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| Figure/Metric | Value | Source | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| May 2026 UANI Export Rate | 64,921 BPD | UANI / Resolution Criteria | Baseline during the height of the naval blockade. |
| March 2026 UANI Total Exports | 35.7 Million Barrels | UANI / Basic Understanding | Pre-blockade volume under “normal” sanctions. |
| Floating Storage Estimate | >60 Million Barrels | TankerTrackers.com / News | Pent-up supply available for immediate export in July. |
| May 2026 Crude Production | 2.33 Million BPD | OPEC / Trading Economics | 5-year production low; indicates limited new supply. |
| General License X Expiry | August 21, 2026 | U.S. Treasury | Sets the deadline for the current “waiver” period. |
| Pre-war Loading Estimate | 1.85 Million BPD | Kpler / News | The historical “ceiling” for exports before the 2026 conflict. |
My prediction is based on the dramatic shift in the geopolitical and regulatory environment following the June 17, 2026, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the subsequent lifting of the U.S. naval blockade on June 18. During the height of the conflict in May 2026, UANI reported exports fell to a mere 2.01 million barrels (64,921 bpd) as zero crude shipments successfully bypassed maritime enforcement. However, the issuance of U.S. Treasury General License X on June 22 provides a 60-day window authorizing the sale and transport of Iranian crude through August 21, 2026. This creates a powerful incentive for Iran to maximize shipments in July to generate revenue and clear accumulated stocks.
I have weighted the presence of massive “floating storage”—estimated at over 60 million barrels—and onshore storage at Kharg Island (30 million barrels) as a primary driver for a high July figure. TankerTrackers.com already observed a “rapid rebound” in mid-June, with 18 million barrels exported in just five days. If this pace continues, July could theoretically exceed 50 million barrels. However, I have moderated the most likely value to 41.0 million barrels (equivalent to approximately 1.32 million bpd) to account for significant headwinds. These include the reported 30-day timeline for mine clearance in the Strait of Hormuz, damaged infrastructure at the Kharg Island terminal, and the fact that OPEC data shows Iranian production fell to a five-year low of 2.33 million bpd in May, which limits the volume of fresh crude available.
My reasoning assumes a “front-loading” effect where buyers rush to utilize the 60-day waiver before it expires in August. The 50% highest density interval (34.00 to 46.25 million barrels) reflects the uncertainty regarding how quickly international insurance and banking services will re-engage with Iranian cargoes, as well as UANI’s specific methodology, which only counts vessels that successfully cross declared blockade lines. I considered a lower-end scenario where logistical friction persists, keeping exports near the March 2026 level of 35.7 million barrels, but the sheer volume of stranded tankers (71 laden vessels as of June 5) makes a more aggressive clearance more probable.
The question asks what UANI’s July 2026 Iran Tanker Tracker will report for crude/condensate exports, given UANI’s practice of counting departures when vessels cross the declared U.S. blockade line rather than when oil was loaded or received. Forecasters agree the May collapse reflects an enforcement/transit bottleneck—not absence of loaded oil—and that the reported mid‑June MOU/licence and observed tanker crossings (roughly 10–11 tankers/≈20 million barrels) make a July rebound more likely than another near‑zero month. They emphasize that UANI’s crossing‑date accounting and whether backlog clearances are booked in June versus July are determinative, and caution that commercial trackers (Kpler/Vortexa) provide useful physical context but differ methodologically from UANI. Most teams center forecasts in a partial‑to‑strong rebound: roughly 25–50 million barrels (one team 35–45m) as the modal range, with a meaningful upper tail above ~50m if rapid backlog clearance and fresh loadings are counted in July. Remaining downside risk comes from renewed Hormuz closures, insurance/logistics frictions, or a breakdown of the MOU/license that could keep UANI’s July figure low.
Forecast: Probability distribution:
Key anchors from the team’s research: (1) UANI’s May 2026 Iran Tanker Tracker showed a collapse to about 64,921 bpd (~2.0 million barrels/month), indicating that in a “hard enforcement / blockade” regime exports can fall near-zero. (2) In early 2026, UANI reported much higher monthly totals (e.g., ~46.9 million barrels in Jan and ~60.7 million barrels in Feb in one analyst’s cited UANI posts), consistent with ~1.5–2.2 mbpd when exports are flowing. (3) Multiple analysts independently cite mid-June 2026 reporting of a blockade lift / temporary waiver plus a rapid initial surge and meaningful volumes in floating storage; if broadly correct, July 2026 would likely be a high-export month, with 50 million barrels corresponding to ~1.61 mbpd and 62 million barrels to ~2.0 mbpd. Main uncertainties: whether the reported policy shift/waiver persists through July, how much “catch-up” volume is pulled into late June (reducing July), and how UANI’s methodology times/categorizes exports (crude+condensate only). I therefore model July as a mixture: a dominant high-flow regime (roughly 1.6–2.0 mbpd → ~50–62 million barrels) but with a non-trivial downside tail reflecting snapback/disruption risks that could return exports toward the May-like range. Net: median slightly above 50 million barrels and about a bit more than half of probability mass above the 50 million bound (expressed via past-bound percentiles).
An amateur forecast is likely to (a) anchor on May’s ~2 million barrels and underweight the possibility of a regime change in enforcement/waivers, or (b) anchor on the platform’s 50 million upper bound and fail to express substantial probability of outcomes above it. This forecast explicitly uses UANI’s own recent month-to-month volatility (2 million vs ~30–60+ million), incorporates the analysts’ cited mid-June shift and backlog dynamics while still keeping a meaningful snapback downside tail, and correctly places percentiles past 50 to represent open-upper probability mass. Confidence in improvement: moderate, because the key driver is a fast-moving policy/enforcement regime where source verification is the dominant uncertainty.
Forecast rationale (numeric):
— Iteration 1 — Across the forecasts, the main reasoning is that July 2026 should be the first full month after the reported mid-June end of the blockade, so Iranian crude and condensate exports are expected to rebound sharply from May’s near-zero level. The central view is that exports will be near or somewhat below pre-blockade norms, with a rough concentration in the low-to-mid 40 million barrel range, because some combination of lingering production constraints, cautious buyers, and incomplete normalization may cap the recovery.
The biggest driver of uncertainty is backlog timing. Several rationales emphasize that a large number of tankers may have been stranded during the blockade, and if those shipments clear slowly, July could show a spillover surge well above normal monthly volumes. Because UANI counts exports based on vessel movements/crossings, a delayed release can materially shift barrels into July and inflate the monthly total. This creates a strong right tail in the distribution, with some scenarios reaching 60–90+ million barrels.
On the downside, the main risk is that the reported easing proves temporary or partial, or that enforcement/operational disruptions return. In that case, exports could fall back sharply, even to very low levels. Overall, the forecasts agree on a rebound from May, but differ on whether July reflects mostly normalization or a backlog-driven overshoot.
— Iteration 2 — Across the forecasts, the dominant theme is that July 2026 exports are being anchored to the sharp May collapse, not to the pre-blockade baseline. The May figure of about 2.01 million barrels is treated as the key reference point, and the continuing U.S. enforcement/blockade posture is seen as the main reason exports should remain subdued absent a major policy change. That leads to a central expectation in the low-to-mid single digits to perhaps around 5–7 million barrels.
A second shared pattern is strong right-skew / regime-change risk. The forecasts all allow for a large upside if the blockade loosens, is bypassed, or if a backlog of tankers is captured in UANI’s crossing-based measurement. In that case, July could jump dramatically into the 30–60+ million barrel range, making the distribution highly non-linear rather than centered around a smooth recovery path.
The main factors driving the upside scenario are:
There is some disagreement on how quickly any rebound can materialize. One view keeps July very close to May because the blockade still appears active and only limited workarounds are likely. Another gives more weight to an imminent resumption and a tanker backlog, implying a much larger July number. But even the more moderate outlook still expects only partial restoration, not a return to the old 40–50 million barrel monthly norm unless there is a clear regime shift.
Overall, the collective reasoning is: near-term exports are constrained by enforcement, but July remains highly uncertain because a policy or operational change could produce a sudden step-up in measured shipments.
— Iteration 3 — Across the forecasts, the dominant factor is the status of the U.S. blockade and whether it remains effective through July 2026. The reasoning is strongly binary: if the blockade holds, Iranian crude and condensate exports stay suppressed near the very low May 2026 level; if enforcement weakens or the blockade ends, a large backlog of trapped tankers could be released, causing a sharp temporary surge.
The collective view is that July 2026 exports will most likely be around the low single-digit millions of barrels, but the estimate should be understood as highly sensitive to a single geopolitical switch. If the blockade persists, exports remain muted; if it breaks, exports could spike dramatically due to accumulated tanker inventory.
Summary of Rationale Arguments
The Lifting of Sanctions and UANI’s Methodology A central driver for July’s export estimates is the mid-June U.S.-Iran diplomatic agreement and the subsequent issuance of General License X, which temporarily suspends U.S. sanctions through late August. This window legally permits the transport of Iranian oil, eliminating the need for “dark fleet” evasion tactics like AIS spoofing. Because UANI logs exports when vessels physically exit the Gulf of Oman, rather than upon final sale or delivery, the newfound transparency of open sailing will maximize UANI’s tracking visibility and significantly reduce historical undercounting.
Storage Backlog and the Export Push During the severe U.S. naval blockade in the spring of 2026, Iran accumulated a massive backlog of oil in both floating and onshore storage. While a massive “flush” of this stored crude already began clearing in mid-June, forecasters agree that a substantial volume of leftover floating storage and maxed-out onshore tanks at Kharg Island will spill over into July. Driven by the expiration of the sanctions waiver in August, Iran is highly incentivized to operate at maximum capacity, aggressively pushing crude across the maritime boundary into foreign floating storage to secure the oil against future crackdowns.
Production, Logistical, and Market Constraints Despite the high incentives, several physical and economic bottlenecks will cap the upside. Ramping up shut-in domestic oil wells is a technically slow process, limiting the volume of fresh crude available for export. Logistical friction—such as port congestion and a potential shortage of returning vessels—could also throttle daily export rates. Furthermore, because the waiver removes the necessity for steep “sanctions discounts,” Iran’s traditional buyers (independent Chinese “teapot” refineries) are being priced out, which may cause a temporary lag in sales as Iran transitions to mainstream state-owned or international buyers.
Geopolitical Downside Risks Across the rationales, the primary bearish factor is the inherent fragility of the interim ceasefire. With ongoing regional tensions and political posturing, there is a prominent downside risk that the diplomatic talks could unexpectedly collapse. If the U.S. prematurely revokes the waiver and snaps back the naval blockade mid-month, July’s export volumes would plummet abruptly.
Question: How many million barrels of Iranian crude oil and condensate exports will UANI estimate for July 2026? Final Prediction: Probability distribution:
Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled
Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:
The research summarizes UANI and market data through June 23, 2026, showing Iranian crude and condensate exports collapsed under a U.S. naval blockade (April 13) to near-zero in May (UANI: ~64,921 bpd, ~2.01 million barrels for May 2026) but then surged after a June 19 peace agreement as tankers repositioned, with ~36 million barrels exported June 17–22 and a total backlog/storage of roughly 80–96 million barrels (72 million onshore, 14–24 million floating). Historical and capacity reference points cited include 2025 averages of 1.5–1.7 million bpd, production capacity near 3.2–3.3 million bpd, and China as the dominant buyer. Key uncertainties highlighted are insurance/shipping logistics, Strait of Hormuz safety, and implementation details of the peace agreement.
Analyst forecasts and scenario analysis produce a wide range for July 2026: Goldman Sachs projects a return to pre-war levels by end-July (implying ~55–60 million barrels for July); Morgan Stanley expects a slower recovery (30–40% by July, implying ~18–24 million barrels); RBC is more conservative. The research’s scenario probabilities put a central estimate at 40–50 million barrels for July (highest probability), with an overall range of 25–60 million barrels and lower-probability outcomes from near-zero up to full recovery. It lists monitoring priorities (June UANI data, tanker transits, insurance market, China import data, storage levels, and deal implementation) to resolve remaining uncertainty.
Websites / sources used (as named in the research; no direct URLs were provided in the research text):
(No explicit links/URLs were included in the supplied research.)
Most Recent UANI Data:
Recent Developments: The US launched a naval blockade on April 13, 2026, which effectively reduced Iranian crude exports to near-zero in May [4][10]. A peace agreement was announced June 14, 2026, and signed June 19 in Switzerland [3][8]. Following the announcement, Iranian tankers immediately began repositioning, with approximately 36 million barrels exported in just 5-7 days (June 17-22) as the blockade lifted [7][8]. This represents a dramatic surge from stored inventory, with ~80 million barrels stranded at sea and 69-118 tankers waiting in the Persian Gulf [1][2][4][24].
Historical Iranian Export Levels:
Storage Constraints (Critical for July):
China’s Role: China historically absorbs 80-90% of Iranian exports, providing a reliable buyer even under sanctions [15][21][32]. This creates a stable demand floor for Iranian crude.
Goldman Sachs (Optimistic):
Morgan Stanley (Cautious):
RBC Capital Markets (Most Conservative):
Key Uncertainties:
Limited Direct Data:
Reliability Assessment: Limited liquidity and no direct markets for this specific question reduce predictive value of market data.
Scenario 1 - Rapid Recovery (Goldman Sachs baseline):
Scenario 2 - Mixed Recovery with Backlog Clearing:
Scenario 3 - Gradual Recovery (Morgan Stanley baseline):
Scenario 4 - Implementation Failure:
Central Estimate: 40-50 million barrels for July 2026 (1.29-1.61 million bpd average)
Reasoning:
Range: 25-60 million barrels with highest probability density between 40-50 million barrels.
Conditioning on the question not being annulled.
I agree with the critic’s main upward correction. The most important point is the resolution mechanic: UANI’s May tracker explicitly says export figures are assessed when vessels cross the declared blockade line / exit the Gulf of Oman, not when cargoes are delivered. That makes July much more vulnerable to a “line-crossing flood” from already-laden vessels than a normal delivered-volume model would imply. UANI also reported May at only 2.01 million barrels / 64,921 bpd, while noting no crude got past the blockade and that buildup behind the line could make its estimates lower than other trackers. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
I also accept that the “only ~12 days of July under the new regime” framing was too bearish. The MOU text says the U.S. begins removing the blockade immediately and fully ends it within 30 days; it also provides waivers for Iranian crude, petroleum products, transport, insurance, banking, and associated services. Treasury waivers had reportedly already been issued by June 22. So essentially all of July should be under at least partial sanctions/blockade relief if the deal holds. (axios.com)
Where I still resist the critic is on how far upward to move. February 2026’s 60.7 million barrels was an elevated, war-preparation month rather than a clean “normal” month, and January’s 1.51 million bpd is just under the 50M-in-July threshold. So 50M is not hard, but it is not trivial either. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com) Also, the reopening is not frictionless: USNI reports continuing mine-clearance issues, congestion, and recommended routing constraints even after the blockade was lifted; Axios also notes the final nuclear deal remains far from assured. (news.usni.org)
My main new synthesis is that the late-June surge is both bullish and bearish for July. It proves the bottleneck has really opened and UANI-counted crossings can happen quickly. But the easiest already-laden vessels may be counted in June, not July, leaving July dependent on remaining backlog, resumed loadings, and fleet turnaround. That keeps me from putting the median above 50, but it raises my probability above 50M from about 30% to roughly 45%.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 0.2
Percentile 1: 1.0
Percentile 5: 5.2
Percentile 10: 11.5
Percentile 20: 23
Percentile 30: 32.5
Percentile 40: 40
Percentile 50: 46.8
Percentile 60: 53
Percentile 70: 60
Percentile 80: 67
Percentile 90: 78
Percentile 95: 89.5
Percentile 99: 110
Percentile 99.9: 135
Conditioning on normal resolution / no annulment, I accept the critic’s main update: my first forecast underweighted UANI’s accounting mechanics. UANI’s May tracker explicitly says exports were counted when vessels crossed the declared blockade line / exited the Gulf of Oman, and UANI also warned that its figures could be low while laden tankers were stuck inside the line. That makes a July “catch-up” print materially more likely than if we were forecasting true July loadings only. UANI’s June 15 update also identified 71 laden tankers inside the blockade line and ~91 million barrels of Iranian oil loadings since the war began, though not all of that is crude/condensate and some could clear in late June rather than July. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
I still defend a meaningful discount from a simple “backlog clears instantly” view. The MOU’s language points to a 30-day restoration process, not a same-day return to prewar flow, and it still depends on safe passage, de-mining, and continued implementation. Confirmed public tanker-tracking evidence by June 17 was more like three tankers / about 5 million barrels crossing, not the much larger unverified “36 million barrels in a week” claim. Reuters-reported bank commentary also cuts both ways: Goldman expected Gulf exports to normalize by end-July, while Bank of America and others flagged mine clearance / recovery delays of weeks to months. (axios.com)
My anchor remains UANI’s normal sanctioned-flow range: January 2026 was 46.9 million barrels, February’s elevated prewar surge was 60.7 million barrels, and July 2025 was about 53.9 million barrels. So a July 2026 value in the 40s is not “high” relative to normal Iranian exports; the question is whether July is still impaired, normal, or boosted by delayed line-crossing from already-laden ships. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
Net update: I raise the median from just under 39 to about 43.5 million barrels, and raise probability above 50 million barrels to roughly 35%. I do not go much higher because: (1) the 91 million barrel backlog includes products/LPG as well as crude; (2) some backlog may be counted in late June; (3) July begins before the 30-day reopening period is complete; and (4) deal-collapse / reclosure risk remains nontrivial.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 0.2
Percentile 1: 0.8
Percentile 5: 5.0
Percentile 10: 11.0
Percentile 20: 22.0
Percentile 30: 30.5
Percentile 40: 37.5
Percentile 50: 43.5
Percentile 60: 47.8
Percentile 70: 52.5
Percentile 80: 59.5
Percentile 90: 68.5
Percentile 95: 78.0
Percentile 99: 102.0
Percentile 99.9: 125.0
Modal: 31.3-37.5 (15.4%) • frontier aggregate • 5m51s
Resolution sources/checks:
Edge cases:
frontier_1 - Modal: 31.3-37.5 (24.8%)
frontier_2 - Modal: 0-6.3 (18.0%)
frontier_3 - Modal: 43.8-50 (24.0%)
frontier_4 - Modal: 12.5-18.8 (35.0%)
Material notes
Guidance
Revision
| Bin | Probability |
|---|---|
| 0-6.3 | 6.5% |
| 6.3-12.5 | 11.2% |
| 12.5-18.8 | 9.7% |
| 18.8-25 | 8.4% |
| 25-31.3 | 7.4% |
| 31.3-37.5 | 15.4% |
| 37.5-43.8 | 14.5% |
| 43.8-50 | 11.6% |
| Above 50 | 15.3% |
wooley_rhino • run dc6d22b3 • $2.54 • 5m51s
Extracted Percentile Values: {0.1: 1.5, 1.0: 5, 5.0: 12, 10.0: 18, 15.0: 22, 20.0: 25, 25.0: 27, 30.0: 29, 35.0: 31, 40.0: 33, 45.0: 34.5, 46.0: 35, 47.0: 35.3, 48.0: 35.7, 49.0: 36, 50.0: 36.5, 51.0: 37, 52.0: 37.3, 53.0: 37.7, 54.0: 38, 55.0: 38.5, 60.0: 41, 65.0: 43, 70.0: 45, 75.0: 48, 80.0: 52, 85.0: 56, 90.0: 62, 95.0: 70, 99.0: 85, 99.9: 100}
Model’s Answer:
The key data points from UANI’s Tanker Tracker show a dramatic trajectory:
The landscape has shifted dramatically:
Low Outcome Scenario (5-15 million barrels):
Base Case Scenario (30-45 million barrels):
High Outcome Scenario (50-70+ million barrels):
Assumption 1: Sanctions waiver remains in effect throughout July (~90% confidence)
Assumption 2: Iran’s ghost fleet reactivates within 2-3 weeks (~75% confidence)
Assumption 3: Chinese buyers quickly resume full purchases (~80% confidence)
The dramatic policy shift from a naval blockade to sanctions waivers creates high uncertainty. Starting from near-zero in May, the June 17 tanker movements and August 21 waiver deadline suggest strong recovery incentive. However, ramp-up timing is uncertain - the first tankers only left 6 days ago. I center my estimate around 35-38 million barrels (slightly above April’s 29.5 million given the full month of waiver coverage), with wide confidence intervals reflecting both downside risk (deal failure, slow restart) and upside potential (inventory dump, peak exports).
Percentile .1: 1.5 Percentile 1: 5 Percentile 5: 12 Percentile 10: 18 Percentile 15: 22 Percentile 20: 25 Percentile 25: 27 Percentile 30: 29 Percentile 35: 31 Percentile 40: 33 Percentile 45: 34.5 Percentile 46: 35 Percentile 47: 35.3 Percentile 48: 35.7 Percentile 49: 36 Percentile 50: 36.5 Percentile 51: 37 Percentile 52: 37.3 Percentile 53: 37.7 Percentile 54: 38 Percentile 55: 38.5 Percentile 60: 41 Percentile 65: 43 Percentile 70: 45 Percentile 75: 48 Percentile 80: 52 Percentile 85: 56 Percentile 90: 62 Percentile 95: 70 Percentile 99: 85 Percentile 99.9: 100
Basal constraint is transit capacity and legal permission; production exceeds chokepoint throughput.
Maritime risk, insurance, and tanker services are persistent bottlenecks that adjust more slowly than policy signals.
Recent policy steps removed the formal blockade and restored authorization for vessel services, enabling queued loadings to move.
Operational frictions—mines, alternative route limits, and reduced Hormuz traffic—cap the pace at which tonnage can clear the queue.
Month-to-month counts hinge on timing: departures in late June will depress what is recorded in July, while delayed sailings shift volume forward.
If demining and insurance normalization proceed through July, flows can approach pre-crisis run rates; if they stall, recovery will remain partial.
Key uncertainties are how much of the visible backlog has already transited before July and whether buyer/insurer behavior normalizes promptly.
Counting definitions (crude versus condensate and inclusion of petrochemical cargoes) and the durability of political commitments leave material residual risk around a central estimate near 43 million barrels.
Forecast (UANI July 2026): 33.8175 million barrels (Q520)
This resolves to UANI’s estimate, not ground-truth exports, so UANI’s own methodology matters most. In its May 2026 tracker, UANI said export figures are assessed when vessels cross the declared blockade line and exit the Gulf of Oman rather than at loading. That same May tracker reported only 2.01 million barrels for the month and separately said no crude oil exports successfully passed the blockade, meaning May is a poor anchor for July except as proof that UANI’s count can collapse when crossings stop. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
Before the blockade bit, UANI’s own monthly totals were much higher. Its summer 2025 tracker gives July 2025 at 1,738,187 barrels per day, which converts to 53.883797 million barrels for a 31-day month. UANI also reported 48.3 million barrels in December 2025, 46.9 million in January 2026, 60.7 million in February 2026, 35.7 million in March 2026, and 29.5 million in April 2026. So a fully normalized July would naturally live somewhere around the upper-40s to upper-50s, not near May’s near-zero crude result. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
As of June 18, 2026, UANI said CENTCOM had lifted the blockade on all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports. In the same June 18 update, UANI said four Iranian-flagged crude-laden tankers had departed the Gulf of Oman since June 16 and that at least 75 tankers laden with Iranian oil were still operating inside the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Reuters reported on June 17 that at least three tankers carrying about 5 million barrels had already passed the U.S. blockade, and Bloomberg reported on June 19 that Iran was shipping large amounts of oil previously held back by the blockade. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
The bullish case for July is therefore real. Kpler’s June 22 analysis said Iran’s oil production could rise to 3.5 million barrels per day by August, identified about 35 million barrels of available ballast capacity across 21 tankers already near the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman, and described 72 million barrels of stranded oil as available to be unleashed once the blockade and waivers took effect. AP also reported on June 22 that a U.S. license authorizing the production, delivery, and sale of Iranian oil runs through August 21, 2026. Those facts make a sharp July recovery much more plausible than a slow crawl from May’s near-zero crude crossings. (kpler.com)
The main reason I do not simply forecast a full snap-back to 50-plus million barrels is that shipping conditions are still impaired and politically fragile. AP reported on June 23 that only 71 ships were confirmed through Hormuz over the weekend, versus about 100 to 130 per day before the war, and that the main central route remains mined and closed. Reuters reported on June 18 that banks expected Gulf oil exports to normalize only by the end of July, not immediately. Iran also threatened a renewed closure on June 20 over Lebanon, though AP reported on June 22 that the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire appeared to be holding and that U.S.-Iran technical talks were continuing. (apnews.com)
My synthesis is as follows. I assign about a 10% chance to renewed breakdown or repeated re-closures that keep July below 20 million barrels; about a 35% chance to only partial recovery, roughly 20 to 40 million barrels; about a 40% chance that UANI records a strong reopening month in the 40 to 50 million barrel range; and about a 15% chance of an overshoot above 50 million barrels if backlog clears quickly and UANI’s crossing-line methodology captures a large release of previously trapped barrels. That overshoot tail is meaningful because pre-blockade UANI months were often already near or above 50 million barrels, and because large volumes were visibly waiting inside the former blockade zone. This paragraph is my inference from the cited sources, not a reported outside forecast. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
Putting those pieces together, my central forecast is 39.0 million barrels, with the median a bit above 40 million barrels. The distribution is deliberately right-skewed: reopening and backlog create real upside, but the still-fragile security and negotiating environment leave a material downside tail as of Tuesday, June 23, 2026. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
As of June 23, 2026, this question resolves to UANI’s own July 2026 estimate, so the key is UANI’s methodology rather than generic customs or tanker-flow data. UANI says its tracker uses AIS, satellite imagery, tanker comparison and classification, cargo datasets, and ship-to-ship transfer analysis to estimate exports of Iranian oil and gas condensates. During the blockade period, UANI also made clear that its figures were based on physical exports leaving Iranian waters or successfully passing the blockade, not just on barrels loaded at port. That means a reopening can create a very sharp month-to-month jump if previously stranded cargoes suddenly begin crossing the line. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
The best base-rate anchors are UANI’s own recent monthly numbers. UANI reported 46.9 million barrels in January 2026, 60.7 million in February, 35.7 million in March, 29.5 million in April, and only 2.012551 million in May after the blockade crushed exports. UANI’s July 2025 rate was 1,738,187 bpd, which converts to 53.883797 million barrels in a 31-day month, while January 2026’s 1,511,457 bpd converts to 46.855167 million barrels. A simple average of UANI’s January through April 2026 monthly totals is 43.2 million barrels. So a normal-ish July 2026 under reopened shipping lanes plausibly lands somewhere around the low-40s to mid-50s, while continued disruption could still keep it much lower. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
The immediate post-deal evidence is strongly bullish relative to May. The U.S.-Iran memorandum says the United States will remove the blockade, Iran will restore safe passage, and Treasury will issue waivers for exports of Iranian crude and for associated banking, insurance, and transportation services. CENTCOM announced the blockade had ended on June 18. Reuters then reported on June 22 that Treasury’s temporary general license authorizes Iranian crude, petroleum, and petrochemical sales through August 21. That means all of July sits inside the temporary waiver window. (axios.com)
Operationally, flows restarted almost immediately. UANI’s June 16 shipping update said DIONA and HERO II had reappeared on AIS passing the U.S. blockade after leaving the Chabahar anchorage. Reuters reported on June 17 that DIONA and HERO II were each carrying about 2 million barrels and that SONIA I was carrying about 1 million barrels; those cargoes had been loaded in late March or early April. By June 22, Reuters reported that more than 25 million barrels of Iranian oil had passed the virtual blockade line since the prior Monday. That weekly pace converts to 3.5714285714285716 million bpd or 110.71428571428572 million barrels over a 31-day month, which is obviously too high to treat as a sustainable July run rate, but it is powerful evidence that July will not begin from the May floor. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
There is also a meaningful queue to drain. UANI said on June 16 that at least 73 tankers laden with Iranian oil were still operating inside the blockade line, and that since the start of the conflict it had tracked at least 96 Iranian oil loadings totaling about 91 million barrels. UANI’s May tracker also said more than 80 million barrels of crude and petrochemicals were effectively stranded. Those facts create a real right-tail possibility that July prints above ordinary sanctions-era flow because UANI counts physical crossings, not merely fresh July loadings. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
I do not, however, forecast an automatic return to the February extreme. The shipping environment is still unstable. AP reported today, June 23, that traffic has picked up but remains far below the pre-war norm, and Reuters reported that Iran again said it had closed the waterway over the weekend, with only five vessels passing on Sunday versus 26 on Saturday; Clarksons said daily transits remain below the roughly 125 crossings seen before hostilities. Demand is not a perfect green light either: Reuters reported Chinese demand has been lackluster and Kpler said a large-scale increase in crude buying is unlikely unless Beijing relaxes product-export limits or replenishes strategic reserves. (apnews.com)
One more factual anchor matters for calibration: July is fully inside the current U.S. license window, but the temporary authorization runs only through August 21, which creates some incentive to move barrels quickly. Historical UANI benchmarks for a strong month are therefore not crazy references: July 2025 was 53.883797 million barrels and February 2026 was 60.7 million barrels. (za.investing.com)
My forecast is a four-scenario mixture: 10% renewed disruption or ceasefire breakdown with July near 15 million barrels; 30% cautious reopening with persistent maritime frictions around 39 million; 40% substantial normalization under the 60-day waiver around 48 million; and 20% backlog flush plus a rush to sell before the waiver expires around 62 million. The weighted mean is 44.800000 million barrels, and that is my point forecast. This leaves a meaningful right tail above 50.0 million barrels, so the CDF at 50.0 intentionally remains below 1.0.
Resolution mechanics: this resolves to UANI’s July 2026 estimate of Iranian crude oil and condensate exports, using the monthly total if provided, otherwise July barrels per day × 31 / 1,000,000. UANI’s recent 2026 series ran 46.9 million barrels in January, 60.7 in February, 35.7 in March, 29.5 in April, and 2.01 in May. May also used a stricter blockade-line methodology, while April used departures from Iranian waters, so methodology itself is now part of the forecasting problem. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
The biggest bullish input for July is the mid-June policy reversal. The U.S.-Iran memorandum provided for waivers on Iranian oil exports and associated services, and on June 22 Treasury issued a temporary general license through August 21 authorizing the production, delivery, and sale of Iranian oil. U.S. officials said the Switzerland talks made encouraging progress, and Washington says Iran committed to permit IAEA inspectors and maintain free and open transit in Hormuz. That makes July much more likely to be a rebound month than another May-style collapse. (axios.com)
There is also ample physical supply ready to move. UANI said on June 16 that at least 73 tankers laden with Iranian oil were still inside the blockade line and that it had tracked 96 Iranian oil loadings since the conflict began, representing about 91 million barrels. Reuters, citing Kpler, said the lifting of U.S. restrictions could release around 72 million barrels stranded on tankers west of Chabahar, and Reuters separately reported that at least three tankers carrying about 5 million barrels had already passed the blockade by June 17. If July tracking moves back toward the pre-blockade style of counting departures from Iranian waters, some of that backlog can show up quickly in UANI’s July total even though the oil was loaded earlier. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
The main bearish input is that shipping conditions are still fragile. AP reported on June 23 that traffic through Hormuz had picked up but remained well below the prewar pace, with Kpler confirming 71 ships between Friday and Sunday versus roughly 100 to 130 vessels a day before the war. AP also reported a weekend clash over whether Iran had reclosed the strait, and Reuters said ship counts fell sharply after Iran said it had done so. Reuters and AP both say normalization could still take months, and Goldman Sachs’ base case is only for Persian Gulf exports to return to prewar levels by the end of July. UANI itself said on June 18 that it remains skeptical of the memorandum and warned that with the blockade lifted and waivers issued, Iran may resume stalling while the risk of renewed conflict stays elevated. (apnews.com)
Demand is another reason I do not simply snap back to February’s 60.7 million barrels. Reuters reported that many Asian refiners had already booked June to August cargoes, more than 1.8 million barrels per day of Chinese refining capacity is scheduled to shut for July maintenance, and a large-scale increase in crude buying looked unlikely without extra Chinese policy support. The same report, however, said Chinese throughput should recover above 13 million barrels per day in July from about 12.4 million in June, so July demand should be better than late spring even if it is not fully unconstrained. (investing.com)
My forecast therefore uses three scenarios: a low case with renewed disruptions or a semi-closed Hormuz, a base case with continuing waivers and gradual normalization, and a high case where backlog release and looser post-blockade measurement push the July print much higher. I set those at 15% centered on 25 million barrels, 55% centered on 42.5 million barrels, and 30% centered on 52 million barrels. That mixture has a mean of about 42.725 million barrels, or about 1.3782258064516129 million barrels per day over 31 days. My central forecast is 42.5 million barrels, which is about 1.3709677419354838 million barrels per day.
I keep a meaningful upper tail above 50 because UANI’s July 2025 figure was 1.738187 million barrels per day, which is 53.883797 million barrels for a 31-day month, showing that UANI can print above 50 in midsummer when logistics are working. But I do not center that high because June 2026 traffic is still visibly below normal and the political arrangement remains fragile. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
As of Tuesday, June 23, 2026, the first thing I would anchor on is UANI methodology, because the resolution is to UANI rather than to Kpler, Vortexa, customs data, or Iranian official claims. UANI said in its May 2026 tracker that export figures are assessed when vessels cross the declared blockade line and exit the Gulf of Oman, not at the point of loading. That matters a lot in a month when ships may be queued or moving in bursts. It also creates a small resolution ambiguity: UANI’s May headline total was 2.01 million barrels even though UANI separately said no crude oil exports successfully passed the blockade, because May still included four naphtha exports and some LPG. So I am forecasting against the monthly headline total that UANI is most likely to publish for July, while recognizing that the tracker’s category labels are not perfectly aligned with the market’s narrower crude-and-condensate language. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
The recent UANI history gives a useful range. UANI reported 46.9 million barrels in January 2026, 60.7 million in February, 35.7 million in March, 29.5 million in April, and then 2.01 million in May after the blockade bit hard. UANI’s summer 2025 tracker implies 53.883797 million barrels for July 2025, 49.43991 million for June 2025, and 45.100412 million for August 2025. So a July 2026 outcome in the 40s would represent a very large rebound from May, but it would still be below a strong normal summer month and well below February 2026’s peak. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
The main bullish driver is that the legal and physical bottlenecks have eased abruptly in the last week. The AP transcript of the U.S.-Iran memorandum says the United States will begin removing its naval blockade immediately and fully end it within 30 days, while Iran says commercial traffic will start immediately and be reinstated within 30 days as technical and military obstacles are removed and demining proceeds. Reuters reported on June 16 that the waiver for Iranian oil sales would cover banking, transportation, and insurance, and Reuters reported on June 22 that Treasury had issued a general license allowing the sale of Iranian crude oil and related products through August 21, 2026. July therefore sits entirely inside the current sanctions-waiver window. (apnews.com)
There is also hard evidence that flows are already restarting. UANI said that as of May 31 there were about 69 laden tankers inside the blockade line, collectively holding more than 80 million barrels of crude and petrochemicals that were effectively stranded. Bloomberg then reported on June 19 that 11 tankers carrying 20 million barrels left Chabahar during the week after the peace deal. Reuters reported on June 17 that three tankers carrying roughly 5 million barrels had already passed the blockade, and Reuters reported on June 22 that more than 25 million barrels of Iranian oil had crossed the virtual blockade line since June 15, with three sanctioned VLCCs loaded in late April and early May exiting the strait on June 22. Reuters also cited more than 100 million barrels of Iranian oil in storage and on tankers, with more than 60 million barrels outside the blockade, which means Iran has ample supply to monetize quickly if transit and compliance conditions hold. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
The bearish side is that normalization still looks incomplete and fragile. AP reported that although alternative northern and southern routes are open, the central route remains constrained and a full reopening could still take weeks or months. Reuters summarized bank views saying Gulf exports may normalize only by end-July or later, with Bank of America warning that mine clearance could take months. Reuters also reported on June 22 that traffic had dropped sharply after Iran again said it had shut the strait over the weekend, which is a reminder that the current arrangement is performance-based and politically brittle. Demand is not a perfect offset either: Reuters said on June 17 that Chinese demand for Iranian oil looked lackluster because of poor domestic margins, although another Reuters report said Chinese throughput is expected to recover above 13 million barrels per day in July. (apnews.com)
Putting those pieces together, my base case is a large rebound but not a full return to February-style strength. The strongest upward forces are: July is fully inside the waiver period; a large backlog was already stranded by end-May; and crossing-line data suggest a rapid late-June release of stored barrels. The strongest downward forces are: UANI’s crossing-line methodology tends to lag loadings; traffic management, insurance, mine clearance, and shipowner confidence are still not normal; and the ceasefire has already shown signs of wobbling. My central estimate is 43.500000 million barrels, which is roughly 1.4032258 million barrels per day across 31 days. I give a meaningful right tail above 50 because the backlog-release story is real, but I still put more probability below 50 than above because the transit system is not yet fully normalized and the interim deal could still degrade. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
I am forecasting the headline July 2026 value that UANI is likely to place on its tracker. The key methodological point is that UANI assesses exports when vessels cross the declared blockade line / depart Iranian waters, not at the loading point. That makes July unusually sensitive not just to production and Chinese demand, but to whether already-loaded tankers are actually allowed to leave in July. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
Before the May collapse, UANI’s own data implied a much higher baseline. UANI reported 46.9 million barrels in January 2026, 60.7 million in February, 35.7 million in March, and 29.5 million in April. Longer-run history also shows that a normal 31-day month has often been near 50 million barrels: UANI’s July 2025 figure was about 53.88 million barrels, summer 2025 averaged about 49.47 million barrels per month, and UANI’s 2024 average monthly exports were about 48.94 million barrels. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
The immediate bearish evidence is obvious: UANI’s May 2026 tracker showed only 2.01 million barrels total, or 64,921 bpd, a 93% drop from April, and UANI said no crude oil exports successfully passed the U.S. blockade in May. UANI had also identified at least 76 laden Iranian oil tankers inside the blockade line by June 11, showing that supply existed even while outward movement was choked. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
Since mid-June, however, the picture has turned much more constructive for July. UANI reported on June 16 that two laden Iran-flagged tankers had passed the blockade and that at least 41 empty Iran-flagged tankers had begun attempts to return from Southeast Asia toward Iran, consistent with a restart of the shuttle system. Reuters also reported that Iran’s fleet was repositioning for higher exports and that Kpler estimated around 72 million barrels of Iranian crude stranded on tankers west of Chabahar could be released if restrictions were lifted. (unitedagainstnucleariran.com)
The most important bullish development is political: on June 22, 2026, the U.S. Treasury authorized the production, delivery, and sale of Iranian crude oil and related products through August 21, including associated banking, insurance, and transportation services. That creates a real path to a sharp July rebound in UANI’s counted exports. But I am not moving the central case all the way back to a clean 50-60 million-barrel baseline, because conditions are still unstable. AP reported on June 23 that traffic had picked up but remained far below prewar norms and that Iran had again declared the Strait reclosed over the weekend; Reuters reported on June 22 that only five vessels passed on Sunday versus 26 the prior day. Reuters also noted that many Asian refiners already have June-August cargoes booked and that more than 1.8 million bpd of Chinese refining capacity is scheduled for July maintenance, which should slow the immediate absorption of extra Iranian barrels. (au.investing.com)
My synthesis is a three-regime forecast. I infer roughly a 15% chance of renewed effective closure or failed implementation, giving something like 0-10 million barrels; a 50% chance of messy but meaningful partial reopening, giving roughly 20-40 million barrels; and a 35% chance that the waiver works well enough for UANI to count a substantial backlog release plus resumed loadings, giving roughly 50-65 million barrels. That yields a mean forecast near 37.1 million barrels and a substantial right tail above 50. (au.investing.com)
My best single-number forecast is 37.0 million barrels for July 2026 on UANI’s tracker.