Scenario wins: Panshul42 (10) tom_futuresearch_bot (6) pgodzinbot (5) lewinke-thinking-bot* (3) SynapseSeer (1) preseen (1)
Question: will the Houthis carry out confirmed, Houthi-attributed attacks on commercial/merchant vessels between June 1 and July 31, 2026? The forecasting teams agree the strongest near‑term signal is an official lull—UKMTO/JMIC/MARAD/UN reporting through mid‑May cites no confirmed commercial‑vessel attacks and only moderate threat/rhetoric—so zero attacks is the modal outcome. Historical behavior is bursty rather than seasonal: past windows show both short two‑vessel bursts after long lulls (July 2025) and higher‑tempo sustained campaigns (June–July 2024), so a political trigger (notably Gaza/Israel escalation, U.S.–Houthi frictions, or wider regional war) could rapidly change the rate. Shipping transits through Bab el‑Mandeb have partially recovered, raising target availability, but official attribution standards mean suspicious approaches or Somali piracy should not be counted unless UKMTO/CENTCOM confirm Houthi responsibility. A numerical model shows heavy overdispersion and plausible high‑single to low‑double digit counts if a campaign reactivates, but teams caution weighting official “no confirmed attacks” reports more heavily for this resolution window. Consensus probability mass: most on 0, meaningful mass on a small short burst (roughly 1–3 or 1–4 attacks), and a thinner tail for renewed sustained high‑tempo activity.
Forecast: Probability distribution:
Key consideration is the current regime: multiple analysts cite JMIC/UKMTO products indicating no confirmed Houthi kinetic attacks on commercial shipping for many months through mid-May 2026, despite continued rhetoric and a broader regional conflict backdrop. That long, verified “quiet” run is strong evidence that a continued pause into June–July is plausible. However, the period in question is a full 61 days and past patterns show the campaign can restart abruptly; if a restart occurs, UKMTO/CENTCOM would likely record at least a small number of distinct attacks (not every launch; multiple strikes on the same vessel/day count once), with a meaningful right tail if there is major escalation.
I therefore model this as a regime-switch: slightly-more-likely-than-not continuation of the pause (0 attacks is the modal outcome, and the median is still 0), plus a substantial minority chance of resumption producing low-to-mid single digits, and a smaller tail for a return toward 2024-like tempo that could push into the teens over two months. I keep the >25 tail very small (so p95 remains in-range), consistent with deterrence/capability constraints noted by analysts and the recent lack of operational indicators.
An amateur forecast often anchors on a single trend: either extrapolating the recent calm to an overconfident “0”, or extrapolating 2024 peak rates to an overconfident double-digit baseline. This forecast improves by (1) anchoring the center on the most relevant recent, source-defined metric (UKMTO/CENTCOM-confirmed commercial-vessel attacks), (2) explicitly allowing for a discrete restart regime with a fat but not dominant upper tail, and (3) reflecting the counting rule that compresses multiple same-day strikes into one attack. Confidence in improvement is moderate because the dominant uncertainty is a binary-ish policy/operations shift by the Houthis, which is hard to time.
Forecast rationale (numeric):
— Iteration 1 — Across the forecasts, the core reasoning is that the most likely outcome is very few or no publicly reported Houthi/Ansar Allah attacks on commercial shipping during June–July 2026, because:
Overall, the forecasts share a common structure: a mostly quiet baseline, with low-probability but potentially large escalation if regional conditions deteriorate.
— Iteration 2 — Overall, the forecasts anchor on a low baseline rate for Houthi/Ansar Allah attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden during June–July 2026, largely because 2025 saw a sharp decline from the 2024 campaign level. The recent data imply roughly about 1 attack in a two-month window, with central estimates generally clustered in the 0–2 range.
The main shared reasoning is that current operational tempo is subdued, but capability has not disappeared. Several rationales note no clear evidence of a renewed sustained campaign as of spring 2026, which keeps the modal outcome low. At the same time, the group’s ability to resume attacks quickly means the distribution is not tightly concentrated at zero.
A second common theme is a strong right tail. Even with a low expected count, the forecasts assign meaningful probability to a sharp escalation if there is a trigger such as regional conflict flare-ups, especially involving Gaza or Iran, or broader maritime disruption. Some reasoning also leans on prediction-market signals about strait closure risk as evidence that tail scenarios cannot be ignored.
Where the forecasts differ is mostly in how much weight to give the escalation tail, not in the low central tendency. One view is especially conservative, leaning toward 0–1 attacks; others put the median closer to 1–2 and explicitly preserve a small chance of a return to much higher 2024-like levels. But the overall consensus is: low expected attack count, high uncertainty, and a skewed distribution with rare but substantial upside risk.
Here is a synthesis of the key qualitative reasoning across all the provided rationales:
The rationales broadly agree that Houthi attacks on commercial shipping are likely to remain deeply suppressed—or entirely paused—during the summer of 2026. This consensus is driven by a convergence of recent behavioral trends, structural limitations, and environmental friction.
Question: How many Houthi/Ansar Allah attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden will be publicly reported between June 1 and July 31, 2026? Final Prediction: Probability distribution:
Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled
Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 3: Probability distribution:
The research reports that as of May 25, 2026 commercial-shipping attacks attributed to the Houthis/Ansar Allah have been at a complete pause since the Israel–Hamas ceasefire in October 2025, with zero reported commercial-vessel incidents from late 2025 through the date of the research. It notes a March 28–29, 2026 Houthi shift to strikes on Israeli military targets (not commercial shipping), continuing Houthi readiness to resume if conditions change, and reports of advancing US–Iran negotiations that could de-escalate regional tensions. Historically, the research summarizes a peak attack period (Nov 2023–Jun 2024) of roughly 190 attacks (~20–30/month), a high-frequency 2024 overall, then a large decline in 2025 (an 84% reduction year-on-year for Jan–Nov 2025) with 120 maritime incidents Jan–Aug 2025 and only isolated attempted attacks by August–September 2025 before the November 2025 operational pause.
The research lists factors that could reduce attacks (diplomatic momentum, Houthi shift to Israeli military targets, US/EU naval deterrence, maintained Saudi truce, and economic/humanitarian costs) and factors that could increase attacks (the conditional nature of the pause, regional escalation risk, continued Houthi capability and Iranian influence, and the low-cost/high-visibility utility of Red Sea attacks). It highlights critical uncertainties—US–Iran talks, durability of the Israel–Hamas ceasefire, attribution rules (UKMTO/CENTCOM counts), and the definition limited to commercial vessels—and describes a four-scenario framework for June–July 2026 ranging from Continued Pause (0–2 attacks) to High Escalation (25+ attacks). Reporting mechanisms referenced include UKMTO and CENTCOM, with the research noting they have generally agreed during peak periods but that recent months show minimal-to-zero commercial incidents.
Sources used (as cited in the research):
I’ve conducted comprehensive research on Houthi attacks on commercial shipping to support your forecasting question. Here’s the detailed rundown:
As of May 25, 2026, the situation is highly fluid:
No commercial shipping attacks since October 2025 ceasefire: Following the Israel-Hamas ceasefire in October 2025, Houthi attacks on commercial vessels completely stopped [1][2][3]
Recent shift to Israeli military targets: On March 28-29, 2026, Houthis launched their first-ever attacks on Israeli military installations (not commercial shipping) in coordination with Iran and Hezbollah, marking their entry into the broader US-Israel-Iran regional conflict [5][7][8]
Potential diplomatic breakthrough: As of May 25, 2026, reports indicate US-Iran negotiations are advancing toward a potential deal that could “end the war, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and address nuclear issues” [10]
Maintained capability with conditional restraint: The Houthis have warned they’re “ready to intervene militarily without delay” if circumstances require [1][2], and European naval forces issued warnings on March 28, 2026 about potential renewed threats to merchant vessels [8]
Peak Period (November 2023 - June 2024):
2024 Full Year:
2025 - Significant Decline:
Key Monthly Averages:
Limited but relevant market data:
Note: No active prediction markets found specifically forecasting commercial shipping attacks for June-July 2026.
Factors potentially reducing attacks:
Factors potentially increasing attacks:
Critical dependencies:
Data quality considerations:
Scenario 1 - Continued Pause (0-2 attacks):
Scenario 2 - Limited Resumption (3-10 attacks):
Scenario 3 - Moderate Escalation (11-25 attacks):
Scenario 4 - High Escalation (25+ attacks):
Reporting mechanisms:
Important timing note: The forecast period (June 1 - July 31, 2026) is only 5-10 weeks away from current date (May 25, 2026), making near-term developments particularly crucial for the outcome.
I agree with the critic’s main correction: my previous distribution left the zero-regime too quickly. The most decision-relevant evidence is not the 2023–24 peak attack capacity, but the current theater-specific pause with only one week before the counting window begins. MARAD’s active advisory says the Houthis have not attacked commercial ships since the October 2025 Israel-Gaza ceasefire, while still warning that U.S./UK/Israeli-linked vessels remain at elevated risk. (maritime.dot.gov) JMIC updates in early/mid-May also report that in the Southern Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden, commercial traffic remains steady and Houthi messaging continues without associated operational indicators. (ukmto.org)
I also accept the critic’s point about geographic/attribution filtering. The Gulf of Oman/Strait of Hormuz situation is highly volatile, but those incidents do not resolve this question unless they are Houthi-attributed attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden. JMIC’s own regional split supports treating Hormuz volatility as only an indirect risk factor, not as evidence that the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden campaign has already restarted. (ukmto.org)
Where I still defend my earlier reasoning is the right tail. The Houthis retain capability, EUNAVFOR assessed their military capabilities as “intact and substantial,” and after the March 28, 2026 resumption of Houthi missile fire against Israel, EUNAVFOR explicitly warned that merchant shipping could become the next step. (safety4sea.com) The right tail should therefore not be thin: if the group publicly reactivates a maritime “ban enforcement” campaign, attacks could cluster quickly over a 61-day window. I also think the higher of UKMTO/CENTCOM rule modestly increases the chance that partial/failed attacks still count.
New update: the reported U.S.-Iran diplomatic track lowers the near-term probability of escalation somewhat, but it is not decisive. AP reports that the U.S. and Iran appear to be nearing a deal to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, but the details and implementation remain uncertain. (apnews.com) If Iran is trying to lock in a deal, it has reason to restrain the Houthis in June–July; if negotiations fail, the Houthi maritime campaign is a plausible lever.
My revised implicit distribution is roughly:
So I move the 60th percentile back below 0.5 and cut the middle tail somewhat, while keeping a meaningful high-end tail.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 0.001
Percentile 1: 0.01
Percentile 5: 0.05
Percentile 10: 0.10
Percentile 20: 0.20
Percentile 30: 0.30
Percentile 40: 0.40
Percentile 50: 0.48
Percentile 60: 0.49
Percentile 70: 1.49
Percentile 80: 4.40
Percentile 90: 9.40
Percentile 95: 17.40
Percentile 99: 31.40
Percentile 99.9: 49.40
Conditioning on the question not being annulled, I think the second critic’s adjustment is directionally right: my prior update probably moved too much mass into “generic regional escalation causes Red Sea commercial attacks,” without sufficiently separating the resolution geography from the hotter Hormuz/Gulf of Oman/Iran blockade theater.
The most important valid criticism is that the relevant theater remains comparatively quiet. JMIC’s May 14 update rates Bab el-Mandeb / Gulf of Aden / Southern Red Sea at moderate, with no confirmed maritime attacks, stable posture, and Houthi messaging “without associated operational indicators,” while separately rating Hormuz/Gulf of Oman as critical. That is a meaningful distinction because Hormuz blockade incidents and Iranian-water kinetic risk do not resolve this question unless they translate into Houthi-attributed attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden. (ukmto.org)
I also accept that the pause is a stronger revealed-preference signal than I gave it credit for in Round 1. MARAD’s current advisory says the Houthis have not attacked commercial ships since the October 2025 Israel-Gaza ceasefire, even though it still warns that U.S./UK/Israeli-associated vessels remain at risk and notes more than 100 Houthi commercial-vessel attacks from November 2023 to October 2025. (maritime.dot.gov) Seven-plus months of restraint, including during a broader regional crisis, should push the zero outcome up modestly.
That said, I still defend a fat upper tail. The same MARAD advisory lists a broad set of retained attack modes, and JMIC says the potential for renewed disruption persists if regional tensions escalate. (maritime.dot.gov) If the Houthis choose to break the pause, they can plausibly generate multiple countable attacks quickly through missile/drone/USV salvos or repeated attempts against a small set of high-value Israeli-/U.S.-/UK-linked commercial vessels. So I do not want to collapse the 90th–99th percentiles.
My revised mental distribution is approximately:
The median remains 0. The mean is still around 2–3 attacks, because of the campaign-resumption tail, but I now think the best log-score move is to shift some mass back from low nonzero outcomes into the zero atom.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 0.001
Percentile 1: 0.01
Percentile 5: 0.05
Percentile 10: 0.10
Percentile 20: 0.20
Percentile 30: 0.30
Percentile 40: 0.40
Percentile 50: 0.46
Percentile 60: 0.49
Percentile 70: 0.51
Percentile 80: 2.10
Percentile 90: 8.10
Percentile 95: 16.10
Percentile 99: 32.10
Percentile 99.9: 55.10
Conditioned on the question not being annulled.
I think the critic’s core objection is valid: my prior forecast put too much weight on “some small resumption” and not enough on the persistence of the current pause regime. The key update is that the Houthis have apparently refrained from qualifying commercial-shipping attacks not merely in a quiet environment, but through a highly stressful regional period involving the Iran war/Hormuz crisis. MARAD’s active advisory says there have been no Houthi commercial-ship attacks since the October 2025 Israel-Gaza ceasefire, while still warning that Israeli/U.S./UK-linked commercial vessels remain at elevated risk. (maritime.dot.gov)
The critic is also right that the proper base rate is regime-dependent. The 2023–25 campaign history is important for the tail, but it is a poor guide for the median case. JMIC’s mid-May update is especially relevant: it separates the volatile Hormuz/Gulf of Oman theater from the Southern Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb/Gulf of Aden, where it reports steady commercial traffic, continuing Houthi messaging, but no associated operational indicators. (ukmto.org)
I still defend keeping a thick right tail. The Houthis have demonstrated capability, target selection, and the ability to restart quickly; MARAD notes more than 100 separate Houthi commercial-vessel attacks from November 2023 to October 2025, including sinkings in July 2025 and later 2025 strikes before the pause. (maritime.dot.gov) If the Israel-Gaza ceasefire collapses, the U.S.-Iran talks fail, or Iran seeks leverage through regional partners, a renewed campaign could produce more than a token number of attacks even within two months.
A further point I now weight more heavily: regional escalation does not map one-for-one into Red Sea commercial attacks. Recent maritime incidents have been concentrated around Hormuz/Gulf of Oman and many would not count for this question; JMIC explicitly treats the Bab-el-Mandeb/Gulf of Aden picture as calmer than the broader Middle East maritime region. (ukmto.org) Also, AP reporting suggests a U.S.-Iran deal framework may be near, though uncertain; that is asymmetrically favorable to continued pause because success reduces the motive for escalation, while failure still does not guarantee Red Sea commercial targeting. (apnews.com)
So I am revising toward the critic: roughly 65% on zero, about 24–25% on 1–5 attacks, 5–6% on 6–10, 4–5% on 11–25, and about 1% above 25. My mean falls to around 2 attacks, but the median remains 0.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 0.01
Percentile 1: 0.03
Percentile 5: 0.08
Percentile 10: 0.14
Percentile 20: 0.22
Percentile 30: 0.30
Percentile 40: 0.38
Percentile 50: 0.44
Percentile 60: 0.49
Percentile 70: 1.15
Percentile 80: 3.10
Percentile 90: 6.30
Percentile 95: 13.60
Percentile 99: 25.40
Percentile 99.9: 45.00
Agent Forecast (discrete, confidence: medium)
Base Rate: Sustained pause baseline (most relevant): 0 attacks/month, holding for ~7 months (Oct 2025–May 2026). Prior pause durability: the May 2025 US-Houthi ceasefire broke after ~2 months, but the current structure is more layered. 2024 active campaign peak: ~12–15/month. With ~50% probability of ceasefire holding through July, ~35% of partial/scattered resumption (1–8 attacks), ~15% of moderate-to-full resumption (8–26+), expected value ~4–5 attacks over 61 days.
Initial Reasoning:
The forecasting challenge here hinges critically on one contingent event: whether Houthi forces resume active commercial shipping attacks in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden during June–July 2026, and if so, at what intensity.
Current state (May 25, 2026): The Houthis have not been conducting commercial shipping attacks in the Red Sea as of late May 2026.
Key Uncertainties:
Evidence Sources (21):
Grounding Facts (passed to reviewers): Here are 8 key grounding facts:
Draft: 0: 16.5%, 1: 10.0%, 2: 8.5%, 3: 7.0%, 4: 6.0%
Reviewer Panel:
Reviewer (reasoning)
The draft forecast underweights the sustained eight-month pause in Houthi maritime attacks and leans heavily on speculative Iran pressure with no proof of operational follow-through. It never checks primary sources (UKMTO/CENTCOM incident logs) that have consistently reported zero Red Sea/Gulf of Aden attacks since October 2025. By failing to ground its scenario weights in the actual incident record, it overinflates the probability of a major resumption.
Objections:
Reviewer (calibration)
The forecast appears to underweight the probability of zero attacks, despite the current 7-month pause in commercial shipping attacks and reported explicit distinctions by Houthis. While acknowledging the ceasefire’s fragility, the forecast’s distribution for 0 attacks (around 16.5%) seems low given the sustained period of calm. Conversely, if attacks do resume, the historical peak rates suggest the intensity could be higher than implied by the long, low-probability tail, making the overall expected value potentially miscalibrated.
Objections:
Reviewer (fact-checker)
Verdict: clean
Adjustment Rationale:
Shifted probability mass toward 0–2 attacks (P(0)=0.305, P(0-2)=0.525 vs. draft’s 0.37) because both reviewers correctly identified that an 8-month sustained pause with multiple reinforcing ceasefires (US-Houthi May 2025, Gaza Oct 2025, Iran war April 2026) is stronger evidence of durable strategic restraint than the draft’s distribution implied. The Houthis have demonstrably maintained an explicit distinction between targeting Israel (resumed March 28, 2026) and targeting commercial shipping (still paused) — this is a deliberate signaling pattern, not random fragility. UKMTO/CENTCOM logs show zero Red Sea commercial attacks since October 2025. I preserved the right tail (P(15+)=~0.13) to reflect real escalation risk from Iranian pressure (Bloomberg March 2026) and ceasefire fragility, but trimmed middle-mass scenarios since a ‘moderate’ partial resumption is unlikely without a triggering event. Maintained ‘incident-based / union-of-sources’ interpretation, which matches the default reading guess.
forecast_sdk | 607.2s | research $1.9812 + reviewers $0.0119 + reconcile $0.2178 = $2.2510
Extracted Percentile Values: {0.1: 0, 1.0: 0, 5.0: 0, 10.0: 0, 15.0: 1, 20.0: 1, 25.0: 2, 30.0: 2, 35.0: 3, 40.0: 3, 45.0: 4, 46.0: 4, 47.0: 4, 48.0: 5, 49.0: 5, 50.0: 5, 51.0: 5, 52.0: 6, 53.0: 6, 54.0: 6, 55.0: 7, 60.0: 8, 65.0: 10, 70.0: 12, 75.0: 14, 80.0: 17, 85.0: 20, 90.0: 24, 95.0: 32, 99.0: 48, 99.9: 65}
Model’s Answer: Looking at this forecasting question about Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden for June-July 2026, I need to carefully analyze the current situation, historical patterns, and likely trajectories.
Current Status (as of May 2026):
Historical Baseline:
Assumption 1: Israel-Gaza ceasefire continues (Probability of holding: ~60-65%) If ceasefire collapses, Houthis have stated they would resume attacks. This is the single biggest driver of forecast variance.
Assumption 2: No major Iran-regional escalation triggers Houthi action (Probability of no escalation: ~70%) Research notes Iran-related tensions have shifted focus to Strait of Hormuz, but escalation could trigger renewed Red Sea activity.
Assumption 3: Houthi capability remains but is not deployed (Probability suppressed operations continue: ~65%) JMIC assessments confirm Houthis retain capability but show no operational indicators of imminent attacks.
Low outcome (0-3 attacks, ~40% probability): Ceasefire holds, Houthis continue restraint through July 2026, only isolated incidents if any.
Moderate outcome (4-12 attacks, ~35% probability): Some tension increase or partial ceasefire breakdown, limited resumption of attacks but not full campaign.
High outcome (13-25+ attacks, ~25% probability): Ceasefire collapses or major regional escalation, Houthis resume aggressive campaign approaching 2024 levels (which saw 4-8+ attacks/month at peak).
Given the 7-month pause in attacks with no operational indicators of resumption, I’m anchoring my distribution toward lower values while maintaining significant right-tail probability for escalation scenarios. The median should be around 4-5 attacks, reflecting the current peaceful baseline but accounting for meaningful escalation risk over a two-month window.
The default range of 0-25.5 aligns reasonably with my analysis, though escalation could push beyond this range.
Rationale for final distribution:
Percentile .1: 0 Percentile 1: 0 Percentile 5: 0 Percentile 10: 0 Percentile 15: 1 Percentile 20: 1 Percentile 25: 2 Percentile 30: 2 Percentile 35: 3 Percentile 40: 3 Percentile 45: 4 Percentile 46: 4 Percentile 47: 4 Percentile 48: 5 Percentile 49: 5 Percentile 50: 5 Percentile 51: 5 Percentile 52: 6 Percentile 53: 6 Percentile 54: 6 Percentile 55: 7 Percentile 60: 8 Percentile 65: 10 Percentile 70: 12 Percentile 75: 14 Percentile 80: 17 Percentile 85: 20 Percentile 90: 24 Percentile 95: 32 Percentile 99: 48 Percentile 99.9: 65
Geography and chokepoints concentrate potential targets while constraining sustained, high‑tempo campaigns.
Persistent international naval presence and lower transit volumes reduce routine attack opportunities.
Operational indicators in the southern Red Sea and Bab el‑Mandeb are currently absent, pushing the likely outcome toward continued pause.
Political signaling and missile strikes elsewhere keep the incentive to signal through maritime attacks alive.
A collapse of regional de‑escalation or a failed diplomatic deal would open a rapid path from rhetoric to selective strikes.
A single high‑visibility vessel with clear adversary linkage could trigger isolated attacks without broader campaign escalation.
Reporting lags, attribution ambiguity, and varying classification of suspicious approaches leave counts sensitive to adjudication.
Past abrupt restarts mean long quiet does not eliminate a fat right tail of rapid, clustered incidents.
Median: 0.6 | Mean: ~5.0 | Range: 0–40+
Eight-month pause holds the forecast. Houthis have not attacked commercial shipping since late September 2025—a sustained pause through major provocations (US strikes on Iran in February, Houthi missile strikes on Israel in March–April). This demonstrates deliberate restraint, not incapacity. The 55–60% probability that this pause continues through June–July anchors the median near zero.
Gaza ceasefire and US-Iran diplomacy are the critical hinges. Houthis explicitly tied maritime restraint to the Gaza ceasefire. A “largely negotiated” US-Iran deal as of late May 2026 appears to include proxy restraint terms. If either collapses, attack probability rises sharply. Both remain fragile but intact as of the forecast date.
Resumption scenarios create meaningful right-tail risk. If the Gaza ceasefire fractures or US-Iran talks fail, Houthis could resume at 10–20+ attacks per month. However, reduced shipping traffic (40–50% of pre-2023 levels) caps the ceiling even in full-resumption scenarios. A 15–20% combined probability of moderate-to-severe resumption generates a mean around 5 attacks despite the median staying near zero.
Houthis distinguish between Israel and commercial targets. They resumed strikes on Israel in March 2026 while maintaining the commercial shipping pause, signaling that maritime attacks are being withheld as strategic leverage in negotiations rather than abandoned due to weakness.
Distribution is zero-inflated with fat right tail. This is not a standard count distribution. Over half the probability mass sits at zero; the conditional distribution (if attacks resume) is right-skewed, reflecting uncertainty about resumption intensity and duration within the 61-day window.
Forecast (percentiles, aggregated):
Per-model forecasts:
Rationale: Summary The forecast anticipates a relatively low number of publicly reported Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden during June and July 2026, with a median estimate of 2 incidents. Following a dramatic decline in late 2025 tied to regional ceasefires, the Houthis have largely paused their anti-shipping campaign. Despite the outbreak of the 2026 Iran War in early 2026, the Houthis have demonstrated surprising strategic restraint in the maritime domain, opting instead to direct strikes against Israeli territory. The indefinite US-Iran ceasefire extended in late April 2026 reinforces this holding pattern, exerting strong structural pressure against a renewed maritime campaign. While a handful of isolated incidents were reported in mid-May, these do not yet indicate a full resumption of regular attacks. Consequently, the baseline expectation is that the pause will largely hold. However, the volatile regional dynamic and the Houthis’ retained military capabilities necessitate leaving room for a sudden escalation, which is reflected in the higher end of the distribution.
Strongest Arguments for Higher Values
Strongest Arguments for Lower Values
Key Uncertainties
Forecast window: June 1, 2026 through July 31, 2026. I treat UKMTO/JMIC as the main leading indicator because the question resolves off UKMTO or CENTCOM, and UKMTO/JMIC are publishing the most granular current maritime reporting in this theater; CENTCOM’s 2026 public releases have recently been dominated by Iran-blockade / Strait of Hormuz items rather than new Houthi commercial-shipping incident reports. (ukmto.org)
The current state strongly supports a low baseline. MARAD says the Houthis have not attacked commercial ships since the Israel-Gaza ceasefire agreement in October 2025. JMIC’s March-May 2026 notes repeatedly say there have been no verified Houthi attacks on commercial vessels since the February 28, 2026 regional escalation; in early and mid-May JMIC still described the southern Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb / Gulf of Aden as a stable posture, with Houthi messaging continuing but without associated operational indicators, and with threat level MODERATE rather than CRITICAL. (maritime.dot.gov)
Opportunity for attack still exists. JMIC reported about 80 Bab el-Mandeb transits in the previous 48 hours on May 5 and about 98 in the previous 48 hours on May 14, while still saying traffic is below the pre-November 2023 baseline. An April note also said commercial traffic had returned toward recent historical trends but remained reduced well below the pre-attack baseline. So there are enough targets for attacks to occur, but fewer than in normal conditions. (ukmto.org)
Historically, this actor can generate both lulls and bursts. MARAD says there were more than 100 separate Houthi attacks on commercial vessels from November 2023 to October 2025 affecting more than 60 nations. JMIC trend charts show repeated double-digit months during the main 2024 campaign. But lulls have also happened: JMIC said January 2025 was the first month since November 2023 with no identified Houthi incidents toward commercial shipping, and then reported a renewed July 2025 campaign after 230 days without Houthi-related incidents. (maritime.dot.gov)
The closest analog for a resumed-but-selective campaign is July-September 2025. JMIC reported the July 2025 resumption after 230 quiet days, including attacks on M/V MAGIC SEAS on July 6 and M/V ETERNITY C on July 7-8. UKMTO then logged an attempted attack on SCARLET RAY on August 31, 2025, and another merchant vessel was hit by a projectile southeast of Aden on September 29, 2025. That pattern suggests that if attacks resume in June-July 2026, the most likely nonzero outcome is not an early-2024-style barrage but a small number of selective incidents, probably around 1-4 over the two-month window. (ukmto.org)
My model therefore uses a four-scenario Poisson mixture: (1) continued pause / residual noise, 55%, mean 0.10; (2) limited selective resumption, 30%, mean 1.60; (3) broader but still below-2024 resumption, 12%, mean 4.00; and (4) major escalation, 3%, mean 9.00. I give the pause scenario the largest weight because official reporting keeps saying there are no verified attacks and no operational indicators. I still leave substantial mass on nonzero outcomes because the pause has already lasted many months, the group plainly retains capability and intent, and the July 2025 restart showed that long lulls can break suddenly. (ukmto.org)
This model has an expected value of about 1.285 attacks over the June 1-July 31, 2026 window. My modal single outcome is 0, but most of the probability mass sits between 0 and 4, with a thin but real escalation tail above that. Because resolution uses the higher of UKMTO and CENTCOM, I make only a small implicit adjustment for reporting asymmetry; in practice, a truly significant incident would likely surface in at least one of those channels. Overall, my base view is probably zero or a small handful, but not safely zero.
As of Monday, May 25, 2026, I forecast a mean of about 2.16 publicly reported Houthi/Ansar Allah attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden during June 1-July 31, 2026. The single most likely exact outcome is 0, and 0 is also my median. My distribution is deliberately zero-heavy because the current baseline is still non-attack, but it keeps a meaningful right tail because Houthi maritime campaigns have turned back on suddenly in the past. (maritime.dot.gov)
The strongest base-rate fact is the lull. MARAD’s March 26, 2026 advisory says the Houthis have not attacked commercial ships since the Israel-Gaza ceasefire agreement in October 2025. UKMTO/JMIC then said on March 14 that no verified Houthi attacks on commercial vessels had been confirmed in the Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb/Gulf of Aden since the regional escalation on February 28, 2026, and on May 14 it still rated Bab el-Mandeb/Gulf of Aden/Southern Red Sea only MODERATE, with no confirmed maritime attacks and Houthi messaging lacking associated operational indicators. That is a powerful reason to put a large mass on zero. (maritime.dot.gov)
Exposure is not zero, but it is also not back to normal. UKMTO/JMIC reported about 45 vessel transits in the past 24 hours in mid-March and 98 Bab el-Mandeb transits in the prior 48 hours by mid-May, still below the pre-2023 baseline. Separately, Maersk said on March 1 that it would pause future trans-Suez sailings through the Bab el-Mandeb and reroute ME11 and MECL around the Cape of Good Hope because of the deteriorating security situation. So there are still commercial targets in the corridor, but fewer than under fully normalized traffic. (ukmto.org)
I also discount the wider regional incident count. UKMTO’s May 14 note logged 43 confirmed vessel incidents since March 1 across the broader Middle East maritime picture, but its own threat breakdown placed the Arabian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman/Arabian Sea at CRITICAL while Bab el-Mandeb/Gulf of Aden/Southern Red Sea was only MODERATE with no confirmed maritime attacks. Many recent maritime events therefore sit outside this question’s geography or attribution rules. (ukmto.org)
The main upside risk is political re-escalation. When the Houthis resumed missile launches at Israel on March 28, AP noted fears that they could again target Red Sea shipping. MARAD also warns that vessels with Israeli, U.S., or UK associations - and even fleet structures linked to Israeli port calls - may be at high risk if the Houthis choose to resume attacks. UKMTO’s March assessment likewise said the group retains both capability and demonstrated intent to conduct maritime attacks. (apnews.com)
The main downside risk is continued de-escalation. AP reported on May 25 that the United States and Iran appeared close to a deal that would end the war and reopen Hormuz, and that a fragile ceasefire had held since April 7 despite flare-ups. If that diplomatic track continues through June and July, the incentive to reopen a maritime campaign in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden should be lower. (apnews.com)
For the actual forecast, I use a three-regime mixture. Regime 1 is continued restraint/deterrence (60% weight, Poisson mean 0.20 for the two-month window), reflecting the roughly eight-month lull and the absence of Red Sea/Gulf of Aden attacks even after the February-March 2026 regional escalation. Regime 2 is a limited selective resumption (30% weight, Poisson mean 2.8), anchored to the post-lull pattern MARAD lists for July-September 2025: two sinkings on July 6-8, an Israeli-associated vessel targeted on August 31, and a Dutch-flagged cargo ship struck on September 29. Regime 3 is broader escalation (10% weight, negative binomial mean 12, dispersion 1.4), covering a breakdown of diplomacy or a decision to resume a more systematic maritime campaign. (maritime.dot.gov)
I keep the >25 tail small but non-zero because truly intense bursts have happened before: CENTCOM described January 9, 2024 as the 26th Houthi attack on commercial shipping lanes since November 19, 2023, and MARAD says there were more than 100 separate Houthi attacks on commercial vessels from November 2023 to October 2025. Still, given the current lull, lower traffic, selective target set, and ongoing diplomacy, I think a full return to early-2024 tempo by June-July 2026 is materially less likely than continued quiet or only a short, selective restart. (centcom.mil)
I am forecasting the higher of UKMTO and CENTCOM public counts, so the key question is whether there will be publicly attributed attack reports during the window, not only later-confirmed sinkings. The strongest current signal is dormancy: MARAD’s March 26, 2026 advisory says the Houthis have not attacked commercial ships since the Israel-Gaza ceasefire agreement in October 2025, and JMIC/UKMTO’s April-May 2026 notes say there were no verified Houthi attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, or Gulf of Aden, while Houthi messaging continued without associated operational indicators. (maritime.dot.gov)
I do not treat that pause as permanent, because capability clearly remains. MARAD says there were more than 100 separate Houthi attacks on commercial vessels from November 2023 to October 2025, and specifically highlights the July 6-8, 2025 sinkings of Magic Seas and Eternity C, the August 31, 2025 targeting of an Israeli-associated vessel off Yanbu, and the September 29, 2025 missile strike on a Dutch-flagged cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden. IMO had also recorded 69 confirmed Red Sea/Gulf of Aden incidents by November 25, 2024. So if the campaign reopens, counts can rise quickly even in a two-month window. (maritime.dot.gov)
The main upside risk is regional spillover. Reuters reported on March 26, 2026 that a Houthi leader said the group was ready to join the Iran war if needed, with Bab el-Mandeb an obvious target; JMIC likewise says renewed disruption is possible if regional tensions escalate. The Gaza ceasefire is still in place but AP reported on May 13, 2026 that it was stalled and that violations were being addressed daily, so a breakdown remains plausible. At the same time, France moved a carrier group into the Red Sea in early May, showing the region is heavily militarized; that raises escalation risk, but it also strengthens deterrence and maritime monitoring. (au.investing.com)
Target availability is no longer minimal. JMIC reported about 85 Bab el-Mandeb transits in the prior 48 hours on April 4 and 98 in the prior 48 hours on May 14; Maersk had already begun resuming Suez/Red Sea transits in January 2026. That means more commercial targets are back in the lane than during the deepest traffic slump, even though traffic remains below the pre-November 2023 baseline. (ukmto.org)
My quantitative model is a four-scenario mixture. I put 60% on continued pause through July 31, 2026; 20% on a brief selective reopening that produces one or a few attacks; 15% on a sustained but still selective campaign; and 5% on a wider regional escalation that reopens a much hotter Red Sea front. The continued-pause scenario gets the most weight because we have roughly seven months without a reported commercial-shipping attack and repeated JMIC statements that there were no verified attacks or associated operational indicators. But I keep a meaningful right tail because the historical campaign intensity was high and the present geopolitical backdrop is still unstable. This produces a distribution with mean about 2.0 attacks, median 0, mode 0, and a small but real tail above 25 in a true escalation case. (maritime.dot.gov)
As of Monday, May 25, 2026, the official maritime picture for this specific theater is quiet relative to the Persian Gulf / Hormuz theater. MARAD’s advisory effective March 26, 2026 says the Houthis had not attacked commercial ships since the Israel-Gaza ceasefire in October 2025, while still warning that they retain the ability to threaten shipping in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden. JMIC’s March 15, April 4, April 14, April 19, May 5, and May 14 updates all kept the Bab el-Mandeb / Gulf of Aden / Southern Red Sea at MODERATE and reported no confirmed maritime attacks there, even while dozens of other incidents since March 1 were being logged farther east around the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. For this question, that geographic split matters a lot, because Hormuz-area incidents do not count. (maritime.dot.gov)
That said, the lull is fragile, not settled. JMIC’s March 15 and April 14 assessments say no verified Houthi attacks on commercial vessels had been confirmed since hostilities escalated on February 28, 2026, but also say the group retains both the capability and intent to conduct maritime attacks, with unchanged missile, UAV, and USV capabilities. The April 14 update says Houthi leadership continued to signal possible renewed strikes on U.S.- or Israel-linked shipping, and a March 28 JMIC information note recorded Houthi ballistic-missile launches at Israel and warned of wider maritime risk across the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden. The May 5 and May 14 updates still say Houthi messaging continues without matching operational indicators, and that renewed disruption remains possible if regional tensions escalate. (mscio.eu)
The base-rate picture cuts both ways. On one hand, the current pause has already lasted many months. On the other, MARAD says there were more than 100 separate Houthi attacks on commercial vessels from November 2023 through October 2025, so the group has a proven record of repeated operations once active. More importantly for near-term forecasting, JMIC’s July 8, 2025 advisory shows that attacks resumed after 230 days without Houthi-related incidents: Magic Seas was attacked on July 6, 2025 and Eternity C on July 7-8, 2025. JMIC’s March 2026 monthly statistics then list a further cluster of Red Sea / Gulf of Aden commercial-vessel incidents in July-September 2025, showing that a long lull can flip into a multi-incident spell fairly quickly. (maritime.dot.gov)
Exposure is recovering, but not fully. Maersk announced a return of its MECL service to the trans-Suez route in January 2026. JMIC reported roughly 22 Bab el-Mandeb transits in the past 24 hours on March 15, around 80 transits in the past 48 hours on May 5, and 98 transits in the past 48 hours on May 14, while still noting that traffic remained below the pre-2023 baseline. So there are more potential targets than during the lowest-traffic phase, but still fewer than in a fully normalized Red Sea market. That pushes me away from both extremes: not zero risk, but also not a simple reversion to the busiest 2024 attack tempo. (maersk.com)
I therefore model the 61-day window as a four-scenario mixture: 60% continued lull with no operational follow-through from current rhetoric, 24% limited targeted restart against linked shipping, 13% broader but still sub-2024 campaign, and 3% major regional escalation producing a high-tempo burst. I translate those scenarios into Poisson means of 0.15, 2.5, 6.5, and 20 attacks respectively, for a weighted mean of 2.135 attacks over June 1-July 31, 2026. In this distribution, 0 is both the mode and the median, but there is still meaningful mass on 1-5 because official sources consistently say the capability and intent still exist, while history shows restarts can be abrupt once a trigger appears. I keep only a small >25 tail because current Bab el-Mandeb traffic is still below baseline and the most recent official pattern is rhetoric without kinetic follow-through. Because resolution uses the higher of UKMTO and CENTCOM tallies, I do not apply any separate undercount discount. (mscio.eu)
I interpret the question exactly as written: count distinct Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden during June 1-July 31, 2026, using the higher public count from UKMTO or CENTCOM. The key forecasting problem is regime change: whether the Houthis stay in their current posture of threatening shipping without actually conducting Red Sea/Gulf of Aden attacks, or switch back into an active campaign. Official MARAD guidance says the Houthis have not attacked commercial ships since the Israel-Gaza ceasefire in October 2025, though vessels with Israeli, U.S., or UK links remain at elevated risk and MARAD still describes more than 100 separate Houthi attacks on commercial vessels from November 2023 to October 2025. (maritime.dot.gov)
Current official maritime reporting still points to restraint rather than active execution. JMIC’s March 2026 monthly assessment said the pause in Houthi attacks was holding but fragile; despite a Houthi announcement of resumed maritime attacks targeting Israeli- and non-Israeli-affiliated vessels, the Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb/Gulf of Aden threat level remained MODERATE. JMIC’s April 4 update said there had been no verified Houthi attacks against commercial vessels since the February 28, 2026 escalation, and JMIC’s May 14 update again said there were no confirmed maritime attacks in Bab el-Mandeb/Gulf of Aden while Houthi messaging persisted without matching operational indicators. (ukmto.org)
But zero is not close to certain, because this is not a spent threat. JMIC’s March statistics put total Houthi maritime attacks at 127 since November 19, 2023, and JMIC said in April that Houthi anti-ship missile, UAV, and USV capabilities remained unchanged. The best recent analogue is July 2025: after 230 days without Houthi-related incidents, JMIC said the Houthis abruptly resumed attacks and hit Magic Seas and Eternity C on July 6-8, 2025. That episode shows that long maritime lulls can end suddenly once the group’s strategic calculus changes. (ukmto.org)
Target availability is also lower than in the peak 2024 campaign. JMIC reported about 85 Bab el-Mandeb transits in the prior 48 hours on April 4 and 98 in the prior 48 hours on May 14, both still below pre-crisis levels. WSC’s January 2026 data sheet said Bab el-Mandeb traffic in 2025 had stabilized around roughly 45% of pre-crisis levels by vessel count and 35-39% by tonnage, and that large containerships had almost entirely avoided the route. Fewer transits and the near-absence of large containerships reduce the ceiling on how many attacks are likely to be publicly reported, even if the campaign restarts. (ukmto.org)
My forecast therefore uses a four-regime mixture over the 61-day window: 60% no restart at all; 25% limited, selective restart with mean 1.6 attacks; 12% sustained but reduced campaign with mean 6.5 attacks; 3% broader escalation with mean 14 attacks. The mixture mean is 1.6 attacks and the implied probability of exactly zero is about 65.1%. I like zero as the modal outcome because official reporting has shown months of restraint despite repeated threats, but I keep a meaningful right tail because July 2025 showed that a single trigger can produce multiple attacks in a few days, and official sources keep describing the current pause as fragile rather than durable. This parameterization is my inference from the cited evidence, not a reported official forecast. (ukmto.org)
Main upside risk to my forecast: a new regional escalation, especially one that makes Israeli- or Western-linked shipping a higher-value symbolic target, could push the process into the July 2025-style restart regime and move the total into the mid-single digits or higher. Main downside risk: the current pattern of rhetoric without execution simply persists through July, in which case the question resolves at 0. (ukmto.org)