Bin | Probability |
|---|---|
| Below 151 | 1.4% |
| 151-176 | 55.3% |
| 176-201 | 16.1% |
| 201-226 | 11.9% |
| 226-251 | 6.6% |
| 251-275 | 4.0% |
| 275-300 | 2.0% |
| 300-325 | 1.2% |
| 325-350 | 0.7% |
| Above 350 | 0.7% |
wooley_rhino • run f786818b • $2.42 • 6m55s
CENTCOM’s cumulative metric and intermittent public releases are the binding constraint on any reported count.
Operational definitions and which CENTCOM releases are folded together set the narrow boundary for plausible totals.
The most recent authoritative public statement on May 14 records 161 vessels destroyed at sea.
Earlier Epic Fury fact sheets showed 155+ and July releases noted more than 60 IRGC small boats struck without updating the cumulative tally.
If CENTCOM explicitly adds July strike effects into the Epic Fury cumulative line, the reported total would increase by at least the reported small-boat number.
Absent a consolidated battle-damage update, the May 14 discrete figure functions as the operative higher-quality count for resolution.
Key uncertainties are the exact wording CENTCOM will use (struck versus damaged or destroyed) and whether blockade or commercial-vessel actions are counted.
Resolution is sensitive to reporting choices and timing: a single terse cumulative update could shift the resolved number by dozens, while fragmentary releases may leave 161 as the last authoritative total.
Forecast (median): 187.8064 Iranian vessels reported damaged or destroyed (as of Aug 11, 2026).
How many Iranian vessels will CENTCOM report as damaged or destroyed in Operation Epic Fury as of August 11, 2026?
Key figures
Historical context
Operation Epic Fury began on February 28, 2026, following a period of heightened tensions. The initial 38 days of the campaign were characterized by extremely high-intensity major combat operations. During this phase, CENTCOM utilized a rapid reporting cycle, issuing fact sheets on March 6 (43 vessels), March 23 (140+ vessels), and April 6 (155+ vessels). By mid-May, the campaign had effectively neutralized Iran’s conventional “blue water” navy, including the destruction of its most modern frigates and all 11 Ghadir-class midget submarines. A 60-day ceasefire was established via a Memorandum of Understanding on June 17, 2026, which temporarily halted the increase in vessel counts until its collapse in early July. This pattern of rapid initial escalation followed by a diplomatic pause is consistent with past high-intensity precision-strike campaigns.
Tailwinds
Headwinds
Detailed reasoning
My analysis is primarily based on the official reporting trajectory provided by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and recent kinetic developments in the theater. As of early May 2026, the cumulative total of Iranian vessels reported as damaged or destroyed was 161, a figure confirmed by Vice Admiral Brad Cooper during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. This represents a significant increase from the 43 vessels reported in early March and the 155 reported in April.
The operational environment shifted in mid-June with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that established a temporary ceasefire. However, this diplomatic track collapsed on July 8, 2026, when President Trump declared the agreement terminated following Iranian attacks on merchant shipping. Crucially, on July 7 and 8, CENTCOM reported a massive new wave of precision strikes against over 80 targets, which included “more than 60” Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) small boats.
The core of the forecasting challenge is whether and when these 60+ vessels will be formally incorporated into a cumulative campaign metric. Under the resolution criteria, the question resolves to the highest cumulative integer reported by CENTCOM on or before August 11. I have identified three primary scenarios for the resolution:
The “Reporting Stasis” Scenario (approx. 25% probability): In this case, CENTCOM does not issue a new official cumulative tally before the August 11 deadline. Although the July strikes are documented in press releases, the resolution relies on a cumulative count. If no such update occurs, the count remains at 161 (or 155, depending on the interpretation of “official page” vs. “press release”).
The “July Incorporation” Scenario (approx. 50% probability): This is the most likely path. CENTCOM typically releases updated “Fact Sheets” following major phases of combat. Incorporating the 161 baseline vessels plus the “more than 60” from the July 7/8 strikes suggests a new total in the range of 221 to 235. This assumes a relatively quiet period following the initial retaliatory strikes.
The “Renewed Attrition” Scenario (approx. 25% probability): Given the collapse of the ceasefire and the stated U.S. goal of dismantling the Iranian security apparatus, continued maritime engagements are probable through late July and early August. Because the major Iranian surface fleet has already been largely destroyed (including frigates and corvettes like the IRIS Dena and IRIS Sahand), future counts will likely be driven by the destruction of smaller IRGC patrol craft and minelayers. If high-intensity operations continue, the total could realistically climb toward 280-300 vessels.
I have weighted the forecast toward the 220-250 range, reflecting the likely formalization of recent strike results while acknowledging the potential for reporting delays or further operational successes against the remaining IRGC small-boat inventory.
Key uncertainties
Conclusion