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The question asks for the IMF PortWatch seven‑day mean of Strait of Hormuz total transit calls (n_total) for 2026-06-29 through 2026-07-05, resolved from the official ArcGIS PortWatch layer as of 2026-07-12. Forecasters agree the official PortWatch rows (which lagged to June 23 as of June 29) are the binding data source and likely determine the outcome, but they disagree on how much weight to give recent private-AIS/maritime-intel rebounds reported after June 21. All teams place most mass on a volatile partial-reopening regime rather than full normalization or persistent near-zero traffic: blended model outputs center around a median in the high 30s–low 40s transits/day with quantiles roughly p05≈5, p25≈20, p50≈40, p75≈65, p90≈80. Key contextual drivers supporting that view are private counts showing sharp late‑June rebounds (e.g., reports of 44–78 daily transits), simultaneous renewed attacks/route disputes and high insurance costs that could cause daily volatility, and historical analogues where shipping adapts but rarely returns instantly to pre-crisis norms. Practical guidance emphasized by teams: prioritize the official PortWatch rows when they post, monitor day‑by‑day counts (a few extreme days will sway the seven‑day mean), and check inbound vs outbound flows to judge persistence versus one‑time backlog clearances.
Forecast: Probability distribution:
We are forecasting the IMF Portwatch “Total” vessel transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz, averaged over the 7 days from June 29 to July 5, 2026 (inclusive). The main uncertainty is the security/regulatory regime during this exact week: in the analysts’ material, late June shows (i) very low Portwatch-reported levels earlier in June (e.g., ~18 total over June 8–14 ≈ 2.6/day), (ii) a material rebound by around June 21 (Forecaster 2 cites Portwatch 7-day MA ~13.1), and (iii) large spikes reported by non-Portwatch trackers and press (e.g., a day reported around 78 on June 24; ~44 on June 28), alongside renewed volatility/escalation risk (late June).
The four forecasts split into two clusters:
I treat the week as a mixture of regimes rather than a smooth extrapolation: there is a meaningful chance of a sharp suppression (single digits) if risk spikes, but also a substantial chance that flows remain in the tens per day if limited safe-passage persists. I downweight Forecaster 4’s tight concentration around ~3 because it implicitly assumes a near-complete collapse for most of the week despite multiple signals of a late-June rebound; however, I keep a pronounced lower tail to represent genuine “re-closure” risk. I also temper Forecaster 3’s higher median because Portwatch can run lower than headline tracker counts during AIS disruption.
Net result: a median in the low-to-mid 30s, with a wide interval spanning from low-single-digits to near-normal (high double-digits) outcomes.
An amateur forecast is likely to anchor on a single salient reference point (either the early-June near-closure numbers or the late-June spike headlines) and produce an overconfident narrow range. My forecast instead (1) conditions on the Portwatch-specific measurement issue highlighted by multiple analysts, (2) uses a scenario-mixture to represent abrupt geopolitical regime shifts during the exact week, and (3) keeps a wider, better-calibrated spread while still locating the center between the competing analyst clusters. Confidence is moderate because the dominant driver is short-horizon conflict dynamics.
Forecast rationale (numeric):
— Iteration 1 — Across the forecasts, the main reasoning is highly consistent:
Overall, the collective reasoning points to a stable, cautious near-term average around the low-40s, with limited probability of a move into the 60+ range.
— Iteration 2 — The forecasts converge on a partial recovery in ship transits, but still well below normal levels for the week of June 29 to July 5. The central expectation is a 7-day moving average in the low-to-mid 40s, with most of the probability mass below 60 transits per day.
— Iteration 3 — The forecasts largely converge on a low-40s 7-day moving average for June 29 to July 5, 2026, with the reasoning built around a few shared pillars:
The collective view is that the Strait of Hormuz remains in a post-disruption recovery phase, with traffic likely to stay roughly around 41–44 transits per day on average for that week. The main disagreement is only on the exact center point, not the broader shape of the forecast: slight recovery is expected, but large swings in either direction remain possible, and a break above 60 is considered unlikely.
Historical and Geopolitical Context Prior to the early-2026 conflict, Strait of Hormuz traffic averaged roughly 100 or more daily transits. Since the onset of hostilities, this baseline has collapsed, routinely dropping to the low single digits. A fragile mid-June ceasefire prompted a brief surge as vessels attempted to clear a massive backlog, but renewed drone and missile strikes over the late-June weekend quickly shattered this recovery. While a fresh “stand-down” and emergency diplomatic talks in Doha offer a potential path to de-escalation, severe risk aversion, suspended international naval escorts, and skyrocketing war-risk insurance premiums are expected to heavily suppress commercial movement during the target week.
Methodological Limitations of IMF PortWatch A crucial driver of the forecast is the resolution metric’s reliance on IMF PortWatch, which tracks vessels exclusively via Automatic Identification System (AIS) satellite signals. Due to the high-threat environment, active military targeting, and GPS spoofing, a substantial portion of vessels are navigating “dark” with their transponders intentionally turned off. Consequently, even if physical traffic begins to flow, PortWatch will systematically and severely undercount the actual number of transits.
Structural and Logistical Constraints Even in optimistic scenarios where the ceasefire holds and the massive backlog of trapped vessels begins to move, daily traffic faces hard physical ceilings. Bottlenecks such as uncleared sea mines, the strict necessity for single-file military escorts, and challenging monsoon weather patterns in the Arabian Sea will limit the maximum capacity of the Strait. Furthermore, historical maritime recoveries show that shipowners resume operations in a delayed, gradual trickle rather than an immediate surge. Because the target week begins with deeply depressed transit numbers following the late-June escalation, the resulting 7-day average will be mathematically anchored to these lows, reflecting a highly cautious and mechanically constrained operational environment.
Question: What will be the 7-day moving average of ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz for the week of June 29 to July 5, 2026? Final Prediction: Probability distribution:
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Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:
The research states that, as of June 29, 2026, ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz remain extremely volatile following a US–Iran conflict that effectively closed the strait for months and a fragile peace memorandum signed June 14–15. After an initial recovery phase (June 15–24) that saw daily counts rise to a peak reported at 62–78 ships on June 24, transits collapsed over June 24–29 to roughly 13 ships/day (with reported short-term ranges of ~13–31 ships/day and daily counts of 58 → 24 → 12 over three days). Historical baselines cited are 100–138 ships/day pre-conflict (2025–Feb 2026) and under 10 ships/day during the core conflict (March 1–June 14); commercial maritime intelligence firms (Kpler, AXSMarine, Windward, S&P Global) provide the day-by-day figures referenced.
The research characterizes the current navigation environment as a “confused, two-tier system” (Iran-controlled northern route and US/Oman-protected southern route), with large downside risks (renewed hostilities, mine hazards, insurance and operator avoidance) and upside pressures (pent-up demand, sanction waivers, resumed talks). Quantitative anchors presented: pessimistic 10–20 ships/day, base 20–35 ships/day, optimistic 35–50 ships/day, and very optimistic 50–70 ships/day; experts in mid-June had projected ~40 ships/day (50% of pre-war) within 30 days, but the June 24 peak appears to have been short-lived. The research notes primary data sources are commercial maritime intelligence providers and references IMF Portwatch’s “Vessel Transits” dashboard although specific IMF Portwatch transit numbers were not located in the research.
Sources used (as cited in the research):
You’re forecasting during an extremely volatile period. A US-Iran conflict that began February 28, 2026 (“Operation Epic Fury”) effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz for months. A peace memorandum was signed June 14-15, 2026, but the recovery has been fragile and marked by renewed violence in the past week [1][7][9].
Last 48-72 Hours (June 26-29):
Competing Navigation Regimes: The strait now operates as a “confused, two-tier system” [9]:
Expert Projections (made mid-June):
Actual Performance:
Kalshi (as of June 15, 2026): [16]
Market liquidity/volume: Not disclosed in available sources, but Kalshi is a CFTC-regulated prediction market with real-money trading, suggesting reasonable reliability.
Downside Risks:
Upside Factors:
Based on historical patterns from similar ceasefire-disruption cycles:
Key consideration: You’re forecasting just 14 days after the peace agreement, during a period of renewed violence. The June 24 peak of 62-78 ships appears to have been a false dawn, with traffic collapsing 80-90% in subsequent days [9].
The resolution source is IMF Portwatch’s “Vessel Transits” dashboard. While I found references to IMF Portwatch tracking Strait of Hormuz disruptions [14], I did not locate specific current transit numbers from that platform in my search. The data above comes primarily from commercial maritime intelligence firms (Kpler, AXSMarine, Windward) that may use different methodologies than IMF Portwatch. You should verify if IMF Portwatch’s numbers align with these commercial sources.
The 7-day moving average you’re forecasting will capture the immediate aftermath of renewed hostilities. The strait has shown:
The week ahead depends critically on whether peace talks prevent further escalation. Historical precedent from this conflict shows traffic can swing dramatically (10x) within days based on security perceptions.
Conditioned on non-annulment, I mostly accept the Round 5 Critic’s adjustment. The strongest point is lower-tail calibration: the directly relevant Polymarket market resolves on IMF PortWatch total transit calls for the same June 29–July 5 period, includes the same broad vessel classes, and shows 150+ weekly transits at 87% with about $12.7k volume. Since 150/week is only 21.43/day, this argues that my previous lower tail below ~21/day should be trimmed, though not eliminated given limited liquidity and possible trader/model herding. (polymarket.com)
I also agree with trimming the extreme upper tail. A week averaging above 100/day would require 700+ PortWatch transit calls, i.e. a rapid return near normal despite fresh attacks, route confusion, insurance caution, and a likely weak start. The PortWatch-linked historical mirror gives a long-run average of 85.42/day and a historical max of 138/day, while showing the latest available official value at 5/day on June 21 after 23/day on June 20. That does not prove the target week will be low, but it makes a >100/day weekly average look sub-1% rather than ~1%+. (hiddenmetrix.com)
I still defend not moving the median too high. The resolving variable is IMF/ArcGIS n_total, not oil barrels or tanker-only flow, and the official layer indeed contains n_total alongside vessel-type fields. But the week begins in a messy post-attack environment: Al-Monitor reported a weekend drop from 38 ships Saturday to 22 Sunday in Kpler data, while Axios emphasized that the June 24 surge may have partly been an outbound backlog burst rather than normal two-way reopening. (services9.arcgis.com)
The new bullish counterweight I would add is that all-vessel/security-source signals are not as bearish as commodity-only counts. PortNews reports JMIC/UKMTO raising the threat level to SUBSTANTIAL, but also says JMIC listed 125 vessel transits over the previous 48 hours, with both southern and northern routes in use and AIS-on instructions under temporary routing measures. I do not map that directly to PortWatch—methodologies differ—but it supports shifting some mass from the very-low tail into the 30–55/day band. (en.portnews.ru)
My final mixture is roughly:
Net update: I raise the 10th–20th percentiles, keep the median around 35/day, and reduce the far upper tail versus Round 4.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 1.6
Percentile 1: 4.8
Percentile 5: 11.0
Percentile 10: 17.6
Percentile 20: 25.0
Percentile 30: 29.0
Percentile 40: 32.2
Percentile 50: 34.8
Percentile 60: 39.2
Percentile 70: 44.8
Percentile 80: 52.0
Percentile 90: 63.5
Percentile 95: 74.0
Percentile 99: 95.0
Percentile 99.9: 118.0
Conditioning on non-annulment: I am forecasting the numerical IMF PortWatch / n_total resolving value, not true physical traffic.
I agree with the critic’s main point that my Round 3 distribution was a bit too focused on the Oman/southern-route slowdown. The resolving metric is total Strait of Hormuz transits as PortWatch classifies them, and ships using Iran-approved routes can still count. Arab News/AFP reports that although Omani-route use was very limited by June 29, ships continued crossing via Iran-approved routes, inbound flow was relatively stable, and some totals may rise retrospectively as crossings are identified. (arabnews.com)
I also now put a bit more weight on AIS-on / escorted-route capture. PortWatch’s recent low data still matters: the PortWatch-linked series had June 15–21 values of 6, 11, 12, 16, 19, 23, 5, with latest value 5 on June 21, and the official ArcGIS layer exposes the relevant n_total field. (hiddenmetrix.com) But the undercount is not a constant: temporary routing instructions reportedly tell vessels to keep AIS on, and JMIC/UKMTO reporting also indicates traffic is using both the Omani and Iranian-controlled routes. (en.portnews.ru)
I still defend keeping the median only in the low 20s, not pushing toward the 30s. The week begins immediately after two vessel attacks, elevated mine risk, and a visible weekend slowdown; S&P’s broader framework emphasizes that repeated short “open” windows followed by attacks have created a credibility gap and a behavioral drag among shipowners, charterers, and insurers. (spglobal.com) The 7-day average also limits the upside: one or two convoy/backlog days can push the average into the high 30s or 40s, but a mean above ~60 requires sustained high, visible, PortWatch-captured traffic after a weak June 29 start.
The main upward pressure is that energy flows are not stopping: Reuters/gCaptain reports continued oil and LNG loading activity, some VLCCs entering or exiting, and traffic remaining far below pre-conflict levels but not halted. (gcaptain.com) Net: I make a small upward revision from Round 3 in the median and upper-middle tail, while keeping the left tail and trimming extreme normalization scenarios.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 0.45
Percentile 1: 1.5
Percentile 5: 4.4
Percentile 10: 7.1
Percentile 20: 11.4
Percentile 30: 14.9
Percentile 40: 18.2
Percentile 50: 21.7
Percentile 60: 25.9
Percentile 70: 31.3
Percentile 80: 38.0
Percentile 90: 49.0
Percentile 95: 58.0
Percentile 99: 81.0
Percentile 99.9: 107.0
Modal: 0-19 (48.2%) • frontier aggregate • 4m43s
Resolution sources/checks:
Edge cases:
frontier_1 - Modal: 0-19 (48.0%)
frontier_2 - Modal: 38-56 (28.0%)
frontier_3 - Modal: 0-19 (81.0%)
frontier_4 (revised) - Modal: 0-19 (75.0%)
Material notes
Guidance
Revision
| Bin | Probability |
|---|---|
| Below 0 | 0.1% |
| 0-19 | 48.2% |
| 19-38 | 23.5% |
| 38-56 | 13.5% |
| 56-75 | 7.6% |
| 75-94 | 3.8% |
| 94-113 | 1.6% |
| 113-131 | 0.8% |
| 131-150 | 0.5% |
| Above 150 | 0.4% |
wooley_rhino • run 36637571 • $2.82 • 4m43s
Extracted Percentile Values: {0.1: 2, 1.0: 5, 5.0: 9, 10.0: 12, 15.0: 15, 20.0: 17, 25.0: 19, 30.0: 21, 35.0: 23, 40.0: 24, 45.0: 26, 46.0: 26.5, 47.0: 27, 48.0: 27.5, 49.0: 28, 50.0: 28.5, 51.0: 29, 52.0: 29.5, 53.0: 30, 54.0: 31, 55.0: 32, 60.0: 35, 65.0: 38, 70.0: 42, 75.0: 46, 80.0: 51, 85.0: 56, 90.0: 62, 95.0: 72, 99.0: 92, 99.9: 120}
Model’s Answer:
The question asks for the simple arithmetic mean of daily “Total” transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz over June 29 to July 5, 2026, based on IMF Portwatch data.
Pre-war baseline: 100-140 vessels per day transiting the strait under normal conditions.
Conflict impact: Starting in late February 2026, traffic collapsed to approximately 5-10% of pre-war levels.
Most recent confirmed IMF Portwatch data:
Post-deal recovery indicators (various sources):
Recent disruptions impacting the forecast window:
Assumption 1: IMF Portwatch will publish usable data by July 12
Assumption 2: Security incidents won’t cause complete closure
Assumption 3: Recovery trajectory continues despite incidents
Low outcome scenario (7-day MA: 5-15):
Base case scenario (7-day MA: 18-35):
High outcome scenario (7-day MA: 40-65):
Very high outcome (7-day MA: 70+):
The most recent authoritative data point shows the 7-day MA at 13.14 as of June 21. Since then, there was a brief spike (62-70 daily transits on June 24-25) followed by a sharp pullback after the June 26 attack. The June 29 attack will likely suppress traffic at the start of the resolution period.
Given:
I center my distribution around 24-28 for the median, with significant uncertainty given the active conflict environment. The distribution accounts for both the possibility of continued suppression (keeping values in the 10-20 range) and potential stabilization allowing recovery toward 40-50.
Percentile .1: 2 Percentile 1: 5 Percentile 5: 9 Percentile 10: 12 Percentile 15: 15 Percentile 20: 17 Percentile 25: 19 Percentile 30: 21 Percentile 35: 23 Percentile 40: 24 Percentile 45: 26 Percentile 46: 26.5 Percentile 47: 27 Percentile 48: 27.5 Percentile 49: 28 Percentile 50: 28.5 Percentile 51: 29 Percentile 52: 29.5 Percentile 53: 30 Percentile 54: 31 Percentile 55: 32 Percentile 60: 35 Percentile 65: 38 Percentile 70: 42 Percentile 75: 46 Percentile 80: 51 Percentile 85: 56 Percentile 90: 62 Percentile 95: 72 Percentile 99: 92 Percentile 99.9: 120
Channel geometry and navigational capacity impose a slow-moving upper bound on daily transits.
Legal, insurance, and mine-clearance constraints create practical ceilings and a high cost to rapid normalization.
Recent weeks produced a managed reopening that was sharply reduced after security incidents, leaving visible movement above the trough but below pre-crisis norms.
Insurer hesitancy, route diversions, and corridor-management choices sustain downward pressure on counted, transponder-visible calls.
A durable safety agreement plus verified mine clearance would allow backlog-driven spikes within days; without them, flows remain constrained.
A fresh strike, mine incident, or credible new threat could collapse visible transits back toward the crisis floor within hours.
Measurement uncertainty from transponder interference, dark transits, and differing tracker universes materially widens likely outcomes.
Short-window event risk and the mapping between visible counts and actual commercial throughput are the dominant sensitivities.
Forecast (7-day moving average of PortWatch ship transits, Jun 29–Jul 5, 2026): median = 32.3687
What will be the 7-day moving average of ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz for the week of June 29 to July 5, 2026?
Key figures
Historical context
Tailwinds
Headwinds
Detailed reasoning
My analysis of the forecast for ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz for the week of June 29 to July 5, 2026, is based on a synthesis of recent historical data, real-time maritime tracking reports, and external market signals.
Historically, the Strait of Hormuz is a stable chokepoint with a pre-crisis median of 93–125 daily transits. However, the conflict starting February 28, 2026, fundamentally altered this regime. Data from the IMF PortWatch platform—the authoritative source for this forecast—showed daily totals collapsing to near zero in March and remaining severely depressed. As recently as June 21, 2026, PortWatch reported only 5 transits, with a 7-day moving average of 13.14.
Despite this depressed baseline, multiple high-frequency indicators from late June suggest a significant “release of pent-up demand.” Third-party trackers like Kpler and S&P Global reported a spike to 78 transits on June 24. Although subsequent attacks on the vessels Ever Lovely (June 25) and M/T Kiku (June 27) caused a temporary retrenchment to the 30–40 transit range, the announcement of a cessation of hostilities on June 28, 2026, provides a strong tailwind for the forecast week.
I have weighted the Polymarket data heavily, as it specifically targets the IMF PortWatch resolution. The market indicates an 83% probability that the 7-day moving average will fall between 20 and 40. This range is logically consistent with a scenario where shipping begins to normalize under a ceasefire but is still hampered by “dark” AIS activity, the withdrawal of P&I insurance, and the need for mine clearance.
My predicted most likely value of 29.50 reflects a daily transit regime that is roughly triple the June baseline but still less than one-third of peacetime levels. This account for the fact that IMF PortWatch often records lower counts than other trackers during periods of AIS spoofing or deactivation, which remains a reported issue in the region. The 50% HDI of 24.50 to 34.50 captures the expected stabilization of traffic as negotiations begin in Doha, while the broader 80% interval allows for the possibility of a faster “peace dividend” recovery (up to 40+) or a reporting-lag-driven lower average (down to 18.50).
Key uncertainties
Conclusion