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| Figure/Metric | Value | Source | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| May 2026 GSCPI | 1.77 | New York Fed / Reuters | Latest official data point showing high pressure. |
| Drewry World Container Index | $4,166 | Drewry (June 25, 2026) | 119% increase since Feb 2026; signals rising costs. |
| Freightos China-US Rate | $7,880 | Freightos (June 2026) | 62% monthly increase; reflects June shipping rush. |
| ISM Mfg. Supplier Deliveries | 60.6 | ISM (May 2026) | Values >50 indicate slower deliveries; correlates 0.79 with GSCPI. |
| Strait of Hormuz Traffic | 57% of pre-war | WTO/AXSMarine (June 24) | Shows persistent physical disruption despite diplomatic efforts. |
| US Effective Tariff Rate | 11.8% | Wikipedia (April 2026) | Baseline tariff level before upcoming July 24 changes. |
The GSCPI is designed to represent supply chain stress in standard deviations from a historical mean of 0. Historically, the index remained relatively stable until the COVID-19 pandemic, where it reached an all-time high of 4.45 in December 2021. Conversely, it hit a record low of -1.58 in May 2023 during a period of global inventory destocking. The current 2026 surge is the most significant since the pandemic, driven by the ‘2026 Iran War’ and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in February/March 2026. Prior to this, the index had been near zero (0.28 in May 2025). The 2026 escalation mirrors patterns seen during the 2024 Red Sea crisis, but with higher intensity due to the direct involvement of energy-critical corridors. Additionally, the U.S. trade policy environment in 2026, including the Section 122 universal tariffs, echoes the high-tariff regimes of 2018-2019 but on a broader global scale.
My analysis identifies a critical tension between the economic reality of global logistics and the administrative rules of the forecast resolution.
Economically, the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index (GSCPI) is currently in a state of acute acceleration. After a jump from 0.68 in March to 1.82 in April 2026, the index eased only slightly to 1.77 in May. However, high-frequency data from June 2026 indicates a secondary surge. Container freight rates rose between 60% and 120% in the 30 days leading into July, and supplier delivery times reached their worst levels since August 2022. This is driven by a combination of physical chokepoints—specifically the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea diversions—and “panic” shipping as businesses rush to import goods before a universal 10% U.S. tariff is adjusted or renewed on July 24, 2026. This front-loading has absorbed roughly 2 million TEUs of global capacity, creating a synthetic peak in demand. I weighted these factors heavily, suggesting that if the July value is recorded, it will likely fall between 2.0 and 2.5 standard deviations.
Administratively, the resolution criteria specify that if the New York Fed has not published the July 2026 value by the resolution deadline, the value must resolve as 0. Multiple sources, including the New York Fed’s own calendar, confirm the July reading is scheduled for August 6, 2026—six days after the July 31 resolution timestamp provided in the task anchor. Historically, such forecasting questions often follow the mechanical fallback when dates do not align. I have therefore assigned a high probability to a resolution of exactly 0.
The resulting forecast is a “bimodal” distribution. The primary mass is centered at 0 to account for the mechanical resolution fallback. The secondary, broader mass reflects the underlying economic pressure, which I predict will remain at multi-year highs (approximately 2.10 SD) due to the compounding effects of maritime war, energy price shocks, and trade policy shifts. Even with a tentative peace memorandum regarding the Strait of Hormuz signed on June 14, the time required for mine clearance and naval normalization means these improvements will not materialize in the July data, which typically reflects conditions from the preceding four weeks.
Question: what will the New York Fed’s July 2026 Global Supply Chain Pressure Index (GSCPI) read? Forecasters note this is a short-horizon nowcast two months after the May reading (about +1.77 SD), so persistence is the dominant signal—recent diagnostics show high lag‑1 autocorrelation (~0.82) and small typical month‑to‑month volatility, which mechanically centers a July median near ~1.77 SD (ARIMA benchmark p50 ≈ 1.77; p25–p75 roughly 1.45–2.09). Timely indicators largely support continued above‑normal pressure: S&P Global PMIs show lengthened supplier delays/shortages, container rates and airfreight yields are strong, while the Baltic Dry Index has softened; major chokepoint risks (Middle East, Panama, Red Sea) remain mixed and could push outcomes either way. All teams therefore place most mass near the current elevated level (roughly 1.2–2.3) but explicitly allow a meaningful downside if June’s unreleased reading falls sharply and an upside if freight/geopolitical stress worsens. Publication failure is treated as a negligible tail (rule‑based fallback to 0), and very large extreme moves (below −2 or above +4) are considered small-tail risks. The consensus is to watch the June GSCPI release (July 6), July PMIs, and late‑July freight/chokepoint reports to decide whether the spring spike is persisting or unwinding.
Forecast: Probability distribution:
We are forecasting the New York Fed’s GSCPI for July 2026 as of 2026-07-01, with the latest cited published value being May 2026 = 1.77 (April 1.82). With only ~2 months between May conditions and the July reading, the key dynamic is short-horizon persistence vs. partial mean reversion: supply-chain pressure measures often decay after a shock, but typically not all the way back to 0 immediately unless the underlying disruption clearly resolves.
Across analysts, the median clusters around 1.4–1.6 SDs with a right-skewed tail to reflect potential renewed escalation (e.g., shipping lane disruptions, geopolitical shocks) and a thinner left tail reflecting the possibility of a faster-than-expected normalization (or demand-driven easing). I center the distribution at 1.50, with most mass in roughly 0.9–2.6, but keep a small (~1%) chance of a spike above 4.0, consistent with historical extreme episodes being possible though unlikely on such a short horizon.
An amateur forecast would likely (a) anchor tightly to the last reported value (~1.77) and understate volatility/mean reversion, or (b) assume rapid reversion toward 0 and understate persistence when disruptions are ongoing. This forecast improves by explicitly combining (i) near-term persistence (only a couple months ahead), (ii) typical post-shock mean reversion, and (iii) asymmetric tail risk (rare but plausible renewed shocks), producing a wider and better-calibrated interval rather than a single-point extrapolation.
Forecast rationale (numeric):
— Iteration 1 — The forecasts converge on a simple story: July 2026 GSCPI is likely to remain elevated but ease somewhat from May’s 1.77 reading, with a central expectation in the roughly 1.3–1.6 range.
Geopolitical shipping stress is the dominant driver.
The April–May spike is attributed to Middle East tensions and Strait of Hormuz-related disruption, which raised freight and logistics pressure.
There are signs of partial easing.
A sharp drop in crude oil prices during June is viewed as reducing transportation-cost pressure and suggesting the shock is no longer intensifying.
Supply-chain indicators remain somewhat tight.
Even with easing energy prices, PMI delivery-time measures and container/shipping conditions still point to lingering delays, implying the index should not return to normal immediately.
Effects are lagged.
Several rationales emphasize that supply-chain indices respond with a delay, so July could still reflect earlier disruption even if market conditions improved by late June.
— Iteration 2 — The overall reasoning points to a moderate decline in the New York Fed Global Supply Chain Pressure Index by July 2026, but still at an elevated positive level rather than near normalization.
A reasonable synthesis is that the GSCPI is likely to ease meaningfully from May’s spike, but stay elevated, with the most plausible July outcome in the low-to-mid 1s. The key uncertainty is whether easing energy costs and natural reversion dominate, or whether ongoing geopolitical and regional supply disruptions keep the index higher for longer.
— Iteration 3 — Across the forecasts, the dominant view is that the New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index for July 2026 will ease from the elevated May reading of 1.77, but remain clearly above zero.
The collective view is that July 2026’s GSCPI will likely be moderately lower than May’s 1.77, but still in elevated territory, with a central tendency around the low-1s to mid-1s. The forecast is driven by mean reversion and cheaper energy, offset by sticky supply-chain frictions and meaningful geopolitical upside risk.
Historical Context and Trajectory The rationales agree that the GSCPI spiked significantly in April 2026 due to severe geopolitical shocks—most notably disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and the Middle East—before easing slightly in May. While the index is historically mean-reverting, forecasters highlight that ongoing structural constraints will likely make the index “sticky,” preventing a rapid return to its historical average by July.
Upward Pressures (Supply Bottlenecks and Front-Loading) Analysts identify several converging factors keeping supply chain pressures high:
Downward Pressures (Cooling Demand and Raw Materials) Counterbalancing these upward forces are a few deflationary signals:
Methodological Dynamics The NY Fed’s GSCPI isolates pure supply shocks by mathematically filtering out demand surges using “New Orders” from PMI data. Multiple rationales emphasize a critical statistical quirk for July: as the tariff-driven demand boom abruptly drops but physical port congestion remains stubbornly high, the model will interpret the lingering delays as a severe, pure supply-side constraint. This dynamic could cause the index reading to remain artificially elevated, or even spike, despite a physical cooling in purchasing activity.
Conclusion Overall, the rationales anticipate a tug-of-war between unwinding consumer demand and entrenched physical shipping bottlenecks. While the fading of tariff-panic ordering and lower bulk shipping rates provide downward gravity, persistent port congestion, high freight rates, and the mathematical design of the index strongly suggest the GSCPI will remain in elevated territory for July.
Question: What will the New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index be for July 2026? Final Prediction: Probability distribution:
Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled
Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:
The research summarizes recent NY Fed Global Supply Chain Pressure Index (GSCPI) readings and drivers: April 2026 was 1.82 (highest since July 2022) and May 2026 was 1.77 (released June 5, 2026), with March at 0.68 and February at 0.55. The surge in supply-chain pressure in early 2026 is attributed primarily to the US-Israeli strikes on Iran starting February 28, 2026, Iran’s temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz (stranding roughly 1,150–2,000 ships), and a spike in oil from ~$65 to over $108/barrel; a 14-point peace memorandum signed mid–late June 2026 and a subsequent partial reopening of the Strait led to oil falling to ~$72–74/barrel and shipping resuming at reduced capacity (late-June daily crossings well below normal). Historical context notes the COVID-era peak of 4.47 (Dec 2021) and that the April–May 2026 readings are the highest in nearly four years but well below that peak.
For July 2026 (GSCPI released Aug 6, 2026), the research frames expectations around three scenarios and key uncertainties rather than a single point estimate. Optimistic: 1.0–1.3 if peace holds and shipping normalizes quickly; Base case: 1.3–1.6 reflecting gradual improvement and Citigroup’s warning of an 18+ month normalization with sectoral variation and infrastructure/logistics constraints; Pessimistic: 1.6–2.0+ if the peace deal falters or reopening is slow. Important caveats include the peace deal’s durability, Iran transit-fee proposals, unclear extent of infrastructure damage, and risk of secondary shocks; surveys and cost measures point to lingering elevated pressures, so a return to near-zero (historical average) by July 2026 is judged unlikely in this research.
Sources cited in the research (websites mentioned or relevant): https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/gscpi https://www.citigroup.com/ https://www.clevelandfed.org/ https://www.worldbank.org/ https://polymarket.com/ https://kalshi.com/ https://manifold.markets/ https://www.metaculus.com/
The most recent GSCPI readings show:
The index measures supply chain pressure in standard deviations from the historical average, where 0 = average pressure, positive values = above-average pressure, and negative values = below-average pressure [11].
Starting February 28, 2026, US-Israeli strikes on Iran triggered a major supply chain disruption [17][24]. Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz—a waterway carrying ~20% of global oil trade—stranding approximately 1,150-2,000 ships and causing oil prices to surge from $65 to over $108 per barrel [19][20][23][24].
The April-May 2026 readings (1.82-1.77) are comparable to late 2022 levels [3][4][6][7], representing the highest readings in nearly 4 years but still well below the COVID peak.
The index “remains nearly one standard deviation above pre-pandemic averages.” Specific sectors face different trajectories:
No active prediction markets found for the GSCPI specifically on major platforms (Polymarket, Kalshi, Manifold, Metaculus) [25-31]. These platforms focus primarily on political events, crypto, AGI timelines, and major geopolitical outcomes, but do not appear to have liquidity in economic indices like the GSCPI.
Based on historical recovery patterns and current conditions:
Optimistic scenario (rapid improvement): 1.0-1.3
Base case scenario (gradual improvement): 1.3-1.6
Pessimistic scenario (minimal improvement or deterioration): 1.6-2.0+
The July 2026 GSCPI will capture the immediate post-crisis period following the June peace agreement and Strait reopening. Historical patterns suggest gradual rather than immediate normalization. The May reading of 1.77 likely represents near-peak levels for this crisis, with July expected to show some improvement but remaining meaningfully elevated above the historical average (>1.0). Expert analysis consistently points to multi-month recovery timelines, making a return to normal (near-zero) levels by July 2026 highly unlikely.
All numbers below are conditional on the question not being annulled. I continue to include a tiny low-end mass for the rule that the answer resolves to 0 if the NY Fed does not publish the July 2026 value by the deadline.
I think the Round 5 critic’s push is valid in direction. My Round 4 adjustment probably moved a bit too far back toward mean reversion. The strongest point is that the post-May evidence is not just “Hormuz headlines”: late-June container-rate data are closer to actual GSCPI channels. Drewry’s June 25 assessment had the WCI up to $4,166/40ft, its highest since September 2024, with tight capacity and expectations that rates would rise further in coming weeks. That is meaningful new information not already contained in the May GSCPI print. (drewry.co.uk)
I also agree that the April-to-May decline from 1.82 to 1.77 is weak evidence of a peak. Reuters described May as still elevated around late-2022 levels, tied to Middle East disruption and factory input challenges. A five-hundredths downtick can easily be component noise, partial offset, or revision artifact rather than a real turning point. (uk.marketscreener.com)
That said, I still want to avoid simply centering above May. The GSCPI is broad and demand-adjusted: it combines transportation costs, BDI/Harpex/airfreight, and PMI delivery-time/backlog/purchased-stock components across seven major economies, then extracts a common factor after attempting to purge demand effects. This attenuates any one chokepoint story and means tanker/Hormuz narratives should not be mapped one-for-one into the index. (newyorkfed.org)
My new synthesis is: July is likely sticky near May, with a slight upward skew, but not enough to make a major new high the base case. The unknown June print is still the key missing datum. If June prints above 2.0, July below 1.5 becomes unlikely; if June is near 1.6–1.7 and July freight/PMI components ease, the normalizing path remains live. I now put the median at 1.75, slightly below the critic’s 1.78 but above my Round 4 1.70. I also keep the right tail fat because July could reflect lagged June disruption, front-loading, peak-season capacity constraints, and insurance/routing caution. The NY Fed calendar lists the July GSCPI release for August 6, 2026 at 10:00 ET, so publication-failure mass remains very small. (newyorkfed.org)
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 0.03
Percentile 1: 0.46
Percentile 5: 0.78
Percentile 10: 0.98
Percentile 20: 1.23
Percentile 30: 1.42
Percentile 40: 1.59
Percentile 50: 1.75
Percentile 60: 1.92
Percentile 70: 2.12
Percentile 80: 2.36
Percentile 90: 2.72
Percentile 95: 3.05
Percentile 99: 3.68
Percentile 99.9: 4.25
I accept the Round 5 critic’s main correction: I was still a little too anchored to the visible “supply-chain stress” narrative. The GSCPI’s construction matters: it combines PMI delivery/backlog/purchased-stock components and transportation-cost variables, and the NY Fed methodology tries to purge demand effects from both PMI and transport-cost series before extracting the common component. So frontloading, tariff timing, and peak-season demand should not be treated as one-for-one inputs to the July GSCPI. (libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org)
The hard anchor is still high, though: the latest available value is May 2026 = 1.769, down only slightly from April = 1.823, after March was 0.676 and February 0.546. This argues against a rapid return near zero by July, but also implies April/May already captured a very stressed regime without breaking 2. (ycharts.com) The August 2026 NY Fed calendar lists the GSCPI release for August 6 at 10:00 ET, so the fallback-to-0 nonpublication scenario remains a small tail rather than a central consideration. (newyorkfed.org)
I also agree with trimming the >3 tail. Freight and air data are still supply-pressure-positive—BLS reported May import air freight prices up 18.8% m/m and export air freight up 4.3% m/m, with June import/export price data not due until July 17, underscoring timing/revision uncertainty. (bls.gov) Freightos’ June 30 update is also mixed in the right way for this forecast: ocean rates were very high and port congestion was reducing available capacity, but Freightos explicitly noted frontloading/BAF/tariff timing as drivers and said an early peak-season unwind could occur in July. (freightos.com)
My updated synthesis: July is more likely below May than above it, but not by much. The reopening/normalization and demand-adjustment arguments pull the median down; sticky delivery delays, lagged airfreight, congestion, and PMI components keep the forecast well above normal. I am moving down from 1.73 to 1.67, with more mass in 1.1–1.5 and less above 3.0. I still leave a meaningful upper tail for renewed incidents, insurance/routing friction, or broad PMI deterioration.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: -0.75
Percentile 1: 0.07
Percentile 5: 0.57
Percentile 10: 0.85
Percentile 20: 1.13
Percentile 30: 1.33
Percentile 40: 1.50
Percentile 50: 1.67
Percentile 60: 1.83
Percentile 70: 2.01
Percentile 80: 2.23
Percentile 90: 2.51
Percentile 95: 2.78
Percentile 99: 3.30
Percentile 99.9: 4.02
Modal: 1-1.8 (39.5%) • frontier aggregate • 7m48s
Resolution sources/checks:
Edge cases:
frontier_1 - Modal: 1.8-2.5 (36.6%)
frontier_2 - Modal: 1-1.8 (51.0%)
frontier_3 - Modal: 1.8-2.5 (45.6%)
frontier_4 - Modal: 1-1.8 (38.6%)
frontier_5 - Modal: 1-1.8 (57.1%)
Material notes
Guidance
Revision
| Bin | Probability |
|---|---|
| Below -2 | 0.1% |
| -2–1.3 | 0.5% |
| -1.3–0.5 | 0.7% |
| -0.5-0.3 | 1.3% |
| 0.3-1 | 7.5% |
| 1-1.8 | 39.5% |
| 1.8-2.5 | 37.1% |
| 2.5-3.3 | 11.1% |
| 3.3-4 | 2.1% |
| Above 4 | 0.1% |
wooley_rhino • run bdc71dcc • $3.09 • 7m48s
The GSCPI is a standardized, mean-zero index with high persistence, so shocks unwind slowly.
Long-run anchoring toward zero constrains extremes, but prior large departures remain influential for months.
Current transport inputs show elevated container and airfreight pressure while dry-bulk and fuel costs have eased.
Manufacturing surveys report meaningful supplier-delivery deterioration across major economies, sustaining upward pressure.
A July print near 1.74 standard deviations is consistent if container and airfreight momentum persists and survey lags keep delivery times long.
Rapid normalization of Baltic dry rates, sharp fuel declines, or immediate reopening of major chokepoints would pull the index materially lower.
The outcome is sensitive to the June intermediate release and any revisions to component series reported before the July aggregation.
Geopolitical escalation, late-month shipping incidents, or faster-than-expected easing of port congestion are the largest residual uncertainties.
Forecast: median = 1.6809 SDs
The New York Fed says the GSCPI integrates transportation-cost data and manufacturing indicators and is updated on the fourth business day of each month. It uses shipping-cost data plus PMI delivery times, backlogs, and purchased-stocks data across China, the euro area, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (newyorkfed.org)
The starting point is an elevated level. Reuters reported the official May 2026 GSCPI at 1.77, only slightly below April’s 1.82, after March had already jumped to 0.68 from 0.54 in February. In the New York Fed’s own May 11 analysis, the bank said the index had risen by about 1.3 points over the two months since the Middle East conflict began, to about 1.8 standard deviations above average, with the increase driven predominantly by longer delivery times and larger order backlogs. (investing.com)
For July 2026, I expect some easing relative to May, mainly because transport conditions began improving in June. Reuters reported that crude shipments through the Strait of Hormuz had risen to the highest level since the conflict began, and oil prices fell as more tankers resumed transits. But Reuters also reported that shippers expected confidence to take weeks to rebuild and that a return to full pre-conflict volumes could take months, with some analysts saying it is more a 2027 story than a 2026 story. That combination argues for easing, but not normalization. (au.investing.com)
June PMI evidence points the same way: pressures are still real, but the direction in Europe looks better. Official S&P Global eurozone flash data said manufacturers continued to report substantial lengthening of suppliers’ delivery times in June, but this was the least pronounced deterioration since March; importantly, most responses were collected before the June 17 memorandum of understanding for a cessation of hostilities. Reuters also reported that UK supplier delivery times lengthened by the smallest amount since February, and that euro area delivery-time data showed signs of relief even while the Middle East conflict still cast a shadow over supply chains. This makes it likely that July data, which will capture more of the post-ceasefire period than June flash data did, will be lower than the May reading. (pmi.spglobal.com)
I do not expect a collapse, however, because manufacturing demand and precautionary stockbuilding are still strong. Reuters said U.S. manufacturers in late June were preemptively placing orders ahead of expected shortages and higher prices, while the official eurozone flash PMI said manufacturing was benefiting from inventory building as customers front-ran price rises and supply fears. Reuters also reported that the AI boom kept Asian manufacturing firm in June and that supply shortages and shipping delays continued to lengthen lead times; China returned to expansion in the official June PMI, Japan’s PMI rose to 54.8, and South Korea stayed expansionary at 52.1. Freightos likewise reported an early peak season, sharp June rate increases, and Red Sea diversions that were still extending lead times. (investing.com)
A useful base-rate check is the 2022 episode: the New York Fed noted that after the spring 2022 bump, the GSCPI then fell for five consecutive months, reaching 0.9 by September 2022. That history suggests post-shock mean reversion can be meaningful over a 2-3 month horizon. Today’s shock is smaller than the pandemic peak and there is already some de-escalation, but unlike 2022 there is an added AI-investment and front-loading component that should slow the decline. (libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org)
So my forecast is a four-scenario mixture: 49.9% gradual easing with July around 1.35; 25.0% sticky elevation around 1.70; 15.0% faster normalization around 0.85; 10.0% renewed escalation around 2.30; plus a 0.1% point mass at 0 for the small chance the July figure is not published by the deadline. That mixture has an expected value of about 1.45615. In words, I think the most likely outcome is that July remains clearly above zero and still elevated, but below the 1.77 May reading because July should reflect more post-ceasefire healing than June data did, while peak-season shipping pressure and AI-related stockbuilding keep the index from falling quickly. (pmi.spglobal.com)
As of Wednesday, July 1, 2026, the latest released GSCPI reading is May 2026 at 1.77, down slightly from 1.82 in April. The New York Fed says the GSCPI is updated on the fourth business day of each month, and its official calendars list the June 2026 release for July 6, 2026 and the July 2026 release for August 6, 2026. That means this forecast is being made before the June reading is released and about five weeks before the July reading resolves. (newyorkfed.org)
Methodologically, the GSCPI is a standardized index of global supply-chain stress built from transportation-cost data and manufacturing-survey indicators across seven economies, so the best near-term forecast inputs are current freight indicators and current supplier-delivery / shortages data rather than broad macro growth alone. The New York Fed notes that the measure is expressed in standard deviations from its historical average, with positive values meaning above-average pressure. (newyorkfed.org)
The near-term signal from the manufacturing side remains clearly elevated. ISM’s May 2026 manufacturing report said the Supplier Deliveries Index was 60.6, matching April and marking its highest reading since May 2022, which indicates slower deliveries. S&P Global’s June 5 analysis of May global manufacturing data said supply shortages were at their highest since November 2022 and average supplier delivery times in April and May lengthened by the greatest extents since mid-2022. GEP’s June 2026 Global Supply Chain Volatility Index likewise said safety stockpiling hit its highest level in over three years, transportation costs had been elevated for three straight months, North American pressures were the highest since August 2022, and Asia remained under the greatest strain. Flash June eurozone PMI data still showed sharply lengthened suppliers’ delivery times, and S&P Global’s PMI site shows U.S. manufacturing PMI at 55.7 for June, consistent with continued strong goods activity rather than a sudden collapse in pressure. (ismworld.org)
The transport side also argues against a quick return toward normal. Reuters reported on June 10 that Asia-U.S. container spot rates had roughly doubled since the start of the war, with Shanghai-Los Angeles at 4565 dollars per 40-foot container and Shanghai-New York at 5505 dollars on the latest Drewry data. S&P Global Ratings said the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index had risen to 2985 on June 12 from 1333 on February 27, more than doubling pre-conflict levels, with peak-season surcharges and general rate increases planned through July. At the same time, I do not want to over-extrapolate toward a 2021-style extreme: S&P Global’s commodity analysis noted that even if the strait reopens, disruptions can persist for months because ships and inventories are out of position, but it also framed reopening as an expected baseline rather than an impossible tail event, and S&P Ratings expects structural oversupply in containers later in 2026 to reassert downward pressure beyond the immediate surge. That combination points to a July reading that is still high, likely above the May level, but not necessarily exploding toward the pandemic peak. (marketscreener.com)
My forecast is therefore a four-scenario mixture. I use 20% probability on partial easing by July with a mean around 1.25, 45% on elevated-but-stable pressure around 1.85, 30% on a renewed rise to a new local high around 2.20, and 5% on a larger escalation around 3.00. This produces a distribution mean of 1.8925, so my practical point forecast is about 1.89. In words: the modal outcome is that July 2026 stays in the same stressed regime as April-May, with somewhat greater odds of moving higher than of snapping back toward zero. I assign only a very small implicit probability to the special resolve-as-0 fallback, because the product has been published monthly since 2022 and both the July and August 2026 calendars already list the scheduled releases. (newyorkfed.org)
Today is July 1, 2026. The June 2026 GSCPI has not yet been released: the New York Fed says the index is updated on the fourth business day of each month, the July 2026 calendar lists the next release on July 6, 2026, and the August 2026 calendar lists the July 2026 reading for August 6, 2026. The official page also notes that the index is measured in standard deviations from its historical average. (newyorkfed.org)
Methodologically, GSCPI is a common factor extracted from 27 demand-cleansed variables: PMI delivery times, backlogs, and purchased-stocks measures across China, the euro area, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the U.K., and the U.S., plus global shipping and BLS airfreight price measures. That matters because the best July forecast should lean on current transport-cost and supplier-delay evidence, not just on the last GSCPI print. (newyorkfed.org)
As of July 1, the latest public reading is May 2026 at 1.769, down slightly from 1.823 in April but still near the highest level since mid-2022. Recent transport data remained hot: BLS reported that in May 2026 import air freight from Asia rose 32.3% month over month, inbound air freight from Asia rose 21.2%, and overall import air freight rose 18.8%. Those series are directly relevant because BLS airfreight indexes are among the transport inputs used in GSCPI. (ycharts.com)
Survey evidence also argues against a quick snap-back. S&P Global wrote that its May global manufacturing commentary showed the PMI Global Supply Shortages Index at its highest since November 2022, and that supplier delivery times in April and May lengthened to the greatest extents since mid-2022 as shipping was disrupted by the Hormuz shock. On June 23, S&P Global’s flash eurozone PMI still reported sharply lengthened suppliers’ delivery times, though price pressures were softer and most responses were collected before the June 17 U.S.-Iran cessation-of-hostilities memorandum. S&P Global’s PMI homepage also showed the U.S. manufacturing PMI at 55.7 in June, unchanged, suggesting demand remained firm rather than collapsing. (spglobal.com)
The main bearish factor is partial normalization: the eurozone flash release indicates softer input-cost and output-price pressure in June, and the June 17 memorandum plausibly reduces the odds of a July reading that keeps climbing. The main bullish factor is persistence: S&P Global noted in March that the war had effectively killed expectations of a second-half-2026 return to Suez for key Asia-Europe and Asia-U.S. East Coast lanes, which argues that rerouting, longer transit times, and backlog effects may linger well into July. My inference is that July should be lower than the worst late-spring stress readings more often than not, but still clearly above zero and usually above 1.0. (pmi.spglobal.com)
My quantitative prior is mean reversion from the May level of 1.769 over two months, but I shift that prior upward because current transport and PMI inputs are still unusually stressed. I therefore center the distribution at about 1.62, with most mass between roughly 1.0 and 2.3 and a right tail for renewed disruption. I also include a very small 0.2% point-mass at 0.00 for the special resolution rule in the unlikely event the July value is not published by the deadline; that probability is tiny because the series is routinely released monthly and the August 6, 2026 release is already on the New York Fed calendar. (newyorkfed.org)
The July 2026 GSCPI will be the July monthly reading published by the New York Fed. The Fed says the index is updated at or shortly after 10:00 a.m. on the fourth business day of each month, and the New York Fed’s August 2026 calendar lists the GSCPI release on August 6, 2026. The index is a standardized measure of supply-chain stress built from transportation data including the Baltic Dry Index, Harpex, and BLS airfreight indices, plus PMI-based manufacturing indicators across China, the euro area, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (newyorkfed.org)
The recent level is already elevated. Historical values sourced from the New York Fed series show 0.4393 in January 2026, 0.5456 in February, 0.6761 in March, 1.823 in April, and 1.769 in May. Reuters described the April jump as the highest reading since July 2022 and said May remained elevated because of Middle East-related disruptions. The next release, for June 2026, is scheduled for July 6, 2026, so on July 1 the latest settled official value is still May. (ycharts.com)
My baseline is that July remains high rather than snapping back toward zero. Global PMI evidence through late June still points to unusual shortages and delayed deliveries: S&P Global said reported supply shortages in May were at the highest level since November 2022 and that supplier delivery times in April and May lengthened by the greatest extents since mid-2022. In June flash data, Japan still showed some of the steepest lead-time lengthening in its PMI history, although the June incidence was the least pronounced since March; the euro area and UK also still referenced war-related supply fears and delays, even as some June price-pressure indicators moderated. GEP’s June volatility release additionally said safety stockpiling hit the highest level in over three years. (spglobal.com)
The main upside reason is transport stress. Reuters reported on June 10 that Asia-U.S. container shipping costs had roughly doubled since the start of the Iran war, and Drewry’s World Container Index reached $4,166 per 40-foot container on June 25, a 22-month high. That argues against a quick normalization in the GSCPI’s transport-sensitive components and supports a July print at least around May’s level. (marketscreener.com)
The main downside reason is that not every transport indicator is moving the same way. The Baltic Dry Index weakened late in June: TradingEconomics reported 2,524 on June 26, and a Reuters-covered market note showed only a small rebound to 2,659 after a two-month low. June macro data also were not uniformly stress-inducing: China’s official manufacturing PMI returned only modestly to expansion at 50.3 in June, suggesting some support from export demand rather than a broader collapse in factory activity, and some June flash PMI commentary hinted that the worst delivery-time pressure may have passed in a few regions. (tradingeconomics.com)
Putting this together, I expect a high but roughly plateauing July reading: a touch above May because container stress and stockpiling remained intense into late June, but not a large new spike because dry-bulk conditions eased and some PMI delivery metrics stopped worsening. My point estimate is 1.82055. I encode the forecast as a mixture distribution with 18.0% probability of partial normalization centered near 1.20, 52.0% probability of a plateau centered near 1.78, 25.0% probability of renewed re-acceleration centered near 2.18, 4.7% probability of a more severe July spike centered near 2.85, and a 0.3% point mass at 0 for the low-probability nonpublication contingency in the resolution rules. This yields a right-skewed forecast with most mass in the broad 1.3 to 2.4 region. (newyorkfed.org)
I am forecasting the New York Fed’s July 2026 Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, which the Fed says is updated on the fourth business day of each month; the New York Fed’s July 2026 calendar shows the June reading due on July 6, 2026, and the same calendar system lists the July reading for August 6, 2026. The index combines transportation-cost data and manufacturing-survey indicators across seven economies. As of today, July 1, 2026, the latest official reading available is May 2026 at 1.77, down slightly from 1.82 in April; Reuters also reported that March was 0.68, so the spring jump in pressure was very large and May remained near late-2022 stress levels. (newyorkfed.org)
The main reason I am not forecasting a fast return toward zero is that the shipping shock still looks materially unresolved. The IEA’s Middle East Maritime Chokepoints Shipping Monitor says the regional war began on February 28, 2026, and was still affecting shipping flows as of its June 24, 2026 update. S&P Global wrote in early June that reported global supply shortages had climbed to the highest level in three and a half years and that supplier delivery times in April and May lengthened to the greatest extents since mid-2022. Separate S&P and Xeneta updates also pointed to sharply higher freight stress, with the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index more than doubling from late February to mid-June and further rate increases expected in mid-June. (iea.org)
June PMI evidence is mixed, which matters because the July GSCPI will depend on July transportation and manufacturing conditions rather than only the already-published May figure. On the hawkish side for GSCPI, Reuters reported that U.S. supplier delivery times in the June flash PMI lengthened to the worst since August 2022, and Japan reported that supplier shortages and shipping delays lengthened lead times. On the softer side, Reuters reported that euro area June data showed some easing in delivery times, UK June data showed the smallest supplier-delay deterioration since February, and China’s official June factory PMI returned to expansion. My read is that this combination argues for July remaining clearly above average, but with a meaningful chance that June/July is a plateau rather than the start of another vertical leg up. (marketscreener.com)
I therefore use a judgmental three-scenario mixture. Scenario 1 is partial relief: ceasefire effects, some normalization in European and UK delivery times, and resistance to further July rate hikes pull the index down but still leave it elevated; I center that at 1.40 with 32% probability. Scenario 2 is sticky high pressure: shipping rerouting, inventory rebuilding, and peak-season congestion keep the index close to current levels; I center that at 1.85 with 48% probability. Scenario 3 is renewed escalation: freight and supplier delays worsen again during July and the index revisits clearly higher 2022-like territory; I center that at 2.55 with 19.5% probability. I also include a 0.5% point mass at 0.0 for the special resolution rule if the July value is not published by the deadline; that probability is very small because the New York Fed has published the product monthly since 2022 and already lists the August 6 release date. The resulting mean forecast is 1.83325, and the distribution is intentionally right-skewed because upside stress can reappear faster than global logistics can normalize. (newyorkfed.org)