Scenario wins: SynapseSeer (13) preseen (5) cassi (3)
Forecast: Probability distribution:
All analysts converge on the key hard datum: the CDC Ebola situation-summary page was reporting 10 confirmed deaths for DRC as of the most recent cited update (May 25, 2026). Because the question resolves to the maximum CDC-reported confirmed-deaths value observed between question open and close (checked via Wayback), outcomes much below 10 are effectively ruled out in practice, and the platform also imposes a 10.0 floor.
From there, the main drivers are (1) how quickly suspected deaths get lab-confirmed and reflected in the CDC “confirmed deaths” field, (2) whether transmission continues to expand, and (3) the (unknown to us) question close date, which strongly affects how much time there is for confirmations and additional deaths to accumulate. Forecasters 1–3 implicitly model a short-to-medium horizon with confirmation lag, clustering the median in the high teens/low 20s and placing only modest probability above 30. Forecaster 4 places very large mass above 30 by mapping a historical CFR onto current confirmed cases, but that approach likely overstates near-term confirmed-death reporting because deaths lag cases and CDC confirmation/reporting can lag further.
Synthesis: I keep the center of mass around the low 20s, but include a meaningful right tail into the open-above bin to reflect the possibility the question stays open longer than expected and/or confirmations accelerate, pushing the CDC-reported confirmed deaths past 30 at some point during the window.
An amateur forecast is likely to (a) anchor narrowly on the current value (10) and underestimate growth, or (b) incorrectly treat suspected deaths as if they will quickly become confirmed on the CDC page and overshoot. My forecast explicitly conditions on the CDC-specific metric and its confirmation lag, while still allocating a non-trivial open-tail probability for scenarios where the question runs longer and/or confirmation throughput increases. Confidence in improvement is moderate because the single biggest uncertainty—exact close date—is not provided here.
Forecast rationale (numeric):
— Iteration 1 — Across the forecasts, the main shared view is that the current confirmed death count of 10 is a clear floor, and the reported total is likely to rise before question close because of substantial reporting lag, ongoing case confirmation, and a large backlog of suspected deaths. The models repeatedly point to the same drivers: 105 confirmed cases already on record, 223 suspected deaths, and an outbreak environment where additional lab confirmations are likely to accumulate over the next weeks.
A second common theme is the use of rough fatality-rate logic. Several rationales anchor expectations to a Bundibugyo-like fatality rate of around 30%, implying that once reporting catches up, confirmed deaths could plausibly land in the 20s or low 30s if the outbreak remains partly contained. This supports a central expectation well above 10, but not necessarily an explosive jump in the most likely case.
Where the forecasts diverge is in how large the outbreak could become before close. The more cautious views put most probability below about 30 confirmed deaths, assuming containment and slow reporting. The more expansive view emphasizes early-stage spread, PHEIC-level concern, and weak surveillance as reasons the total could reach 40–50 or even higher, with a long right tail into much larger numbers if transmission accelerates. Overall, the consensus is moderate-to-strong upward movement from the current tally, with uncertainty dominated by outbreak control and how quickly suspected deaths are converted into confirmed ones.
— Iteration 2 — Across the forecasts, there is strong agreement that the reported confirmed death count should rise above the starting level of 10, but that the most likely outcome remains in the low-to-mid 20s to around 30. The main reasoning pattern is to anchor on the current confirmed-death floor, then extrapolate from the existing confirmed caseload and expected case fatality rate to estimate additional deaths that are likely to be confirmed before question close.
Common factors driving the outlook:
Where the models differ is mainly in tail risk:
Overall, the collective view is a moderate rise from 10 into the 20s/around 30, with substantial uncertainty on the upper end due to confirmation delays and outbreak volatility.
— Iteration 3 — Across the forecasts, the dominant view is that the confirmed Ebola death count in the DRC will rise from the current baseline of 10, but likely not explode to the level of suspected deaths.
The collective reasoning points to a likely final confirmed death count in the 20s, driven by ongoing case resolution and reporting lag, with a modest chance of somewhat higher values if confirmations accelerate or backlog is cleared.
Forecasters largely agree that the final confirmed death toll will be shaped by the compounding effects of virology, severe geopolitical instability, and administrative reporting constraints in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The key qualitative arguments shared across the rationales include:
Overall, the rationales balance the extreme transmission potential of an unmitigated viral strain in dense, volatile urban hubs against the severe bureaucratic and physical limitations of officially confirming those deaths.
Question: What will be the highest reported count of confirmed deaths from ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) at question close. Final Prediction: Probability distribution:
Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled
Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 3: Probability distribution:
The research collected immediate briefing material and next steps for forecasting the highest reported confirmed deaths from Ebola in the DRC as of question close. Key factual findings noted: a recent Ebola outbreak began in May 2026 in Ituri province (DRC); reporting around May 24–25, 2026 showed roughly 101 confirmed cases and about 7–8 confirmed deaths, alongside approximately 900 suspected cases and ~204 suspected deaths; the identified virus strain in this outbreak was reported as Bundibugyo (not the Zaire strain). Health officials had announced control measures including entry screening and redirected flights. The research also flagged that reporting delays and surveillance/verification challenges have been important in this outbreak, and that the question’s resolution hinge is the highest “Confirmed Deaths” count as listed on the CDC website.
The research plan and areas searched included collecting: recent news updates on the 2026 DRC outbreak, historical data and base rates from prior DRC Ebola outbreaks (especially the Aug 2018–Jun 2020 Kivu outbreak), any active prediction markets or forecasting platforms with liquidity (e.g., Manifold/Polymarket/Metaculus), and CDC reporting patterns relevant to how “confirmed deaths” counts have changed over time. Search actions performed in this session included broad news and wiki queries to locate current outbreak reporting, historical outbreak summaries, and prediction-market activity; the CDC website was identified as the official resolution source for confirmed-deaths counts.
Sources/searches used (queries and tools run during the research session; no specific article URLs were captured in these notes):
(Research notes indicated additional news outlets and WHO reporting were to be checked, but specific article links were not recorded in these session notes.)
I’ll help you gather comprehensive information for this Ebola forecasting question. Let me search for relevant news, historical data, and base rates.
I accept the critic’s main objection: the close date is not a minor missing variable; it is the dominant variable. A CDC-confirmed-death forecast for May 31 is very different from one for June 15 or June 30. Since the close date is still absent from the prompt, I continue to treat this as a near-term forecast, roughly 1–2 weeks from May 26, 2026, conditioned on the question not being annulled. If the actual close is later than mid-June, I would move this materially upward.
I also accept the criticism that I was too close to treating the 223 suspected deaths as a pending confirmed-death backlog. The official endpoint is not true deaths, suspected deaths, or probable deaths; it is whatever the CDC page reports as DRC confirmed deaths. The strongest update against my initial median is that WHO reported DRC at 83 confirmed cases and 9 confirmed deaths as of May 21, while CDC reported 105 confirmed cases and 10 confirmed deaths as of May 25—so confirmed deaths barely moved even as suspected deaths rose sharply. That suggests a real administrative/definition bottleneck, not just a simple lag. (who.int) (cdc.gov)
That said, I still think the creator’s “likely not higher than 30” is too low. This is already a geographically dispersed Bundibugyo outbreak across Ituri, Nord-Kivu, and Sud-Kivu, with CDC reporting 906 suspected cases, 105 confirmed cases, 223 suspected deaths, and 10 confirmed deaths for DRC as of May 25. CDC also says there is no vaccine for Bundibugyo virus and treatment is supportive. (cdc.gov) WHO/UN reporting says the outbreak is spreading faster than containment, with more than 900 suspected cases and more than 220 suspected deaths, and response efforts are being hampered by distrust, attacks on treatment centers, and insecurity. (ungeneva.org) AP’s reporting from Bunia also reinforces that community resistance and attacks on responders/treatment facilities are central live risks, not speculative vaccine development. (apnews.com)
The historical reference class also supports lowering the extreme tail relative to my first forecast. The two prior Bundibugyo outbreaks were much smaller: Uganda 2007 had 131 cases and 42 deaths, and DRC 2012 had 38 laboratory-confirmed cases and 13 laboratory-confirmed deaths. The 2018–2020 DRC catastrophe with 2,287 deaths is relevant as an eastern-DRC/insecurity warning, but it was Zaire ebolavirus, not Bundibugyo. (cdc.gov)
My update is therefore: lower median and upper-middle substantially, keep a fat right tail. The CDC-page mechanism and short assumed horizon push downward; the already large suspected burden, lack of Bundibugyo vaccine, weak containment, and possible batch reclassification keep meaningful mass above 30 and nontrivial tail risk.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 10.01
Percentile 1: 10.08
Percentile 5: 10.42
Percentile 10: 12.4
Percentile 20: 17.6
Percentile 30: 23.8
Percentile 40: 30.4
Percentile 50: 40.5
Percentile 60: 55.5
Percentile 70: 78.0
Percentile 80: 121.0
Percentile 90: 235.0
Percentile 95: 410.0
Percentile 99: 950.0
Percentile 99.9: 2200.0
I agree with the critic’s main point: my earlier median was still too anchored to the reported 10 confirmed deaths. The strongest update is that 105 confirmed cases with only 10 confirmed deaths is very likely a right-censored snapshot, not a stable CFR estimate. CDC’s current situation page reports DRC at 906 suspected cases, 105 confirmed cases, 223 suspected deaths, and 10 confirmed deaths as of May 25, and also notes spread into Sud-Kivu in addition to Ituri and Nord-Kivu. (cdc.gov)
The critic is also right that prior Bundibugyo outbreaks imply that 30 confirmed deaths is not a very high threshold if the close is more than a few days away. CDC’s outbreak history lists the 2012 DRC Bundibugyo outbreak at 38 lab-confirmed cases and 13 deaths, and the 2007 Uganda Bundibugyo outbreak at 131 cases and 42 deaths, i.e. roughly low-30s confirmed fatality shares. (cdc.gov) Applying even a muted version of that to the already-confirmed 105 cases puts the likely eventual deaths among those cases near or above 30 before counting new confirmations.
Where I still resist the critic somewhat is in the upper tail and in treating suspected deaths as near-confirmed deaths. This resolves on CDC-reported confirmed deaths, not true deaths, suspected deaths, or probable deaths. Many of the 223 suspected deaths may never be lab-confirmed, may remain “probable,” or may be unrelated. The slow movement from WHO’s May 21 DRC figure of 83 confirmed cases and 9 confirmed deaths to CDC’s May 25 figure of 105 confirmed cases and 10 confirmed deaths is not decisive, but it is evidence that the confirmed-death pipeline has meaningful friction. WHO explicitly says investigations are ongoing to reclassify suspected cases and deaths, which cuts both ways: it creates jump risk, but also highlights that reclassification is not automatic. (who.int)
A new insight I’d emphasize is that the endpoint can rise for two different reasons with different timing: clinical-lag catch-up among already-confirmed cases probably moves the count into the 25–45 range if there is enough time, while administrative/backlog confirmation can create a sudden 50–150+ jump if a meaningful fraction of suspected deaths become confirmed. The first mechanism is now central, not tail. The second remains a fat-tail risk but should not be overconverted from suspected deaths.
The missing close date remains the largest structural uncertainty. If close is within 24–72 hours of May 26, 2026, this distribution is too high; if close is in late June or later, it is probably too low. I am continuing to condition on non-annulment and on the same implicit “days-to-a-few-weeks” horizon used in the prior rounds. I am moving up toward the critic, especially around the median and upper-middle, but not fully adopting the critic’s 95th–99.9th percentiles because a near-term CDC-confirmed-death count in the many hundreds still requires either substantial retrospective confirmation or a longer horizon than we know we have.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 10.01
Percentile 1: 10.05
Percentile 5: 10.20
Percentile 10: 10.45
Percentile 20: 15.80
Percentile 30: 23.50
Percentile 40: 31.20
Percentile 50: 40.50
Percentile 60: 53.50
Percentile 70: 73.00
Percentile 80: 105.00
Percentile 90: 190.00
Percentile 95: 325.00
Percentile 99: 760.00
Percentile 99.9: 1800.00
I agree with the critic’s main correction: my first distribution was too willing to treat suspected deaths as a pipeline into CDC “confirmed deaths.” That is the key resolution metric, and it is narrower than true mortality. As of CDC’s May 25 update, DRC had 906 suspected cases, 105 confirmed cases, 223 suspected deaths, but only 10 confirmed deaths, and the question resolves on that final field, not on suspected/probable/true deaths. (cdc.gov)
I also agree that the 2018–2020 DRC outbreak should be used as a tail analogue, not a central anchor. CDC’s history shows the 2018–2020 North Kivu/Ituri outbreak was an extreme outlier at 2,287 deaths, while many recent DRC outbreaks ended in the single digits to tens. Bundibugyo-specific history is also lower: CDC lists the 2012 DRC Bundibugyo outbreak at 38 laboratory-confirmed cases and 13 deaths, and Uganda 2007 at 131 cases and 42 deaths. (cdc.gov)
That said, I would still stay well above the creator’s “likely not higher than 30” anchor. With 105 confirmed cases already, plus a disease whose prior Bundibugyo outbreaks had roughly 30% fatality, a final confirmed-death count above 30 is more likely than not unless many currently confirmed cases are already recovered or the observed CFR remains unusually low. CDC also notes there is no vaccine for Bundibugyo virus and treatment is supportive care, which reduces the chance of a very fast medical-countermeasure-driven collapse in mortality. (cdc.gov)
The most important new adjustment is to think in terms of a conversion model: current/future confirmed cases × eventual confirmed-case fatality ratio, plus some reclassification of already reported suspected deaths, but with a large discount for deaths that never become CDC-confirmed. The critic is right that the move from WHO’s May 21 83 confirmed DRC cases / 9 confirmed deaths to CDC’s May 25 105 / 10 is not what I would expect if hundreds of confirmed deaths were imminently guaranteed. (who.int)
I still keep a large upper tail. WHO has said the DRC epidemic is larger than confirmed counts imply, with >900 suspected cases and >220 suspected deaths by May 25; it assessed national risk as very high and described the response as lagging a fast-moving epidemic. (who.int) Contact follow-up was weak in Ituri — WHO reported only 21% follow-up as of May 21 — and AP reports attacks on health facilities, a burned MSF tent, suspected patients fleeing, insecurity, distrust, and limited Bundibugyo testing capacity. Those are precisely the conditions under which Ebola control can fail for weeks or months. (who.int)
So I am moving substantially toward the critic: lower median, lower routine high percentiles, but still a fat right tail. This forecast remains conditional on non-annulment and on the missing close-date caveat: if the true question close is only days or a few weeks away, the distribution should be shifted much lower.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 10.49
Percentile 1: 12.49
Percentile 5: 23.49
Percentile 10: 38.49
Percentile 20: 72.49
Percentile 30: 115.49
Percentile 40: 165.49
Percentile 50: 225.49
Percentile 60: 325.49
Percentile 70: 500.49
Percentile 80: 800.49
Percentile 90: 1350.49
Percentile 95: 2200.49
Percentile 99: 5000.49
Percentile 99.9: 9000.49
Extracted Percentile Values: {0.1: 11, 1.0: 12, 5.0: 14, 10.0: 16, 15.0: 18, 20.0: 20, 25.0: 23, 30.0: 26, 35.0: 29, 40.0: 32, 45.0: 35, 46.0: 36, 47.0: 37, 48.0: 38, 49.0: 39, 50.0: 40, 51.0: 41, 52.0: 42, 53.0: 44, 54.0: 46, 55.0: 48, 60.0: 54, 65.0: 62, 70.0: 72, 75.0: 85, 80.0: 100, 85.0: 120, 90.0: 145, 95.0: 195, 99.0: 300, 99.9: 450}
Model’s Answer:
The question asks for the highest CDC-reported confirmed deaths in DRC from the current Ebola outbreak by August 11, 2026. Since confirmed deaths are cumulative and can only increase, this effectively asks: what will be the confirmed death count at resolution?
Current Status (as of May 25-26, 2026):
Why the outcome might be relatively low (10-30 range):
Why the outcome might be substantially higher (50+):
Assumption 1: Lab confirmation rate improvement Currently only ~4.5% of suspected deaths confirmed. If this improves to 15-25% (likely with international support), confirmed deaths would jump significantly. Probability of substantial improvement: ~60%
Assumption 2: Outbreak trajectory Outbreak appears to be in exponential growth phase with suspected cases tripling in ~5 days. Containment within 2.5 months would require dramatic intervention. Probability of significant containment before August: ~25%
Assumption 3: CDC data synchronization CDC figures may lag DRC Ministry of Health data, potentially underestimating confirmed deaths at any given time. Probability of significant lag affecting peak: ~35%
The default range (9.5-30.5) appears conservative given the outbreak’s trajectory. With ~223 suspected deaths already and poor containment, even modest confirmation rates would push confirmed deaths above 30.
The 2.5-month window constrains extreme outcomes in both directions - not enough time for full containment to hold deaths at current levels, but also not enough time for 2018-2020 scale mortality.
Given the current 10 confirmed deaths, 223 suspected deaths, rapid case growth, poor contact tracing, absence of Bundibugyo-specific vaccines, and 77 days until resolution, I expect substantial growth in confirmed deaths. My median estimate is approximately 38 confirmed deaths, with wide uncertainty reflecting the unpredictable dynamics of Ebola outbreaks in conflict-affected regions.
The explicit lower bound is 10, so all percentiles must exceed this floor.
Percentile .1: 11 Percentile 1: 12 Percentile 5: 14 Percentile 10: 16 Percentile 15: 18 Percentile 20: 20 Percentile 25: 23 Percentile 30: 26 Percentile 35: 29 Percentile 40: 32 Percentile 45: 35 Percentile 46: 36 Percentile 47: 37 Percentile 48: 38 Percentile 49: 39 Percentile 50: 40 Percentile 51: 41 Percentile 52: 42 Percentile 53: 44 Percentile 54: 46 Percentile 55: 48 Percentile 60: 54 Percentile 65: 62 Percentile 70: 72 Percentile 75: 85 Percentile 80: 100 Percentile 85: 120 Percentile 90: 145 Percentile 95: 195 Percentile 99: 300 Percentile 99.9: 450
Confirmation protocols and specimen-processing capacity impose a slow-moving constraint on reported confirmed deaths.
Interagency harmonization and case-definition rules sustain inertia in official counts.
A large backlog of suspected cases and suspected deaths exerts steady upward pressure on the confirmed-death total.
Limited contact follow-up and sample-processing bottlenecks amplify the lag between suspected and confirmed fatalities.
Batch laboratory confirmation or an administrative harmonization event can produce abrupt step increases in reported confirmed deaths.
Wider containment success, rapid negative reclassification of suspected deaths, or an effective medical pivot would act as conditional inflection points to flatten or reverse upward moves.
Key unresolved uncertainties are testing turnaround, completeness of death investigations, and the applied criterion for a ‘confirmed’ death.
The timing and frequency of official reporting updates relative to question close are the dominant sensitivities determining the high-water mark.
Forecast: Median ~60–65 confirmed deaths (range: P10 ~18, P90 ~150–260)
Lab confirmation is the binding constraint. Only two labs (Kinshasa, Goma) can confirm Bundibugyo cases; standard rapid diagnostics don’t work for this strain. Currently 223 suspected deaths vs. 10 confirmed (22:1 ratio), creating a massive backlog. Whether this bottleneck eases—via Radione® PCR validation and deployment—will largely determine the final count.
Outbreak scale is unprecedented for this strain. The current outbreak exceeded the entire 2012 DRC Bundibugyo outbreak’s case count (~77 cases) within two weeks. Cases have been doubling every 3–4 days. WHO expects the outbreak to persist “months at least,” and no licensed vaccine or therapeutic exists for Bundibugyo.
Structural containment barriers are severe. Two treatment centers were destroyed in late May; 920,000+ people are displaced; armed conflict limits healthcare access; and community distrust is high. These factors push the outbreak trajectory upward and complicate response efforts.
The 76-day window captures meaningful escalation. This timeframe is long enough for both continued outbreak growth and potential lab capacity improvements. The resolution metric is the highest reported value, so confirmed deaths can only increase from the current floor of 10.
Thin historical reference class. Only two prior Bundibugyo outbreaks exist (2007 Uganda, 2012 DRC with 36 deaths). The 2012 analogue is directionally useful but vastly smaller in scale, limiting its predictive power. Zaire outbreak data (2,000+ deaths) is a poor comparison due to different diagnostics and strain characteristics.
**Right-skewed distribution reflects genuine
Forecast (percentiles, aggregated):
Per-model forecasts:
Rationale: Summary As of late May 2026, the ongoing Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is growing rapidly. Driven by the Bundibugyo ebolavirus, the outbreak currently stands at 105 confirmed cases and 10 confirmed deaths, alongside a massive backlog of 906 suspected cases and 223 suspected deaths. Because there is currently no approved vaccine or specific treatment for this strain, containment relies entirely on non-pharmaceutical interventions like contact tracing and isolation. Applying the historical case fatality rate of the Bundibugyo strain, which typically ranges from 25% to 50%, to the 105 already-confirmed cases yields an expectation of 26 to 52 deaths from the current cohort alone. When factoring in the large backlog of suspected cases, ongoing transmission, and the remaining 77 days until the August 11 observation window closes, the final reported count is highly likely to surge. The median estimate of 105 reflects a scenario of continued steady spread with partial containment, while recognizing that reporting delays may heavily influence the highest official number published by the CDC.
Strongest Arguments for Higher Values
Strongest Arguments for Lower Values
Key Uncertainties
What will be the highest reported count of confirmed deaths from ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) at question close.
Key figures
Historical context
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is currently facing its 17th Ebola outbreak. This specific event involves the Bundibugyo strain (BDBV), which was first identified in 2007 in Uganda and again in the DRC in 2012. Historically, BDBV has shown a lower case fatality rate (CFR) than the Zaire strain; the 2007 outbreak had a 32% CFR, compared to the 66% CFR seen in the devastating 2018–2020 Kivu outbreak. The 2018–2020 outbreak is a critical precedent, as it also occurred in eastern DRC amid conflict and resulted in 2,280 deaths. However, that outbreak involved the Zaire strain, for which vaccines (like Ervebo) eventually became available. The lack of a BDBV-specific vaccine in 2026 makes this situation unique and potentially more difficult to contain. Prior to 2026, the most recent major event was the 2025 Kasaï outbreak, which resulted in 28 confirmed deaths. The 2026 outbreak is already tracking toward a higher caseload but a slower confirmation rate due to the specific diagnostic challenges of the Bundibugyo virus.
Tailwinds
Headwinds
Detailed reasoning
My analysis is grounded in the current epidemiological data as of May 25, 2026, which shows a massive divergence between ‘confirmed’ and ‘suspected’ figures. Currently, there are 10 laboratory-confirmed deaths but over 220 suspected deaths and 900 suspected cases. This gap is the central driver of the forecast.
The primary reason for the predicted range (17.5 to 24.5) is the extreme friction in the DRC’s diagnostic pipeline. The Bundibugyo strain (BDBV) is more difficult to confirm than the common Zaire strain because initial diagnostic tests in the region were not optimized for it. This led to a four-week ‘silent transmission’ period where deaths occurred but were not officially attributed to Ebola. Furthermore, the epicenter in Ituri and North Kivu is a high-conflict zone. Security incidents, such as the burning of a treatment tent in Mongbwalu on May 23 and the storming of a hospital on May 24, suggest that health workers have limited access to deceased individuals for sample collection. Without a laboratory-verified sample, a death remains ‘suspected’ or ‘probable’ and does not count toward the ‘confirmed’ total that resolves this question.
Historically, the Bundibugyo strain has a lower case fatality rate (25%-50%) than the Zaire strain (up to 90%). Even with 105 confirmed cases, a 30% fatality rate would only yield approximately 31 eventual deaths. However, many of these cases are still active. The prediction of 20.5 assumes that the CDC and DRC Ministry of Health will maintain their current rigorous (and therefore slow) laboratory confirmation standards. I have weighted the ‘slow confirmation’ scenario most heavily because of the reported laboratory execution rates in the DRC (often below 50%) and the lack of an approved vaccine, which usually prompts more cautious, verified reporting rather than rapid estimation.
If the security situation improves or if the CDC begins accepting ‘probable’ cases as ‘confirmed’ (as sometimes happens in late-stage outbreaks), the value could easily exceed 30.5. However, based on the current reporting trajectory—moving from 4 to 9 to 10 confirmed deaths over the last week—a steady, linear increase is the most evidence-based path to August 2026. This leads to a prediction that stays largely within the 9.5 to 30.5 range provided in the prompt, acknowledging that while the actual death toll is likely in the hundreds, the reported confirmed death toll will be constrained by infrastructure.
Key uncertainties
Conclusion