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Question: on which weekly Drewry WCI nominal report date between 2026-06-03 and 2026-08-12 will the index reach its in-window maximum? Drewry WCI is published weekly (Thursday nominal dates), so the likely resolving dates are the Thursdays from 2026-06-04 through 2026-08-06. All teams agree the series enters the window already rising (May 4–28 saw four consecutive gains) and that June GRIs/PSSs, carrier surcharges, Freightos daily-rate spikes, blank sailings, and bunker-cost/geo‑risk pressures make further early-June strength likely. Counter-signals—decelerating weekly gains, NRF/Global Port Tracker indicating partly front‑loaded demand, and potential Suez/Red Sea normalization—make a quick mid/late‑June peak plausible. Forecasters commonly place the center of mass in late June to mid‑July (the 2024 disruption/mid‑July analogue) with smaller probability on an early June front‑loaded spike (2025 analogue) or a late‑window peak if capacity discipline persists (2013/2021‑type regimes). The open-ended “>2026-08-12” outcome is treated as a very low-probability operational edge case (missing/unusual nominal dates), since if rates keep rising the last qualifying in‑window report (likely 2026-08-06) should resolve as the maximum. Key near-term diagnostics to watch are the June 4, June 11, and June 18 prints to see whether surcharges stick or gains fade.
Forecast: Probability distribution:
We are forecasting the nominal report date (assigned 14:00 UTC) whose Drewry WCI Composite value is the highest within 2026-06-03 to 2026-08-12 (inclusive by date), with ties going to the earliest such report date. The WCI is typically published weekly (commonly on Thursdays), giving roughly ~10 candidate report dates in-window (early June through early August).
Across analysts, the key shared evidence is that immediately pre-window (May 28, 2026) the index was rising for several weeks and Drewry commentary expected further upward pressure in the coming weeks, with demand reportedly front-loaded into June ahead of a July 1 bunker/fuel adjustment and carrier surcharges/GRIs. That pattern supports a local maximum occurring in late June to mid-July (if front-loading leads to a crest and then stabilization/decline). However, there remains a meaningful scenario where rates keep rising through July (or are volatile but drift upward), in which case the in-window maximum would likely occur at the last regular in-window report date (around 2026-08-06).
Open-tail (“>2026-08-12T12:00:00Z”) should be low-probability but non-zero: it could occur if no qualifying reports are published in the window, if the relevant nominal-date maximum ends up on a nominal date that timestamps after the platform’s range_max_utc cutoff, or if the publication cadence changes in a way that pushes the earliest maximum-qualifying nominal datetime past the cutoff. I express this as a small 1–5% mass in the open-after bin via p99 placed past the upper bound.
Synthesis choice: compared with the most early-skewed forecast (median late June) and the most late-skewed (median late July with heavy mass on Aug 6), I place the median in mid-July, with substantial probability on late July / Aug 6, reflecting both the front-loading narrative and the plausible continuation of summer strength/volatility.
An amateur forecast is likely to (a) spread probability roughly uniformly across the window or (b) anchor on “the last possible date” without considering why a peak might occur earlier (front-loading ahead of July 1 and Drewry’s near-term commentary), and may also mishandle the open-upper tail by stacking mass at the bound rather than placing it strictly past the bound. My forecast instead (1) conditions on the weekly report cadence and the argmax-within-window structure, (2) balances front-loaded June strength against the realistic possibility of continued increases into late July/early August, and (3) allocates a small but explicit open-tail probability using past-bound percentile placement. Confidence: moderate—shipping rates can be shock-driven, so I keep a wide enough spread rather than over-concentrating on one Thursday.
Forecast rationale (numeric):
— Iteration 1 — Across the forecasts, the core view is that the Drewry World Container Index is already in an upswing and is likely to keep rising before topping out. The main drivers cited are:
Most of the reasoning points to the index not peaking immediately and instead continuing higher for several weeks. Several forecasts place the most likely maximum in July, especially early to mid-July, when capacity constraints and seasonal demand are expected to be strongest.
The main split is how long the rally persists:
The forecasts collectively suggest a July peak is most likely, with the exact timing depending on how quickly blank sailings and demand pressure ease. The distribution is centered on early-to-mid July, but there is a credible tail into late July / early August if tight market conditions persist.
— Iteration 2 — Across the forecasts, the dominant view is that the Drewry World Container Index is most likely to reach its high point late in the June 3–August 12 window, with the strongest individual emphasis on the August 6 report and a secondary cluster around late July.
The collective reasoning points to a late-period maximum, driven by recent upward momentum, seasonal shipping strength, and the weekly Thursday cadence, with August 6 the single most favored date and late July to early August the broader most likely zone.
— Iteration 3 — Across the forecasts, the main reasoning is that the Drewry World Container Index is on an upward path, but the exact peak date depends on how long that momentum persists before easing.
The collective reasoning suggests the WCI’s maximum is most likely to occur in July, with the strongest concentration around early-to-mid July, while allowing for a meaningful chance of a late-July or early-August peak if the current upward pressure persists.
Summary of Rationales
The rationales reflect a strong consensus that the traditional late-summer shipping peak has been pulled forward to early-to-mid summer due to massive “front-loading” by importers. Forecasters agree on several key drivers and market dynamics shaping this timeline:
Question: When will the Drewry World Container Index hit its maximum value during the period in question? Final Prediction: Probability distribution:
Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled
Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 3: Probability distribution:
The research states that as of May 28, 2026 the Drewry World Container Index (WCI) stood at $2,800/40ft, its highest level since July 2025 and marking a fourth consecutive weekly increase. Key drivers cited are an unusually early peak season with demand frontloaded into June ahead of a July 1, 2026 bunker fuel price adjustment; geopolitical disruptions (Strait of Hormuz tensions and Red Sea crisis) forcing reroutes and longer transit times; carrier capacity management including blank sailings and $2,000 peak season surcharges effective June 1; and route-specific rate strength (examples: Shanghai–Genoa, Shanghai–New York, Shanghai–Rotterdam). Short-term forecasts in the research expect continued rate increases through June, with some models (Trading Economics) projecting higher containerized freight index values by end-Q2, while industry commentary and structural fleet additions imply potential relief later in H2 2026.
For the period June 3–August 12, 2026 the research analyzes three scenarios and concludes the most likely timing for the WCI maximum is in June 2026—specifically mid-to-late June (approximately June 11–25)—based on current upward momentum, demand frontloading ahead of the July 1 fuel adjustment, 2025 precedent of an early-June peak, and recent carrier surcharges and blank sailings. A July maximum is considered possible but less likely because the frontloading incentive ends on July 1 and historical patterns showed declines by late July; an August maximum is judged unlikely given expected overcapacity and depleted late-summer demand. The research notes key uncertainties (geopolitical escalation/resolution, carrier blank-sailing behavior, demand durability, weather/port disruptions, and fuel price volatility) and cites the current WCI level ($2,800) as a quantitative anchor.
Websites / sources used (as cited in the research):
(Specific industry reports, press releases and articles from these outlets were referenced in the research.)
The Drewry World Container Index (WCI) currently stands at $2,800 per 40-foot container as of May 28, 2026, marking the highest level since July 2025 and representing the fourth consecutive weekly increase [11][12][19][20]. This reflects a dramatic rise from $1,899 in late February 2026 and $2,553 on May 14, 2026 [1][2][3][20].
The 2026 shipping market is experiencing an unusually early peak season, with demand being deliberately pulled forward into June ahead of the July 1, 2026 bunker fuel price adjustment [7][11][12]. This represents a departure from traditional July-August peak patterns.
Short-Term Outlook (June 2026):
Medium-Term Outlook (July-August 2026):
Traditional Pattern: Peak shipping rates typically occur during July-August (back-to-school) and September-December (holiday shopping) [15]
2025 Precedent (Most Relevant):
Scenario 1: Maximum in June 2026 (Most Probable)
Supporting factors:
Currently rising for 4 consecutive weeks with forecasts for continued increases [11][12][20]
Demand deliberately frontloaded into June ahead of July 1 fuel adjustment [11][12]
2025 precedent showed early June peak followed by July-August decline [14][18]
New surcharges effective June 1 adding $2,000/container [2][3][6]
Likely timing: Mid-to-late June (approximately June 11-25 reports)
Scenario 2: Maximum in Early July 2026 (Possible)
Supporting factors:
Momentum could carry through July 1 deadline
Traditional peak season is July-August [15]
Limiting factors:
Frontloading incentive disappears after July 1
2025 pattern showed decline by late July [18]
Scenario 3: Maximum in Late July/August 2026 (Less Likely)
Note: I found no active prediction markets (Polymarket, Metaculus, Manifold) specifically tracking the Drewry WCI maximum timing for this period. The container shipping market lacks retail prediction market coverage despite being a liquid professional market with weekly published data.
The most likely outcome is that the Drewry WCI will reach its maximum value in June 2026, likely between June 11-25, based on:
The probability of a July maximum is secondary but non-trivial, while an August maximum appears unlikely given structural overcapacity pressures and the demand frontloading dynamic that will leave less cargo available for late summer shipments.
Quantitative Anchor: Current WCI of $2,800 [11][12] is already 47% above late February levels ($1,899) [20], suggesting the rally is maturing. The 2025 early peak pattern provides the strongest reference class for timing expectations.
Conditioning on no annulment and normal weekly Drewry publication.
I accept the critic’s Round 3 correction. My Round 2 update probably over-learned the “July 1 BAF is included in WCI” point and pushed too much mass into July 2/9/16. The key refinement is that Drewry’s methodology cuts both ways: WCI includes BAF/PSS and other applicable surcharges, but it is based on agreed rates with 7-day to 1-month validity, not mere carrier announcements. That means July 1-related fuel charges can be reflected in late-June agreed rates, while announced mid-June hikes can fail to become assessed rates if shippers resist. (drewry.co.uk)
I still think the core peak window is June 25 through July 9. Drewry’s May 28 report had WCI up for a fourth week to $2,800/FEU, with rate increases on Asia–Europe and transpacific routes, upcoming FAK/PSS increases, blank sailings, demand pulled forward into June ahead of the July 1 bunker adjustment, and Drewry’s expectation of further upward pressure in coming weeks. (drewry.co.uk) Freightos’ June 2 update supports a delayed/extended peak risk because ex-Asia daily rates were only starting to spike and Asia–Europe had already surpassed last year’s peak-season highs while transpacific still had catch-up room. (freightos.com)
But I agree the early-failure/late-June-peak case deserves more weight than I gave it. S&P described a split North America market, with tight capacity and blank sailings but also doubts that demand was strong enough to justify broad GRIs; that increases the chance that announced increases only partly stick and that the WCI rolls over after a late-June high. (spglobal.com) The tie/plateau rule also slightly favors earlier dates if the index reaches a high level and then flattens.
I am therefore moving some probability from July 2/9/16 back to June 18/25, while keeping the median at July 2 and preserving a meaningful late-July tail. My approximate mass is now: Jun 4 ~1.5%, Jun 11 ~4%, Jun 18 ~16%, Jun 25 ~19%, Jul 2 ~20%, Jul 9 ~15.5%, Jul 16 ~11%, Jul 23 ~7%, Jul 30 ~4%, Aug 6 ~2%.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-06-04
Percentile 1: 2026-06-04
Percentile 5: 2026-06-11
Percentile 10: 2026-06-18
Percentile 20: 2026-06-18
Percentile 30: 2026-06-25
Percentile 40: 2026-06-25
Percentile 50: 2026-07-02
Percentile 60: 2026-07-02
Percentile 70: 2026-07-09
Percentile 80: 2026-07-16
Percentile 90: 2026-07-23
Percentile 95: 2026-07-30
Percentile 99: 2026-08-06
Percentile 99.9: 2026-08-06
Conditioning on the question not being annulled, I think the critic’s main point is valid: my prior was too crisp around a late-June peak. Drewry’s WCI is not a list-price index; it uses agreed rates on which cargo is or is expected to move, with 7-day-to-1-month validity, and it includes bunker factors and other surcharges such as PSS and congestion/risk-related surcharges. That creates a plausible measurement lag into early July rather than a clean “June demand peak = June WCI peak” mapping. (drewry.co.uk)
I still think the modal region remains June 18–July 2. Drewry’s May 28 report has the composite at $2,800, up for a fourth straight week, with Drewry explicitly citing early peak-season demand, Asia–Europe and Transpacific increases, June 1 FAK/PSS attempts, blank sailings, and demand pulled forward into June ahead of the July 1 bunker fuel adjustment. Drewry also says it expects further upward pressure in coming weeks—not necessarily all summer. (drewry.co.uk)
The strongest adjustment is to give July 2 / July 9 / July 16 more mass. Freightos’ June 2 update says June 1 GRIs/PSS had daily rates spiking by roughly $1,000–$1,800/FEU on key ex-Asia trades, with further mid-month increases announced; this supports additional June gains, but the WCI’s agreed-rate methodology can let those increases show up with a lag. (freightos.com)
I also accept the critic’s correction on the geopolitical mechanism: I should not model Strait of Hormuz tension as directly forcing Cape rerouting in the way a Red Sea/Suez disruption does. I now treat that risk mainly as fuel-cost/surcharge pressure and congestion sentiment. That keeps a right tail, but not enough to make August likely. The 2025 frontloading analogy still argues that these spikes can be brief: by late July 2025, Freightos described Transpacific peak season as early/brief, with mid-July GRIs failing as demand eased, though Asia–Europe behaved less uniformly. (freightos.com)
So I’m moving the median one week later to 2026-07-02, pushing the 80th percentile to 2026-07-16, and giving a fatter late-July/August tail than before. I still keep most probability before mid-July because frontloading, overcapacity, and the tie rule all work against a late-window maximum.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-06-04
Percentile 1: 2026-06-04
Percentile 5: 2026-06-11
Percentile 10: 2026-06-11
Percentile 20: 2026-06-18
Percentile 30: 2026-06-25
Percentile 40: 2026-06-25
Percentile 50: 2026-07-02
Percentile 60: 2026-07-02
Percentile 70: 2026-07-09
Percentile 80: 2026-07-16
Percentile 90: 2026-07-30
Percentile 95: 2026-08-06
Percentile 99: 2026-08-06
Percentile 99.9: 2026-08-06
Conditioning on not annulled, I accept most of the critic’s second-round adjustment. My median stays 2026-07-02, but I am moving additional probability from late June / early July into July 16–July 30.
The strongest criticism is the index-mechanics point. WCI is not a pure demand-volume measure; Drewry’s methodology includes agreed all-in ocean freight with bunker adjustment factors and applicable surcharges, including PSS, and uses rates with 7-day to 1-month validity. That means a July 1 bunker/fuel reset can plausibly support a July 2 / July 9 / July 16 index high even if physical frontloading peaks in June. At the same time, the methodology excludes mere quotes/offers, so announced GRIs/FAKs should not be over-counted unless they stick in actual agreed rates. (drewry.co.uk)
I also accept the composite-index critique. Drewry says the WCI is a volume-weighted composite of eight East-West routes, not just a transpacific gauge. Asia–Europe and Asia–Mediterranean can therefore carry the composite later even if transpacific frontloading fades. Freightos’ May 19 update is relevant: Asia–Europe rates in both 2024 and 2025 picked up before peaking around mid-July, and some 2026 daily rates were already firming before June. (drewry.co.uk) (freightos.com)
The near-term upward case is still strong. Drewry’s 2026-05-28 report had WCI up for the fourth straight week to $2,800/40ft, with Drewry citing Asia–Europe and transpacific increases, early peak-season demand, June frontloading ahead of the expected July 1 bunker adjustment, FAK/PSS increases, blank sailings, and “further upwards pressure” in coming weeks. Freightos’ June 2 update adds that daily rates were spiking after June 1 GRIs/PSSs, with additional mid-month increases announced. That makes June 4 / June 11 a less likely ultimate maximum than I had originally allowed, unless the rate push immediately fails. (drewry.co.uk) (freightos.com)
But I still resist pushing the center deep into late July. The frontloading incentive is real; Drewry explicitly says demand is being pulled forward into June before the July 1 bunker adjustment. There is also a weaker medium-term fundamental backdrop: Drewry’s 2026 financial-health outlook says spot rates are forecast to decline further as overcapacity worsens, and S&P’s mid-May reporting described a split North America market with fuel and capacity management doing much of the work while demand was not uniformly strong enough to justify broad GRIs. (drewry.co.uk) (drewry.co.uk) (spglobal.com)
My updated mental distribution is roughly: low single digits for June 4, modest chance June 11/18, substantial mass June 25–July 9, then a fatter-but-still-secondary right tail through July 16/23/30 and a small disruption-driven chance of August 6. I now put the probability of the maximum being by July 9 around the mid-70s rather than ~80%, and the probability of July 16 or later around 20–25%.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-06-04
Percentile 1: 2026-06-04
Percentile 5: 2026-06-11
Percentile 10: 2026-06-18
Percentile 20: 2026-06-25
Percentile 30: 2026-06-25
Percentile 40: 2026-07-02
Percentile 50: 2026-07-02
Percentile 60: 2026-07-09
Percentile 70: 2026-07-09
Percentile 80: 2026-07-16
Percentile 90: 2026-07-23
Percentile 95: 2026-07-30
Percentile 99: 2026-08-06
Percentile 99.9: 2026-08-06
Modal: Jun 29, 2026 to Jul 08, 2026 (23.0%) • partial_shift • 8m31s
Reading: strict
The resolution criteria are highly specific: they define exactly which source to use, precisely how nominal dates are assigned timestamps (14:00 UTC), a hard cutoff at 2026-08-12T12:00:00Z for in-window resolution, tie-breaking rules, and conditions for annulment. This leaves very little room for charitable interpretation — the resolver must follow the literal criteria closely, including the edge case where a nominal date of August 12 at 14:00 UTC falls after the 12:00 UTC cutoff.
Total evidence registered (shared pool): ?
| Variant | Perspective | Model | Turns | Tools | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | inside_view (inside_view_v1) | openai/gpt-5-mini | 25 | 25 | OK |
| 1 | outside_view (outside_view_v1) | anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6 | 25 | 41 | OK |
| 2 | contrarian (contrarian_v1) | openai/gpt-5 | 9 | 9 | OK |
Evidence confidence: medium
medium evidence]The Hormuz closure has already pulled peak-season conditions into May–June 2026; Drewry’s own May 28 commentary cited ‘early peak-season trends’; forward indicators as of June 1 pointed to Asia–Europe rates potentially reaching $6,000–$7,000/40ft in the second half of June; the 2025 pattern saw a June peak. Front-loading ahead of July 1 BAF surcharges could accelerate the timing. If rates spike rapidly in early June and then plateau or decline, the maximum would fall in weeks 1–3.
The GJOpen market as of June 25 implied low probability of rates exceeding $3,600, suggesting limited additional upside beyond the ~$2,800 baseline; transpacific peak season was still described as ‘starting’ rather than ‘peaked’ by early June; a Weibull hazard model places median peak around week 5 (July 2); the traditional transpacific peak build-up runs July–August.
high evidence]Survival model median falls around week 5 (July 2); the combination of early peak-season pressure building from a $2,800 base plus continued Hormuz-driven surcharges could push the index to a maximum in late June or early July; this aligns with the computed P(peak by week 5) ≈ 52%; the front-loading dynamic (July 1 BAF trigger) could produce a final surge into late June followed by stabilization.
GJOpen pricing suggests limited probability of rates above $3,600 as of late June; if front-loading already occurred by late May, rates could plateau or reverse before late June; 2025 pattern showed rapid post-June decline, but the Hormuz structural factor makes 2026 qualitatively different.
medium evidence]The traditional transpacific peak season runs July–August; in 2024, the WCI peak occurred on approximately July 25 at $5,937; the ongoing Hormuz closure could sustain elevated rates through summer rather than producing a sharp early peak-and-decline; carriers have been disciplined in capacity management; P(peak by week 8 / August 6) ≈ 87% leaves meaningful probability mass in weeks 6–8.
The Hormuz pull-forward narrative argues against late-July being the peak; front-loading demand that pulled peak earlier in 2025 is also present in 2026; the survival model hazard peaks earlier (week 5 median); rates may have already partially priced in peak conditions at the $2,800 baseline.
low evidence]If the August 6 report has the highest value (possible if demand sustains through August), the 14:00 UTC timestamp is still before 12:00 UTC cutoff — wait, August 6 at 14:00 UTC is after the 12:00 UTC cutoff, so August 6 would resolve as ‘>2026-08-12T12:00:00Z’; OR if rates continue rising beyond the window; OR if no qualifying reports are published (effectively zero probability given ongoing WCI publication).
Drewry WCI is consistently published weekly on Thursdays and shows no sign of discontinuation; the survival model puts P(peak by August 6) at ~87%, so there is strong evidence the peak occurs within the qualifying window; historical peaks in summer windows have all occurred within the June–August period.
inside_view_v1)Inside View Causal Analysis
Key causal chain:
Current state (June 3, 2026): Drewry WCI at $2,800/40ft (highest since July 2025), rising 3% week-on-week. Strait of Hormuz closed since early March 2026, adding ~$735/40ft “Hormuz premium” on transpacific routes. Carriers and analysts describe “early peak-season trends.”
Near-term mechanism (June 4–June 25): Forward indicators as of June 1 pointed to Asia–Europe rates potentially reaching $6,000–$7,000/40ft in the second half of June, driven by front-loading ahead of July 1 BAF surcharges. However, GJOpen market as of late June implied only 3.8% probability of WCI above $3,600 on June 25 — suggesting the aggressive forward estimates may have been partially offset by demand constraints.
Survival model (strong quantitative evidence, per brief): Weibull model (shape=1.5, hazard 0.143/week) places the median peak at ~week 5 ≈ July 2, 2026. P(peak by week 5) ≈ 52%; P(peak by week 8, August 6) ≈ 87%. This is the dominant quantitative signal.
Scenario weights by evidence strength:
- “Late June to early July peak” (June 25–July 9): Tagged
highevidence strength — aligns with survival model median, front-loading into July 1 BAF surcharge, and ongoing rate-building trajectory.- “Early June peak” (June 4–June 18): Tagged
medium— supported by Hormuz pull-forward and 2025 June-peak analog, but GJOpen data suggests rates were still moderate as of late June (not yet peaked by that point).- “Mid-to-late July peak” (July 16–July 30): Tagged
medium— traditional peak season, 2024 analog (late July peak at $5,937), sustained Hormuz closure.- “Post-window” (resolves >Aug 12): Tagged
low— only ~13% tail from survival model, strong history of peaks within window.Bin mapping:
- Jun 3–12 (bin_0): includes June 4 report, early-June peak scenario, Hormuz pull-forward — ~10% (June 4 and June 11 reports; front-loading surge possible but GJOpen suggests rates still building, not peaked)
- Jun 12–21 (bin_1): includes June 18 report — ~8%
- Jun 21–29 (bin_2): includes June 25 report — ~10% (GJOpen context at $2,800–$3,600 range suggests not yet peaked; but this is the late-June spike window)
- Jun 29–Jul 8 (bin_3): includes July 2 report — survival model median here, high-evidence scenario — ~22%
- Jul 8–17 (bin_4): includes July 9 and July 16 reports — ~15%
- Jul 17–26 (bin_5): includes July 23 report — ~12%
- Jul 26–Aug 3 (bin_6): includes July 30 report — ~8%
- Aug 3–12 (bin_7): includes August 6 report — ~6%
- bins 8–12 (post-window, out-of-window): The survival model gives ~13% for post-August 6, plus minor annulment risk. These correspond to the “>2026-08-12T12:00:00Z” resolution outcome. Spread ~9% total across bins 8–12.
outside_view_v1)Reference class: weekly Drewry WCI peaks during the June–August window (recent years and the computed time-to-peak projection). Base rate: the brief’s survival/hazard projection (Weibull, shape=1.5) places the median peak in week 5 of the qualifying window (≈July 2, 2026) and P(peak by Aug 6) ≈ 87% (source 20). Adjustment: I tilt only modestly toward that median because the brief explicitly treats that computed projection as strong quantitative evidence (source 20, tagged high) and because Drewry’s May 28 commentary described “early peak‑season trends” (source 6) and the Hormuz disruption has plausibly pulled some mass earlier (sources 17,25,31). I partially offset the pull‑forward by market signals that limited extreme upside (Good Judgment Open implied low probability of WCI > $3,600 for late June; source 7) and the historical variability (2024 late‑July peak vs 2025 early‑June peak; sources 5,8,21). Final: concentrate most mass in the late‑June → early‑July bins (bin_2–bin_4), with the single largest bin at Jun 29–Jul 08 ≈ Drewry nominal date July 2 (bin_3) to reflect the survival‑model median and the brief’s high‑strength late‑June/early‑July scenario (source 20). Specifics and interpretation constraints used: only Drewry nominal weekly reports count; the brief enumerates 10 qualifying Thursday nominal dates (June 4 → Aug 6) because the Aug 12 nominal report at 14:00 UTC would fall after the question’s 12:00 UTC cutoff and therefore is excluded for an in‑window resolution (source 14) — I reflected that strict reading in placing primary mass only in bins covering June 4–Aug 6. Because evidence quality is medium (brief’s stated confidence_in_evidence = medium), I leave a nontrivial tail (13%) beyond the qualifying window (bins_8–_12) to reflect the ~13% survival tail beyond Aug 6 from the brief and the possibility of later peaks or publication/verification edge cases (source 20). Weighting note: the brief labeled the Late‑June→Early‑July scenario as high relative_evidence_strength (source 20); I therefore allocate materially more mass there than to the lower‑evidence early‑June or mid‑July scenarios (sources 6,17,5). Overall confidence: medium (per brief); the distribution is wider than a single‑bin spike to reflect the brief’s key uncertainties (Hormuz persistence, front‑loading, carrier discipline — sources 17,25,26,30) and the modest historical sample of comparable years (sources 5,8,21).
contrarian_v2)Adversarial reading
The bulk of the brief’s evidence (high-evidence scenario tagged for June 25–July 9, survival median at July 2, Drewry’s own early-peak commentary) pulls toward bins 2–3, with the Hormuz-driven pull-forward cited as the dominant structural factor.
Counter-evidence found (or absence)
The GJOpen market pricing (only 3.8 % probability above $3,600 on June 25) and the 2025 pattern of a sharp early-June peak followed by rapid decline both contradict the assumption that the Hormuz premium will sustain a mid-window maximum; the brief itself tags this scenario as only medium-evidence.
Distribution implications
Extra mass is shifted into early June (bin_1) relative to a naive median-centered distribution, because the counter-evidence on rate trajectory timing is substantive and directly challenges the high-evidence late-June/early-July scenario; tail mass on bin_7+ is kept minimal given the low-evidence tag on the post-window scenario.
Strategy: logit_mean • Drafts: 3/3
anchoring_v1The draft’s modal bin is Jun 29–Jul 08, ~26.4% (bin_3), anchored on a Weibull survival model placing the median peak at “approximately week 5 ≈ July 2, 2026.” However, the model uses the survival median (the week by which ~50% of probability mass has accumulated) as a proxy for the modal week, which is an optimistic anchor: the median of a right-skewed Weibull with shape=1.5 sits earlier than the mean, and the mode (hazard-weighted peak likelihood) should sit around the survival model median only if the distribution is symmetric. More importantly, the brief simultaneously notes two strong pull-forward factors — Drewry’s own “early peak-season trends” commentary as of May 28 and the July 1 BAF surcharge front-loading trigger — but the forecaster places only 10–11% in the two earliest bins (Jun 3–21) despite these being the bins directly implied by the “second half of June” forward-rate spike language and the 2025 June-peak analog. The phrase “Asia–Europe rates could climb to $6,000–$7,000/40ft in the second half of June” (source 30) was the most specific near-term timing signal in the brief, yet the forecaster placed the p50 at July 2 rather than at the front of the “second half of June” window (≈June 18–25, bin_1–bin_2). The contrarian variant correctly shifted mass earlier but was averaged away. The result is a forecast whose modal bin (bin_3, Jul 2) sits later than the most specific near-term timing signal, a classic forward-window anchoring error.
ceiling_v1A critical structural ceiling applies here: the resolution criteria state that any report with a nominal date of 14:00 UTC must resolve on or before 2026-08-12T12:00:00Z to count as in-window. The brief correctly identifies (source 14) that the August 12 nominal date at 14:00 UTC exceeds this cutoff, meaning the effective qualifying window closes with the August 6 report. However, the brief then introduces a scenario narrative error: it describes August 6 as resolving in-window (correctly — Aug 6 at 14:00 UTC is before Aug 12 at 12:00 UTC), but then the “post-window” scenario notes that only ~13% tail lies beyond August 6. The draft distributes bins 8–12 only ~3.9% total (0.017+0.008+0.005+0.004+0.004 ≈ 3.8%), far below the survival model’s stated ~13% tail. This means ~9% of mass that structurally belongs in the “>Aug 12” resolution outcome (bin_8 and beyond) has instead been absorbed into in-window bins, violating the stated structural constraint from the survival model. The constraint is explicit: “P(peak by week 8, i.e., by August 6) ≈ 87%” leaves ~13% beyond week 8, which should map to bins 8–12.
math_v1The forecast assigns 26.4% to Jun 29–Jul 08, the survival model median (bin_3), which correctly anchors to the high-evidence scenario. However, the distribution mass across bins 0–7 sums to ~87.0%, while the survival model explicitly places P(peak by Aug 6) ≈ 87%. This is internally consistent. The tail bins 8–12 sum to ~3.0%, which is lower than the stated ~13% survival tail beyond Aug 6 and appears to underweight the annulment/out-of-window risk documented in the brief.
Reviews consumed: 3
The anchoring reviewer flagged that the median-as-mode substitution underweighted the early-window pull-forward signal (Hormuz, “second half of June” Asia-Europe surge, July 1 BAF front-loading) — I partially accepted by shifting some mass from bin_3 into Jun 21–29, which captures the June 25 report at the front of the “second half of June” window (bin_2) and slightly into bin_1. The ceiling reviewer and math reviewer both flagged that the tail (bins 8–12) was underweighted relative to the survival model’s stated ~13% P(peak after Aug 6); I accepted this and raised bin_8–12 from ~3.8% to ~10%, keeping it slightly below 13% because the GJOpen market-implied ceiling and absence of monotone-floor constraint suggest in-window peaks are still favored. I kept Jun 29–Jul 8 (bin_3) as the modal bin because the survival-model median (July 2) plus the high-evidence “late June to early July” scenario remain the dominant quantitative signal — I did not fully pivot to the contrarian early-June view. Net effect: partial shift — bin_3 reduced from 26.4% to 23%, bin_2 raised from 19% to 18% (small change), tail raised meaningfully, contrarian early-window tilt partly integrated.
[anchoring] Shift modal bin earlier to bin_1 or bin_2 to reflect ‘second half of June’ forward signal and 2025 June-peak analog
[math] Bin_0–1 mass (~22%) is higher than the medium-evidence early-June scenario warrants
| Bin | Probability |
|---|---|
| Jun 03, 2026 to Jun 12, 2026 (bin_0) | 9.0% |
| Jun 12, 2026 to Jun 21, 2026 (bin_1) | 11.0% |
| Jun 21, 2026 to Jun 29, 2026 (bin_2) | 18.0% |
| Jun 29, 2026 to Jul 08, 2026 (bin_3) | 23.0% |
| Jul 08, 2026 to Jul 17, 2026 (bin_4) | 13.0% |
| Jul 17, 2026 to Jul 26, 2026 (bin_5) | 8.0% |
| Jul 26, 2026 to Aug 03, 2026 (bin_6) | 5.0% |
| Aug 03, 2026 to Aug 12, 2026 (bin_7) | 3.0% |
| Aug 12, 2026 to Oct 21, 2026 (bin_8) | 5.0% |
| Oct 21, 2026 to Dec 30, 2026 (bin_9) | 2.5% |
| Dec 30, 2026 to Mar 10, 2027 (bin_10) | 1.5% |
| Mar 10, 2027 to May 19, 2027 (bin_11) | 0.5% |
| After May 19, 2027 (bin_12) | 0.5% |
wooley_rhino • run bd6c9bfb • $2.88 • 8m31s
Extracted Date Percentile Values: {0.1: 1780531200.0, 1.0: 1780531200.0, 5.0: 1781136000.0, 10.0: 1781740800.0, 15.0: 1781740800.0, 20.0: 1781740800.0, 25.0: 1781740800.0, 30.0: 1782345600.0, 35.0: 1782345600.0, 40.0: 1782345600.0, 45.0: 1782345600.0, 46.0: 1782345600.0, 47.0: 1782345600.0, 48.0: 1782345600.0, 49.0: 1782345600.0, 50.0: 1782950400.0, 51.0: 1782950400.0, 52.0: 1782950400.0, 53.0: 1782950400.0, 54.0: 1782950400.0, 55.0: 1782950400.0, 60.0: 1782950400.0, 65.0: 1782950400.0, 70.0: 1783555200.0, 75.0: 1783555200.0, 80.0: 1784160000.0, 85.0: 1784160000.0, 90.0: 1784764800.0, 95.0: 1785369600.0, 99.0: 1785974400.0, 99.9: 1786579200.0}
Model’s Answer: Looking at this question, I need to determine when the Drewry World Container Index (WCI) composite will reach its maximum value during the June 3 - August 12, 2026 window.
The WCI is published weekly, with nominal dates appearing on Thursdays based on the research (May 28, May 21 were Thursdays with WCI reports). The possible resolution dates within the window are:
Reports after August 6 would have nominal dates after August 12, 2026 at 12:00 UTC, resolving as >2026-08-12.
Current State: The WCI reached $2,800 on May 28, 2026 - the fourth consecutive weekly gain, up from $2,076 on May 8 (a 35% increase in three weeks).
Factors suggesting mid-June to early July peak:
Factors suggesting potential earlier peak:
Factors suggesting later peak (less likely):
Assumption 1: Peak-season demand follows typical seasonality (probability of failure: ~15%) - If demand is exceptionally strong or weak, timing shifts significantly.
Assumption 2: No major disruption events occur (probability of failure: ~10%) - Major port closures or geopolitical events could cause unexpected late-window spikes.
Assumption 3: Drewry’s near-term forecast of continued increases is accurate (probability of failure: ~20%) - If rates plateau immediately, the maximum could be June 4.
Given Drewry’s explicit expectation of continued increases through June, I weight the distribution toward mid-to-late June and early July, with the peak most likely occurring around late June when seasonal demand typically peaks:
Percentile .1: 2026-06-04 Percentile 1: 2026-06-04 Percentile 5: 2026-06-11 Percentile 10: 2026-06-18 Percentile 15: 2026-06-18 Percentile 20: 2026-06-18 Percentile 25: 2026-06-18 Percentile 30: 2026-06-25 Percentile 35: 2026-06-25 Percentile 40: 2026-06-25 Percentile 45: 2026-06-25 Percentile 46: 2026-06-25 Percentile 47: 2026-06-25 Percentile 48: 2026-06-25 Percentile 49: 2026-06-25 Percentile 50: 2026-07-02 Percentile 51: 2026-07-02 Percentile 52: 2026-07-02 Percentile 53: 2026-07-02 Percentile 54: 2026-07-02 Percentile 55: 2026-07-02 Percentile 60: 2026-07-02 Percentile 65: 2026-07-02 Percentile 70: 2026-07-09 Percentile 75: 2026-07-09 Percentile 80: 2026-07-16 Percentile 85: 2026-07-16 Percentile 90: 2026-07-23 Percentile 95: 2026-07-30 Percentile 99: 2026-08-06 Percentile 99.9: 2026-08-13
Weekly fixed-report cadence and a composite that weights eight trade lanes constrain the outcome to specific Thursday nominal dates.
Chronic overcapacity and seasonal demand set a narrow physical ceiling on how high and how long spot freight can remain elevated.
Carrier GRIs, mid‑month PSS/BAF adjustments, and advance bookings are the immediate upward impulses through early June.
Soft U.S. import momentum and ample charter availability are the primary moderating forces beyond the front‑loading window.
If announced surcharges and front‑loaded bookings persist across billing periods, the maximum will cluster in the late‑June reports; if demand fades, the peak will be earlier and short‑lived.
A sustained route disruption or additional cost pass‑through would shift the maximum into July, while absent such shocks the late‑June (roughly 18 June–2 July) cluster dominates.
Unresolved sensitivities include precise carrier implementation dates, divergence in Asia–Europe versus Transpacific dynamics, and the timing of any geopolitical or port disruptions.
Small changes in route weights or a single large route spike can move the composite peak by one to three weekly reports, so material residual uncertainty remains.
Forecast (Q410): median peak date for the Drewry World Container Index within the window is 2026-07-16.
When will the Drewry World Container Index hit its maximum value during the period in question?
Key figures
Historical context
Historically, the Drewry World Container Index (WCI) has been prone to extreme, infrequent positive spikes rather than steady growth. For example, in June 2025, the index reached a historical all-time high of $3,543 following the announcement of U.S. tariffs. A similar pattern was seen in early 2024, where the index jumped 60.75% in a single week due to Red Sea disruptions.
The index typically exhibits seasonality, with a primary peak in the summer (June-August) as retailers stock up for the winter holiday season, and a secondary peak in January ahead of the Lunar New Year. In 2025, rates surged through early June but declined heavily by mid-July once the initial tariff panic subsided. The 2026 environment is unique because the geopolitical disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz (beginning February 28, 2026) coincide directly with the lead-up to the traditional peak season and a specific legislative tariff deadline in July, creating a more prolonged period of upward pressure than the brief spike seen in June 2025.
Tailwinds
Headwinds
Detailed reasoning
My analysis for the median prediction of 23rd July 2026 is based on a “perfect storm” of supply-side constraints and demand-side urgency.
First, the demand “pull-forward” effect is the primary driver of the timing. Shippers are aggressively moving goods from Asia to the U.S. to ensure they are unloaded before the July 24, 2026, deadline for a 10% universal global tariff. This has created a “cargo rush” that began in May and is expected to reach its zenith in mid-to-late July. As vessels reach 100% capacity, spot rates on the WCI—which measures real-time freight prices—are forced upward by desperate shippers. The 23rd July report is the final nominal release before this specific trade deadline, making it the logical point for maximum price pressure.
Second, shipping lines (carriers) are proactively managing capacity to support these higher rates. Major players like CMA CGM and ONE implemented General Rate Increases (GRI) and Peak Season Surcharges (PSS) on June 1, 2026. These surcharges, often reaching $2,000 per container, typically take several weeks to fully reflect in the composite index as older bookings clear and new, expensive spot bookings dominate the data.
Third, the supply side is severely restricted by the 2026 Iran war and ongoing Red Sea disruptions. Rerouting ships around the Cape of Good Hope has removed significant effective capacity from the market by extending voyage times by 10 days and increasing fuel costs by roughly $1 million per trip. With fuel prices jumping 50% since the conflict’s start on February 28, carriers are passing these costs directly to the WCI via emergency fuel surcharges.
Fourth, historical and seasonal patterns reinforce this window. While the WCI saw an all-time high in June 2025, the current cycle is influenced by a later tariff deadline (July) and a more severe energy crisis. Macrobond data shows a strong seasonal index for June (1.44) and July (1.15), suggesting that even without the tariff, prices would be seasonally firm.
Finally, I weighted the risk of a “late-window” peak. Polymarket forecasts show the probability of a Bab el-Mandeb closure rising from 6% in June to 20% by September. This back-loaded risk suggests that if a major geopolitical escalation occurs, the peak could be pushed to the very end of the observation window (August 6). However, the immediate urgency of the tariff deadline makes late July the more statistically probable median outcome for the absolute maximum.
Key uncertainties
Conclusion