Resolution will be based on the State Department portal, not the legacy DSCA page. DSCA explicitly says that, in accordance with Executive Order 14383, all future Foreign Military Sales web posts for cases notified to Congress are published on the State Department’s Arms Sales: Congressional Notifications page. That matches the resolution source described in the question. (dsca.mil)

For a pre-switch base rate, the DSCA archive shows July 2025 had 8 notifications: six entries on July 21-24 and two on July 11. The same archive shows January 2026 had 11 notifications before the handoff, plus 3 more on February 3-6. So a normal month has recently been able to land anywhere from the high single digits to the low teens. (dsca.mil)

Post-handoff activity still looks substantial. A May 2026 CRS report records at least 7 emergency notifications in March 2026: one for Israel on March 6, then four for the UAE, one for Kuwait, and one for Jordan on March 19. The same CRS report also records 5 emergency notifications on May 1, 2026: one each for Israel, the UAE, and Kuwait, plus two for Qatar. That is not a picture of a dormant pipeline. (everycrsreport.com)

Official June 10, 2026 Congressional Record material printed a large early-June batch of Section 36(b)(1) notifications: Denmark, Italy, South Korea twice, Kuwait, New Zealand twice, and the United Kingdom. Reuters-based reporting also shows additional 2026 notifications in April-June, including Germany on April 17, the Netherlands on April 22, Ukraine and Canada on May 5, India on May 18, Vietnam on June 2, and Denmark plus the UK on June 5. I treat that as evidence that current cadence is still roughly high-single-digit and that clustering risk is real. (govinfo.gov)

The main downside risk is policy and munitions strain. AP reported on May 22, 2026 that Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao said some foreign military sales were being paused so the United States could preserve munitions for the Iran operation. Reuters then reported on June 25 that a senior U.S. diplomat said the Taiwan package did not hinge on China talks. My read is that slowdown risk is real, but not that notifications have broadly stopped. (apnews.com)

So I modeled July 2026 as a three-scenario mixture rather than a single Poisson: a constrained month with mean 4.5 and weight 22%, a baseline month with mean 8.5 and weight 53%, and an active/batched month with mean 13.0 and weight 25%. That produces an expected value of 8.745, so my point estimate is 9 notifications. I deliberately used a wider distribution than a simple single-rate model because these notifications arrive in bursts and can be shifted by one emergency package or one administrative pause. (dsca.mil)

Bottom line: I expect July 2026 to most likely come in around 7-10 notifications, with 11-14 quite plausible if there is one large batch, and 4-6 the main downside if current pacing frictions bite harder than I expect. I leave a small tail above 20 for an unusually intense emergency-driven month, but I think the center of mass remains in the high single digits. (dsca.mil)

I treated this as a monthly count forecast with a structural break in publication venue, not necessarily in the underlying Foreign Military Sales process.

The official Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Major Arms Sales page says that, under Executive Order 14383 signed on February 6, 2026, all future FMS web posts for cases notified to Congress are published on the State Department page. That makes February 2026 a transition month, so I did not use it as a full-month historical datapoint for the baseline. (dsca.mil)

From the official DSCA archive, I extracted the full-month counts for December 2024 through January 2026 as 13, 5, 9, 6, 12, 11, 5, 8, 14, 9, 3, 9, 25, and 11. That is 140 notifications across 14 full months, an average of exactly 10.0 per month. The series is clearly overdispersed: many months fall in the mid-single-digits to low teens, but December 2025 reached 25 because notifications can be batched. (dsca.mil)

July itself does not look like an obvious seasonal peak. In 2025, June had 5 notifications, July had 8, and August had 14. So a July expectation modestly below the overall mean would be defensible on seasonality alone, but not by a large amount. (dsca.mil)

I then made two directional adjustments. First, Executive Order 14383 is substantively pro-arms-transfer: it says future arms sales should prioritize American interests and it sets 30-day, 60-day, and 120-day implementation deadlines, including a task force, an industry engagement plan, and identification of FMS and DCS opportunities. Those deadlines all fall before July 2026, which slightly increases the chance of a busy month. Second, I partly offset that with caution: July is not a year-end batching month like December, and the publication move from DSCA to State could introduce some administrative timing noise even if the underlying policy is more permissive. (whitehouse.gov)

My final distribution is a three-regime Poisson mixture: a quieter month regime, a normal or busy month regime, and a surge or batching regime. I set weights and rates to [0.48, 0.42, 0.10] and [7, 11, 21], respectively. That gives an implied mean of 10.08 notifications, very close to the 14-month historical mean but with enough tail to respect the observed batching risk. My point forecast is 10 notifications. Most of my probability mass sits roughly in the 6 to 14 range, with a meaningful but still minority chance of a high-teens or low-20s month.

I treated this as a count-process forecast with one especially important upside trigger: whether a pending large arms package turns into multiple July web posts. The publication venue changed on February 26, 2026; DSCA says all future FMS web posts after the Executive Order shift are on the State Department congressional notifications page. During research, that State page itself returned a technical-difficulties/forbidden response to my browser, so for post-handoff counting I leaned on official DSCA archive data for earlier months and on CRS/Reuters/AP references to specific State transmittals for March-May 2026. (dsca.mil)

The pre-handoff DSCA archive shows that monthly notification counts are very volatile, not smooth. In the all-entries archive, July 2025 had 8 notifications; August 2025 had 14; October 2025 had 3; November 2025 had 9; December 2025 had 25; January 2026 had 11; and February 2026 had 3 before the handoff. That argues against an overly narrow forecast around any single low number. (dsca.mil)

For the new State-page era, the public activity I could verify is bursty. CRS says there was one Israel notification on March 6, 2026, plus six March 19 emergency notifications: Jordan 1, Kuwait 1, and UAE 4. CRS also lists five May 1, 2026 notifications: Israel 1, Kuwait 1, Qatar 2, and UAE 1. So the post-handoff pattern I can substantiate is clustered rather than a steady every-week cadence. (everycrsreport.com)

The biggest upside risk for July is Taiwan. CRS says the December 17, 2025 Taiwan batch involved eight notifications totaling $11.1 billion. Reuters and AP reported in June 2026 that a new Taiwan package worth about $14 billion was still pending; on June 18 President Lai said he hoped approval would come soon, and on June 25 the State Department’s top East Asia diplomat explicitly referred to a pending arms sale notification to Congress for Taiwan. I infer from the December 2025 precedent that, if this package lands in July, it could add several posts by itself. (everycrsreport.com)

A counterweight is that some of the March-May 2026 activity was emergency Middle East business tied to the Iran war. Reuters reported continued flare-ups in early June, but also a preliminary U.S.-Iran agreement on June 15, 2026. That modestly lowers my expectation of another July Gulf emergency burst relative to March or May, though it does not eliminate it. (investing.com)

My synthesis is a two-regime forecast. In a lower-intensity month, the pending Taiwan package slips again and July looks more like a quiet recent State-page month. In a higher-intensity month, one major multi-notification package lands in July, most plausibly Taiwan but possibly another cluster. I encoded that as a mixture distribution with a low component centered near 3 and a high component centered near 11, which yields an overall mean a bit above 6 and keeps most mass in roughly the 2-11 range, with a thinner tail into the mid-teens. I also widened uncertainty because the question resolves off what is visible on the official portal on August 12, 2026, so publication timing matters.

The resolution source is the State Department Arms Sales: Congressional Notifications page. DSCA states that, following Executive Order 14383 signed on February 6, 2026, all future Foreign Military Sales web posts for cases notified to Congress are published on that State Department page, while the older archive remains on DSCA. (dsca.mil)

For base rates, the DSCA archive shows that January 2026 alone contained 11 public notifications, and early February 2026 had 3 more by February 6. That suggests that double-digit months are well within the historical range for this process, even before the publication venue changed. (dsca.mil)

For the State-hosted era, I can directly identify at least 9 March 2026 notifications from reliable sources: Israel on March 6; Sweden on March 10; six emergency notifications on March 19 consisting of four UAE cases plus one Jordan and one Kuwait case; a UK AUKUS-related notice dated March 20; and Belgium on March 25. So March was a strong month even before allowing for the possibility that I missed a post. (everycrsreport.com)

May 2026 was also clearly active. Reuters reported more than $8.6 billion in May 1 notifications to Israel, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE; CRS separately notes May 1 emergency notifications for Israel and the UAE; an official mirror of the State notice shows Qatar’s Patriot replenishment case; and a Federal Register notice later shows an India Apache follow-on support case delivered to Congress on May 18. June 2026 was at least moderately active too: Reuters reported June 5 notifications for the UK, Denmark, and Kuwait; the Federal Register confirms the UK notice was delivered to Congress on June 5; and a June 17 daily index captured an Austria Black Hawk helicopter notification. (streetinsider.com)

For July specifically, the biggest upside risk is batching. Reuters reported on June 25 that a pending Taiwan arms sale notification to Congress did not hinge on talks with China, while other reporting suggested a notification could come by the end of June; and the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council says January 2026 featured an eight-notification Taiwan batch. Separately, Reuters and HFAC statements indicate the administration was pushing a more than $700 million Turkey sale into formal congressional notification around June 24-25, creating a plausible spillover into early July if it missed the June month-end cutoff. (theprint.in)

The main downside case is that March and May were boosted by emergency Middle East packages, so July could revert toward an ordinary mid-single-digit pace if no comparable bundle appears. The main upside case is a Taiwan or Turkey batch, which is why I do not want an overly narrow single-rate Poisson. I therefore use a 3-scenario mixture: 45% routine month with lambda 5.0, 40% active month with lambda 7.8, and 15% batch month with lambda 13.0. That produces an expected value of 7.32 notifications, with most probability mass in 6-8 but a meaningful right tail into the low teens. (everycrsreport.com)

Bottom line: my median is 7, and my modal region is 6-8. I think July 2026 is more likely than not to look like a normal-to-active month rather than a drought month, but there is a nontrivial chance of a clustered batch that pushes the total above 10. (dsca.mil)

I start from the official posting regime. The DSCA archive states that, beginning February 26, 2026, future Foreign Military Sales web posts for cases notified to Congress are published on the State Department’s “Arms Sales: Congressional Notifications” page pursuant to Executive Order 14383. That means the DSCA archive is mainly a base-rate source, while the State Department portal is the operative venue for July 2026. (dsca.mil)

For base rates, I counted official monthly totals from the DSCA all-entries archive before the handoff. The archive shows April 2025 with 13 notifications, May 2025 with 11, June 2025 with 5, July 2025 with 8, August 2025 with 14, September 2025 with 9, December 2025 with 16, and January 2026 with 11; February 2026 had 3 before the February 26 switch. The main lesson is not a stable monthly rate, but pronounced burstiness: quiet months in the low single digits can sit next to double-digit cluster months. (dsca.mil)

The strongest State-era evidence I found also points to clustered releases rather than a smooth flow. CRS documents that on March 19, 2026, the State Department made six emergency notifications in one burst: four UAE cases, one Jordan case, and one Kuwait case. CRS also documents that on May 1, 2026, State made five more emergency notifications in one burst: one Israel case, one UAE case, one Kuwait case, and two Qatar cases. So the post-switch State-hosted regime still clearly permits large same-day batches. (everycrsreport.com)

Given that evidence, I do not think a single thin Poisson is the right model. I used a three-regime mixture: a quiet-month regime (25% weight, mean 1.8), a normal-month regime (55% weight, mean 7.5), and a batch-month regime (20% weight, mean 14.5). The quiet regime captures the possibility that notifications are sparse or bunch outside July; the normal regime reflects the historical center of gravity in the high single digits; and the batch regime reflects the demonstrated possibility of multi-notification release days and occasional double-digit months. This mixture has an expected value of 7.475 notifications.

My bottom line is therefore a forecast centered in the high single digits, with 6-8 as the densest part of the distribution, but with meaningful tail risk on both sides: a low month if publication timing is sparse, and a double-digit month if another batch appears. I assign only negligible mass above 39 because even the high historical and recent batch examples are far below that level. Overall, 7-8 is my practical point-estimate range, with 7.475 as the model mean.

How many “Foreign Military Sales” (FMS) congressional notifications will be published between July 1, 2026, and July 31, 2026?

• My most likely prediction for the number of FMS congressional notifications is 7.50, with a 50% chance of falling between 5.50 and 10.50.
• The forecast is anchored by the historical precedent of 8 notifications in July 2025 and a consistent high-single-digit monthly average throughout early 2026.
• Strategic demand from the NATO Ankara summit (July 7–8, 2026) and pending Middle Eastern replenishment packages provide significant upward pressure.
• Congressional pressure to release the $14 billion Taiwan arms package remains a volatile catalyst that could result in a cluster of notifications.
• Downward pressure exists from the ‘Operation Epic Fury’ munitions pause, where the U.S. is prioritizing domestic stockpiles over foreign transfers.
• The shift to the centralized State Department portal under Executive Order 14383 remains the definitive source for this count, effective as of February 2026.

Key figures

Historical context

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process is governed by the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, requiring formal notification for sales exceeding specific dollar thresholds (e.g., $14 million for major defense equipment). Historically, July is an active month; in July 2025, exactly 8 notifications were published, including packages for Norway, Egypt, and Ukraine. Prior to 2026, notifications were hosted on the DSCA website. On February 6, 2026, President Trump signed Executive Order 14383, ‘Establishing an America First Arms Transfer Strategy,’ which centralized future notifications on a new State Department portal starting February 26, 2026. This period also saw record-breaking FMS volume in FY 2023 ($80.9 billion), signaling a long-term upward trend in the scale of U.S. defense exports despite recent logistical bottlenecks.

Tailwinds

• The NATO summit in Ankara (July 7–8, 2026) is expected to catalyze new defense industrial production pledges and multi-billion dollar arms contracts.
• High international demand for air defense systems (NASAMS, Patriot) and munitions (GMLRS) remains at record levels following recent regional instabilities.
• Bipartisan Senate pressure in late June 2026 urged the administration to formally notify the long-delayed $14 billion Taiwan arms package.
• The ‘America First’ arms strategy promotes faster case development and streamlined execution, potentially increasing the frequency of notifications.

Headwinds

• Prioritization of domestic munitions stockpiles (Tomahawk, Patriot) due to recent regional conflicts has already caused ‘pauses’ in major sales like the Taiwan package.
• Increasing use of AECA Section 36(b) emergency waivers by the Secretary of State allows for multi-billion dollar sales to bypass the standard notification period and public posting cycle.
• Technical difficulties or publication lags on the newly centralized State Department portal could result in fewer visible posts by the August 12 data maturation deadline.
• Rising borrowing costs and debt constraints in Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs) may slow the conversion of defense requests into formal notifications.

Detailed reasoning

The forecast for July 2026 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) congressional notifications is primarily anchored by a strong historical baseline of 8 notifications recorded in July 2025. This figure serves as the most direct seasonal precedent. Analysis of early 2026 data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) archive prior to the publication venue change showed a monthly pace of approximately 14 notifications (January 8 to February 6, 2026), suggesting that while the baseline is in the high single digits, the administrative process is prone to ‘batching.’

The current operational environment is defined by Executive Order 14383, which centralized publications on the State Department portal as of February 26, 2026. This transition introduces a minor degree of administrative friction, but also emphasizes a more aggressive ‘America First’ arms strategy. Recent activity in June 2026, which included a $428 million package for India and multiple notifications on June 5, confirms that the notification pipeline remains active despite reported munitions shortages.

Weighting of factors:

1. Historical Baseline (High Weight): The July 2025 figure of 8 is the strongest predictor for seasonal behavior.
2. Geopolitical Tailwinds (Moderate Weight): The upcoming NATO summit in Ankara (July 7–8, 2026) and persistent demand from Middle Eastern allies (evidenced by the $8 billion in emergency approvals in May 2026) provide upward pressure.
3. Supply Constraints (Moderate Weight): Pentagon prioritization of domestic stockpiles (Operation Epic Fury) and reported ‘pauses’ in major sales like the $14 billion Taiwan package act as a ceiling on how many notifications can be processed.

The final prediction of 7.50 with a 50% HDI of 5.50 to 10.50 reflects a central expectation of stability, while the wider 80% HDI (3.50 to 13.50) accounts for the lumpy nature of congressional notifications, where a single week of high administrative activity can significantly skew the monthly total. The possibility of the administration utilizing emergency waivers—which bypass the standard notification count—is also factored in as a reason the public count might remain lower than the total volume of defense trade would suggest.

Key uncertainties

• The timing of ‘batch’ publications by the State Department can cause significant month-to-month variance unrelated to actual sale volume.
• Continued use of emergency waivers for Middle Eastern allies could keep several major sales out of the standard notification count.
• The specific impact of the August 12 ‘data maturation’ deadline may exclude notifications issued late in July but not posted until mid-August.

Conclusion

• The most likely outcome is 7.50 notifications, reflecting a stable continuation of the historical baseline of 8 notifications seen in July 2025.
• Decision-makers should monitor the Department of State’s centralized portal for “batching” behavior, as notifications are often published in clusters rather than a steady daily stream.
• Any formal notification of the $14 billion Taiwan package would act as a major outlier, potentially pushing the monthly total toward the upper bound of the forecast range.

Question: How many distinct official State Department “Arms Sales: Congressional Notifications” web posts will be published during July 2026 (counted on the State page as visible on Aug 12, 2026)? Forecasters note the resolution counts posts (not dollar amounts), with historical Julys lumpy and modest (~3, 11, 4, 4–5, 8 for 2021–2025) but a clear near-term signal that the post-transition 2026 pipeline has been active (third‑party trackers show ~14 notifications in both May and June through June 26). All teams therefore center the forecast above the older July base rate and around the low teens (roughly 10–14), while keeping substantial dispersion because July releases cluster on a few days, emergency determinations or large same‑day batches can rapidly add many posts, and tracker “notification dates” may not match State.gov “published” timestamps. Forecasters also flagged practical risks: State.gov access issues in the tool environment increase monitoring uncertainty, and policy changes (EOs, DSCA memos, possible congressional threshold changes) could shift throughput but do not deterministically map to July counts. In short, consensus favors a July count higher than the historical median but below a blunt extrapolation of May/June, with a meaningful right tail for batch risk and a nontrivial left tail reflecting July’s historically irregular cadence.

Forecast and Reasoning

Forecast: Probability distribution:

• 1.00% chance of value below 1.0
• 5.00% chance of value below 3.0
• 10.00% chance of value below 6.0
• 20.00% chance of value below 8.0
• 30.00% chance of value below 10.0
• 40.00% chance of value below 11.0
• 50.00% chance of value below 13.0
• 60.00% chance of value below 14.0
• 70.00% chance of value below 16.0
• 80.00% chance of value below 19.0
• 90.00% chance of value below 23.0
• 95.00% chance of value below 27.0
• 99.00% chance of value below 35.0

Forecast Reasoning

Key driver is the recent publication cadence on the State Department “Arms Sales: Congressional Notifications” page after the late-February 2026 shift. Two analysts report ~46 total 2026 items as of 2026-06-27, implying a central rate around 11–12 posts/month over the post-shift period, with noticeable month-to-month batching/overdispersion (one analyst’s breakdown: March ~12, April ~5, May ~12, June ~14 as of June 25).

For July 2026, I expect a similar-to-slightly-higher count than the 11–12/month baseline because (a) notifications often appear in clusters and (b) there can be administrative incentives to clear items before August recess. Offsetting this, July includes a major holiday week and can also see slowdowns. Given the observed 2026 variability (single-digit to mid-teens) plus batching risk, I center the distribution in the low teens with a moderately fat right tail (into the 20s) but assign very little probability to extreme outcomes (30+), and essentially negligible probability of exceeding 39 in a single month.

An amateur forecast would likely (i) take a simple average (≈46/4 ≈ 11–12) and give an overly tight range, or (ii) anchor on a single recent month (e.g., June) without accounting for clustered/batch publishing. My forecast instead blends the post-shift baseline rate with observed month-to-month dispersion (including an April dip) and explicitly keeps a wider upper tail to reflect batching/backlog risk, while still treating 40+ as an extreme outlier. I’m moderately confident this is better calibrated than a narrow “around 12” guess, mainly via better tail coverage.

Forecast rationale (numeric):

— Iteration 1 — Across the forecasts, the main reasoning is:

• Historical base rates drive the estimate. FMS congressional notifications are typically modeled as occurring at a rate of roughly 5–15 per month, with several forecasts centering on a mid-single-digit to low-teens monthly count.
• July is seen as somewhat elevated. A common assumption is that July may be slightly busier than average because of pre-recess timing and the possibility of agencies pushing notifications out before an August slowdown.
• Policy and administrative factors add uncertainty. One rationale explicitly raises the expected count due to a perceived acceleration of arms sales under current policy, while others emphasize that the normal review and posting pipeline can still constrain volume.
• Batching is a major source of variance. All the models account for the possibility that multiple cases could be grouped into a single release window or that some months could see large, multi-part packages posted together.
• The distribution is right-skewed and wide. The forecasts consistently use overdispersed, fat-tailed distributions, reflecting the fact that monthly counts can vary a lot. Low-end scenarios allow for a quiet month or posting delays, while high-end scenarios allow for an unusually large surge.

Areas of consensus

• A central estimate around 7 notifications is the most common anchor.
• The count is expected to be modest rather than extreme in a typical month.
• There is substantial uncertainty, with batching and posting irregularities as the main reasons for a broad range.

Main disagreement

• One forecast is more optimistic/higher, placing the center around 10–12 notifications due to policy acceleration, while the others remain closer to 7 based primarily on historical averages.

— Iteration 2 — The forecasts converge on a central expectation in the high single digits to around 10 FMS congressional notifications for July 2026. The main reasoning pattern is:

• Historical baseline: Recent publication rates are treated as roughly 8–11 notifications per month, derived from annual totals around 100–130.
• Seasonal/operational uplift in July: Several rationales expect somewhat elevated activity before the August recess, when agencies may try to trigger congressional review windows earlier.
• Policy context as a modest tailwind: A recent administration posture or executive-order environment is seen as a small upward factor, but not a decisive one.
• Publication mechanics create uncertainty: The key downside risk is that notifications may be batched, delayed, or posted unevenly, especially if the “distinct web posts” criterion is applied strictly.
• Right-skewed uncertainty: The expected distribution is right-skewed, allowing for a quiet month on the low end but also for a backlog-clearing surge on the high end.
• Wide tails due to limited monthly data: There is broad agreement that monthly cadence is uncertain enough to justify substantial dispersion around the central estimate.

Overall, the shared view is that July should likely be near typical monthly volume, with a slight upward tilt, but with meaningful risk of either a subdued posting month or a burst of clustered notifications.

— Iteration 3 — Overall, the forecasts converge on a mid-to-high single-digit July count, centered around about 8 notifications, with a plausible range that extends from very low activity to a much busier month.

Main reasoning patterns

• Historical cadence is the anchor: The expected monthly rate is drawn from prior FMS congressional notification patterns, typically around 5–10 per month, with some estimates placing the broader annual pace near 70–120.
• Recent 2026 activity supports continuity: Early-2026 transmittal counts suggest the process was already running at a steady pace, reinforcing expectations for a similar July volume.
• July seasonality matters: Some forecasts expect slightly higher activity in July because it precedes the August congressional recess, which can encourage notifications before the break.
• Posting mechanics can distort counts: The move to a new web posting system introduces uncertainty over whether items appear as individual notifications or batched posts, affecting the observable count.
• Policy changes could shift volume either way: Streamlining efforts and threshold changes may reduce some notifications, but they could also speed publication or concentrate items into larger batches.

Areas of consensus

• The central expectation is around 8–9 published FMS notifications in July 2026.
• The month is unlikely to be completely abnormal absent major disruptions, but batching and administrative changes make exact counts hard to pin down.
• The distribution is viewed as right-skewed: a normal month is most likely, but unusually high counts remain possible if backlogs clear or large deals are announced.

Areas of disagreement / uncertainty

• Some reasoning emphasizes lower volume from new thresholds, website transitions, or summer slowdown.
• Others emphasize higher volume from recess-driven timing, backlog clearing, or large geopolitical packages.
• There is broad agreement that uncertainty is substantial enough to warrant a wide outcome range, including the possibility of a very quiet month or a spike well above the central estimate.

Bottom line

The collective view is that July 2026 will most likely see about 8 FMS congressional notification posts, driven by historical norms and recent pacing, with seasonality and administrative changes creating a wide tail of possible outcomes.

Summary of Rationale Considerations

The Administrative Bottleneck The most dominant factor across the forecasts is the ongoing administrative failure of the newly mandated State Department portal. Following Executive Order 14383 in early 2026, the responsibility for publishing FMS notifications shifted to this specific URL. However, the site has experienced a total rollout failure, publishing no posts from March through June. The administration has instead fulfilled legal obligations via the Federal Register or utilized emergency waivers to bypass standard transparency mechanisms entirely. If this bureaucratic inertia persists, the portal will remain completely empty.

The Historical “July Rush” Countering the inactive portal is the strong historical precedent of a summer surge in FMS notifications. Because statutory congressional review clocks run continuously on calendar days, administrations routinely rush to submit notifications in July. This ensures the review period expires during the long August congressional recess, intentionally limiting lawmakers’ ability to organize joint resolutions of disapproval.

Pending Sales and the “Backlog Dump” Risk Forecasters note that major pending deals—such as a heavily delayed arms package for Taiwan and a major engine sale to Turkey—alongside catalysts like the NATO Summit and Farnborough Airshow, could force the administration to finally activate the portal. If the State Department updates the site to process the July rush, they might simultaneously upload the entire accumulated backlog of unnotified sales from the spring, which would result in a sudden and massive spike in published posts.

Structural Volume Suppressors Even if the portal is activated, two structural factors could limit the final count. First, recent statutory changes drastically increased the monetary thresholds required to trigger a formal congressional notification, mechanically reducing the volume of qualifying sales. Second, the State Department may opt to “bundle” multiple distinct arms sales into single, aggregated web announcements, further minimizing the distinct post count.

SUMMARY

Question: How many “Foreign Military Sales” (FMS) congressional notifications will be published between July 1, 2026, and July 31, 2026? Final Prediction: Probability distribution:

• 10.00% chance of value below 5.445
• 20.00% chance of value below 6.445
• 40.00% chance of value below 8.445
• 60.00% chance of value below 11.445
• 80.00% chance of value below 14.945
• 90.00% chance of value below 17.945

Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled

Report 1 Summary

Forecasts

Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:

• 10.00% chance of value below 5.49
• 20.00% chance of value below 6.49
• 40.00% chance of value below 8.49
• 60.00% chance of value below 11.49
• 80.00% chance of value below 14.49
• 90.00% chance of value below 17.49

Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:

• 10.00% chance of value below 5.4
• 20.00% chance of value below 6.4
• 40.00% chance of value below 8.4
• 60.00% chance of value below 11.4
• 80.00% chance of value below 15.4
• 90.00% chance of value below 18.4

Research Summary

The research reports that a major policy change — Executive Order 14383 (“America First Arms Transfer Strategy,” Feb 6, 2026) — moved all future FMS congressional notifications to the State Department’s “Arms Sales: Congressional Notifications” page, replaced a first-come/first-served model with strategic prioritization, and created a “Promoting American Military Sales Task Force” to streamline processes and publish quarterly metrics. Historical base rates show substantial variation: 129 notifications in 2024 (~$145.8–145.9B), 117 in 2025 (~$104.2B), and a 2008–2024 annual average of ~65 notifications (monthly averages: 2024 ≈10.75, 2025 ≈9.75, long-term ≈5.4). 2026 year-to-date notified sales totaled about $79.6B with several large early-2026 notifications (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Israel, Singapore).

The research lists factors likely to push July 2026 notifications up (streamlining, task force, a prioritized sales catalogue with a 120-day deadline, and administration emphasis on higher sales) and factors likely to push them down (strategic prioritization favoring fewer higher-value sales, market saturation, transition/implementation disruptions, and the 2025 decline from 2024). It notes no active prediction markets were found for this question, important data limitations (no monthly historical breakdowns, limited post-February 2026 data, unclear seasonal patterns, and transition effects), and reminds that AECA still requires 15–30 day advance congressional notifications. The research’s resolution methodology counts notifications visible on Aug 12, 2026 that are dated for July 2026.

Sources/websites used (as cited in the research; no verbatim URLs were provided in the research text):

• U.S. State Department — “Arms Sales: Congressional Notifications” page
• Executive Order 14383 / “America First Arms Transfer Strategy” (Feb 6, 2026)
• Announcements on the “Promoting American Military Sales Task Force”
• Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) historical notification and dollar totals
• Data summaries for 2024 and 2025 notification counts and values
• Mentioned prediction market platforms: Metaculus, Polymarket, Manifold
• Arms Export Control Act (AECA) guidance on congressional notification timelines

(If you want, I can attempt to locate and provide direct links to the specific State Department page, DSCA reports, the executive order text, and other referenced materials.)

RESEARCH

Report 1 Research

I’ve conducted comprehensive research to support your forecast on FMS congressional notifications for July 2026. Here’s what I found:

Major Policy Change - Executive Order 14383

The most critical recent development is President Trump’s “America First Arms Transfer Strategy” signed on February 6, 2026 [1][2][3][4]. This executive order fundamentally restructured how U.S. arms sales are processed and published:

• All future FMS congressional notifications are now exclusively published on the State Department’s “Arms Sales: Congressional Notifications” page (as the question notes) [1][4][14]
• The policy replaces a “first-come, first-served” model with strategic prioritization based on defense spending, geographic importance, and alignment with U.S. interests [2][3][4]
• A “Promoting American Military Sales Task Force” was established to streamline processes and publish quarterly performance metrics [2][4][7]
• The administration mandates reducing bureaucratic inefficiencies in end-use monitoring, third-party transfers, and congressional notifications [1][6][7]

Historical Base Rates (Most Critical for Forecasting)

Annual notification counts:

• 2024: 129 notifications totaling ~$145.8-145.9 billion [10][15]
• 2025: 117 notifications totaling ~$104.2 billion [11][15]
• 2008-2024 average: ~65 notifications per year [19]

Monthly averages derived from annual data:

• 2024: ~10.75 notifications per month
• 2025: ~9.75 notifications per month
• Long-term (2008-2024): ~5.4 notifications per month

The 2024 peak of 129 notifications represented a significant increase from historical norms, with notifications peaking across multiple years due to European rearmament and conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza [19].

Average notification values:

• 2024: $1.13 billion per notification
• 2025: $890.83 million per notification [15]

2026 Year-to-Date Context

Through early 2026, major notified sales totaled approximately $79.6 billion [10], with significant notifications in January-February including:

• $9.0 billion to Saudi Arabia (PATRIOT missiles)
• $3.8 billion to Israel (Apache helicopters)
• $3.0 billion to Saudi Arabia (F-15 sustainment)
• $2.316 billion to Singapore (P-8A aircraft) [14]

Reference Classes & Relevant Considerations

Factors potentially increasing July 2026 notifications:

1. Streamlining efforts: The new policy explicitly aims to reduce processing delays and inefficiencies [2][4][7]
2. Task force establishment: Dedicated effort to accelerate arms sales with quarterly metrics [4][7]
3. 120-day catalogue deadline: By early June 2026, a prioritized sales catalogue should be complete, potentially enabling faster processing [1][6]
4. Political emphasis: Strong administration focus on expanding arms sales to $300+ billion annually [2][7]

Factors potentially decreasing July 2026 notifications:

1. Strategic prioritization: The shift from “first-come-first-served” to strategic prioritization may reduce overall volume while focusing on higher-value, strategically important sales [2][4][15]
2. Market saturation: The 2025 decline (117 vs 129) may reflect that major allies have already placed large orders [15]
3. Implementation transition: New processes and systems may cause temporary disruptions during the transition period (Feb-July 2026)
4. 2025 trend: The 28.54% decline from 2024 to 2025 suggests a cooling market [15]

Regional trends to watch:

• Europe remained the largest market but saw a 50.65% decline from 2024 to 2025 [15]
• East Asia/Pacific increased by 8.12% in 2025 [15]
• Western Hemisphere surged 218.75% in 2025 [15]

Prediction Markets

I found no active prediction markets specifically tracking this question on Metaculus, Polymarket, Manifold, or other platforms. This limits our ability to assess market consensus or aggregate probability estimates.

Data Limitations

1. No monthly breakdowns available: Historical data provides annual totals but not month-by-month distributions [10][11][15]
2. Recency: Limited data on how the February 2026 policy change has affected notification frequency over the subsequent months
3. Seasonal patterns: No clear evidence of seasonal variation in FMS notifications
4. Transition effects: Unclear how the move from DSCA to State Department publication affects timing

Additional Context

The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) requires 15-30 day advance congressional notifications depending on the recipient country and sale value [12]. Congressional opposition is rare, with no sale ever successfully blocked by joint resolution [12]. The new policy maintains these legal requirements while attempting to streamline the process.

The question’s resolution methodology (counting notifications visible on August 12, 2026 at 12:00:00 UTC that are dated for July 2026) accounts for potential publication delays [14].

FORECASTS

R1: Forecaster 1 Reasoning

Conditioning on non-annulment.

I largely accept the critic’s latest shape critique. The biggest valid point is that the H1-2026 sequence is better described as lumpy batching than as an upward trend. The Forum tracker shows 2026 notifications totaling about $79.65B as of its June 26 update, and the row-level dates support the rough monthly pattern we have been using: Jan 11, Feb 5, Mar 11, Apr 5, May 14, Jun 14. That makes 6–8 a central-ish possibility rather than a real tail. The same source also notes the State-page migration and prior link breakage, reinforcing some low/weird-tail website risk. (forumarmstrade.org)

I still defend keeping the median near 10, not moving to 8 or below. Recent annual base rates remain high: Stimson reports 129 notifications in 2024 and 117 in 2025, or about 10.75/month and 9.75/month, with 2025 down from 2024 but still in an elevated regime. H1-2026’s 60 notifications through June are also almost exactly a 10/month pace. (stimson.org)

The EO remains ambiguous for count. It orders a prioritized sales catalog and FMS/DCS opportunity identification within 120 days, streamlining, a task force, and quarterly performance metrics; but those mechanisms can increase sales value or speed while reducing distinct public notifications through bundling, prioritization, or DCS substitution. (federalregister.gov)

A new nuance I’d emphasize: June was not only a June 5/cutoff batch, since the tracker includes later June notifications on June 10, 11, 15, 17, and 25. That weakens an extreme “post-catalog collapse” story. But June also clearly had a large early-month cluster, so a post-batch July lull remains plausible. Calendar effects are mostly neutral: the Senate is out June 29–July 10, but CRS notes that recess or adjournment does not stop statutory review periods. (docs.google.com)

Net: I move a bit more mass into 6–8 and trim high-teens/20s outcomes. I keep a real right tail because one multi-country air-defense, Middle East, Ukraine, Taiwan, or replenishment batch can still produce a high month, but without specific July pipeline evidence I no longer want 18+ to look routine.

Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 0.49
Percentile 1: 2.49
Percentile 5: 4.49
Percentile 10: 5.49
Percentile 20: 6.49
Percentile 30: 7.49
Percentile 40: 8.49
Percentile 50: 10.49
Percentile 60: 11.49
Percentile 70: 13.49
Percentile 80: 14.49
Percentile 90: 17.49
Percentile 95: 21.49
Percentile 99: 29.49
Percentile 99.9: 38.49

R1: Forecaster 2 Reasoning

Conditioning on not annulled.

I agree with the critic’s main update: the prior distribution was still too “smooth.” The strongest evidence is the 2026 month-by-month pattern. From the Forum tracker / spreadsheet, I also count roughly Jan 11, Feb 5, Mar 11, Apr 5, May 14, Jun 14, with a 2026 total around $79.65B as of the June 26 update. That makes 5–7 a live outcome, not merely a thin lower tail. The State/DSCA transition is real, but DSCA’s note mainly changes the publication venue, not the fundamental case-flow process. (dsca.mil)

I also accept the critic’s “post-batch lull” point. May and June 2026 may have been a catalogue/backlog/urgent-sales release rather than evidence that July should stay at 14-ish. EO 14383 required a prioritized sales catalogue and identification of FMS opportunities within 120 days of February 6, which lands in early June, and also set up quarterly performance metrics; that makes June a plausible push month, with July more likely to regress. But I would not overdo this: the same EO emphasizes streamlining and prioritization, and a high-demand geopolitical environment plus an active pipeline still make another batch month plausible. (federalregister.gov)

So I’m moving modestly further toward the critic: median down to 9.4, more mass on 6–8, but still with a fat right tail. My implicit mixture is something like: about one-third chance of a lull month around 5–8, about half chance of a normal elevated month around 8–13, and about one-fifth chance of another batch/high month above 14, including a small tail above 25. July 2025’s count around 8 remains a useful seasonal anchor, but the 2026 elevated base rate prevents me from moving all the way back to the long-run ~5/month regime.

Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 0.4
Percentile 1: 2.4
Percentile 5: 4.4
Percentile 10: 5.4
Percentile 20: 6.4
Percentile 30: 7.4
Percentile 40: 8.4
Percentile 50: 9.4
Percentile 60: 11.4
Percentile 70: 13.4
Percentile 80: 15.4
Percentile 90: 18.4
Percentile 95: 23.4
Percentile 99: 31.4
Percentile 99.9: 38.4

Frontier Forecast — Post 535

Modal: 10-15 (34.9%) • frontier aggregate • 3m52s

Interpret Summary

• Reading: strict
• Type: strict
• Window: Distinct web posts published on the State Department Arms Sales Congressional Notifications page between July 1, 2026 and July 31, 2026, as visible on August 12, 2026 at 12:00:00 UTC

Resolution sources/checks:

• https://www.state.gov/arms-sales-congressional-notifications/: https://www.state.gov/arms-sales-congressional-notifications/ - Resolver URL extracted mechanically from resolution criteria

Edge cases:

• If a single post covers multiple FMS cases, does it count as one notification or multiple? The resolution criteria says ‘distinct web posts,’ so one post = one count regardless of how many cases it covers.
• If the State Department moves the notifications page before or during July 2026, the new source replaces (or supplements) the old one for counting purposes.
• Notifications dated for July 2026 but not yet visible on the portal by August 12, 2026 at 12:00:00 UTC are excluded from the count.

Frontier Views (4/4)

• frontier_1 - Modal: 10-15 (45.0%)

  • Base rates from spring–early summer 2026 on State.gov show clustered FMS notifications with June particularly active (mid-teens plausible) and May showing large single-day drops. Agencies often front-load before the August recess, so July likely remains elevated.

• frontier_2 - Modal: 10-15 (30.0%)

  • The question asks for the number of distinct FMS congressional notification web posts published on the State Department’s “Arms Sales: Congressional Notifications” page during July 2026, counted as of August 12, 2026.

• frontier_3 - Modal: 10-15 (33.0%)

  • The State Department’s ‘Arms Sales: Congressional Notifications’ page was established around February 26, 2026. As of late June 2026, the page lists 40 total items over a period of roughly four months.

• frontier_4 - Modal: 5-10 (42.0%)

  • Cumulative 40 items on the page since late Feb 2026 plus pre-transition DSCA patterns imply a steady-state monthly rate of roughly 5-9 posts. July is seasonally slow, centering the distribution on 5-10 with secondary mass on 10-15.

Adjudication

• Material notes

  • frontier_4: flag_only/warning - Distribution appears too concentrated below the agent’s own primary anchor—would benefit from explicit evidence (historical July-specific suppression) to justify the downweighting.

• Guidance

  • Most agents anchor on the same State.gov accumulation and place modal mass around 10–15 (or split with 5–10). frontier_4 places substantially more mass on 5–10 than the shared anchor supports without supplying July-specific evidence to justify the stronger downward adjustment; flag for review/justification.

• Revision

  • Frontier revision skipped: no_selected_adjudicator_reviews.

Final Distribution (discrete bins)

Sources Checked

• Resolver: Resolver URL extracted mechanically from resolution criteria - https://www.state.gov/arms-sales-congressional-notifications/
• frontier_1: https://www.state.gov/releases/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/2026/06/vietnam-c-130-sustainment
• frontier_1: https://www.state.gov/releases/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/2026/06/kuwait-counter-unmanned-aerial-systems-platforms
• frontier_1: https://www.state.gov/releases/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/2026/06/republic-of-korea-joint-direct-attack-munitions
• frontier_1: https://www.state.gov/releases/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/2026/06/denmark-joint-air-to-surface-standoff-missiles-with-extended-ran…
• frontier_1: https://www.state.gov/policy-issues/foreign-military-sales/page/3

wooley_rhino • run 9be8570d • $3.04 • 3m52s

Extracted Percentile Values: {0.1: 2, 1.0: 3, 5.0: 4, 10.0: 6, 15.0: 7, 20.0: 7, 25.0: 8, 30.0: 8, 35.0: 9, 40.0: 9, 45.0: 10, 46.0: 10, 47.0: 10, 48.0: 10, 49.0: 10, 50.0: 11, 51.0: 11, 52.0: 11, 53.0: 11, 54.0: 11, 55.0: 12, 60.0: 12, 65.0: 13, 70.0: 14, 75.0: 15, 80.0: 16, 85.0: 18, 90.0: 20, 95.0: 24, 99.0: 32, 99.9: 39}

Model’s Answer:

Forecasting FMS Congressional Notifications for July 2026

Understanding the Metric

The question asks for the count of distinct web posts on the State Department’s “Arms Sales: Congressional Notifications” page published during July 2026. Based on Executive Order 14383 (February 2026), this has become the exclusive source for FMS congressional notifications.

Key Data Analysis

Recent Activity Patterns:

• The Australia notification (June 25, 2026) carries Transmittal #26-57, suggesting approximately 57 notifications have been processed year-to-date through late June 2026
• Research indicates “at least 10 distinct June postings” on the State Department page
• The tracker shows 46 total items spanning approximately March-June 2026 (roughly 11-12 per month)

Historical Context:

• Annual FMS notifications averaged ~65 per year historically (~5.4/month)
• 2024 saw a peak of 129 notifications (~10.75/month)
• 2026 data through June shows elevated activity (~$79.6 billion total), suggesting pace consistent with recent high years

Current Monthly Rate Calculation:

• If transmittal #26-57 represents YTD count through late June: ~57/6 = 9.5/month
• If 46 items span March-June 2026: ~46/4 = 11.5/month
• June 2026 specifically appears to have ~10+ postings

Key Assumptions and Uncertainties

Assumption 1: Current notification pace (~9-11/month) continues into July

• Failure probability: ~20%
• If wrong: Could see 5-6 or 15+ notifications due to policy changes, delays, or acceleration

Assumption 2: No major policy disruption during July

• Failure probability: ~10%
• If wrong: Could drastically reduce notifications (government shutdown, policy review freeze)

Assumption 3: Data publication continues normally through August 12 resolution date

• Failure probability: ~5%

Scenario Analysis

Low Outcome (3-6 notifications):

• Summer congressional recess reduces urgency for notifications
• Administrative delays in interagency review
• Policy review holds pending cases
• Likelihood: ~15%

Central Case (8-12 notifications):

• Continuation of current ~10/month pace
• Normal processing under America First Arms Transfer Strategy
• Likelihood: ~55%

High Outcome (15-25+ notifications):

• Backlog clearance from pending cases (including potential Taiwan notification)
• Multiple catch-up notifications like the Australia case (amendments crossing thresholds)
• Policy acceleration under EO 14383’s streamlining directives
• Likelihood: ~25%

Extreme High (25+ notifications):

• Requires significant surge beyond recent patterns
• Possible if multiple allies coordinate major procurement announcements
• Likelihood: ~5%

Distribution Rationale

Given the evidence of approximately 10 notifications per month in recent months, I center my distribution around 10 with moderate variance. The distribution is slightly right-skewed because:

• Policy environment favors acceleration
• Catch-up cases can create notification spikes
• Pending significant deals (e.g., Taiwan) could be released

The distribution accounts for uncertainty through wider confidence intervals at the tails, acknowledging both the possibility of summer slowdowns and accelerated processing.

Percentile .1: 2 Percentile 1: 3 Percentile 5: 4 Percentile 10: 6 Percentile 15: 7 Percentile 20: 7 Percentile 25: 8 Percentile 30: 8 Percentile 35: 9 Percentile 40: 9 Percentile 45: 10 Percentile 46: 10 Percentile 47: 10 Percentile 48: 10 Percentile 49: 10 Percentile 50: 11 Percentile 51: 11 Percentile 52: 11 Percentile 53: 11 Percentile 54: 11 Percentile 55: 12 Percentile 60: 12 Percentile 65: 13 Percentile 70: 14 Percentile 75: 15 Percentile 80: 16 Percentile 85: 18 Percentile 90: 20 Percentile 95: 24 Percentile 99: 32 Percentile 99.9: 39

Statutory Section 36(b) review periods impose fixed windows that produce batchy, uneven public releases.

The post shift to the State Department centralized publication but did not eliminate upstream review gates or pipeline accumulation.

Recent months show elevated posting rates and a robust queue of requests and offers upstream, biasing July upward.

Operational brakes — added releasability checks and emergency front-loading — create timing variability and occasional clusters.

A cleared Taiwan package would add several notifications quickly and drive a pronounced right tail.

Alternatively, administrative delays or continued front-loading into May–June could leave July muted despite a healthy pipeline.

Unresolved uncertainties include the hidden pre-notification queue size and the precise date items are posted at the State venue.

Sensitivity is highest to a Taiwan decision, additional Middle East emergency tranches, and short posting lags that move items across month boundaries.

Forecast (median): 12.1 notifications

• Recent momentum is strong: May and June 2026 each ran at roughly ~14 per month, well above the earlier ~5 per month pace seen in March–April.
• July is likely a bit slower, but not a reset: The late-July congressional recess reduces the effective time for notifications, but it’s still a sizable chunk of the month.
• Expect “lumpy” posting: Notifications often arrive in clusters (multiple posts on the same day), which increases the chance of a higher-than-average month.
• Geopolitics keep pressure on: Ongoing regional needs tied to the Iran conflict / Gulf dynamics and the NATO summit support keeping July above the early-2026 low months.
• Main upside swing is a big multi-post release: A Taiwan $14B package currently described as in “abeyance” is the biggest driver of a right-tail spike if it lands in July.