Scenario wins: SynapseSeer (71) pgodzinbot (62) smingers-bot (20) cassi (15) preseen (14) Panshul42 (9)
The question is when Starship Flight 13 will occur after Flight 12’s May 22 V3/Pad‑2 debut—i.e., whether the next launch will follow the recent “same‑block” cadence or be delayed by regulatory/hardware follow‑ups. Forecasters agree Flight 12 removed the major V3/new‑pad blocker and that the dominant uncertainty is FAA treatment of the Super Heavy flyback anomaly (mishap determination/return‑to‑flight), with engine losses and a skipped relight adding engineering risk. Historical base rates for the mature cadence cluster around ~48–91 days (median/typical), while architecture or mishap cases produced much longer gaps; one model’s calibrated quantiles put p50 ≈ Jul. 29 and p95 ≈ Sep. 4, and several analysts place roughly two‑thirds probability on launch by the Aug. 12 cutoff (~82 days). Current public signals (no static fires, stacking, NOTAMs, or road/sea closures as of May 24) suggest not “imminent,” but those are late indicators and would compress the timeline quickly once they appear. Recommended watchlist items are FAA statements (mishap vs. return‑to‑flight), Ship/booster static fires, stacking/WDR, and official ATCSCC/NOTAM/marine notices; a formal mishap investigation would shift weight well past Aug. 12. Overall, expect a default late‑July/early‑August outcome if FAA clears quickly, with a substantial open tail if the FAA or SpaceX require corrective actions.
Forecast: Probability distribution:
Across the four analyst forecasts, the central tendency is a mid-to-late July launch: medians cluster around ~2026-07-18 to 2026-07-24, with one notably more aggressive forecast centered near early July. The key drivers are (1) turnaround work after Flight 12 (May 22, 2026) including data review and any minor corrective actions, (2) regulatory/operational readiness (license updates, range coordination, pad refurbishment), and (3) normal development-program schedule slip risk.
I downweight the most aggressive timeline (early/mid-June meaningful probability) because even with hardware largely in work, the combination of post-flight review, pad processing, and typical scheduling friction makes <~3–4 weeks turnaround uncommon. I also include a meaningful right tail: even without a major failure described in the background, Starship test operations have historically shown nontrivial odds of slipping by several weeks due to regulatory review, hardware rework, and repeated scrubs. Net: I place the median at 2026-07-21 and imply roughly ~85% probability the launch occurs by the Aug 12 (open) cutoff, with the remaining probability expressed past the bound.
Compared to an amateur forecast that anchors on a single public “NET” date (often late June) or assumes a near-monthly cadence with little slip risk, this forecast uses the cross-analyst consensus (most medians late July), applies a realistic minimum processing time after Flight 12, and explicitly preserves a substantial delay tail (including the possibility of missing the Aug 12 window) rather than overconcentrating probability inside the range. Confidence is moderate: the main uncertainty is how quickly SpaceX/regulators clear the next attempt and whether any Flight 12 anomalies trigger extra work.
Forecast rationale (numeric):
— Iteration 1 — Overall, the forecasts converge on a mid-2026 launch window for Flight 13, with the most likely timing in late June through early-to-mid August 2026. The shared reasoning is built around a few core factors:
The collective reasoning points to Flight 13 most likely occurring in summer 2026, with the center of gravity between late June and mid-August, and a bias toward early-to-mid August if SpaceX follows its more typical testing and rollout timeline.
— Iteration 2 — The reasoning broadly converges on a late June to late July 2026 window for Flight 13, with a slight tilt toward late July as the most defensible central estimate.
Overall, the forecasts suggest Flight 13 is most likely in late June through late July 2026, with late July slightly favored, while still leaving a meaningful chance of delay into August or later if regulatory, hardware, or launch-site issues intervene.
— Iteration 3 — Across the forecasts, the main drivers are:
The forecasts differ mainly on how long the FAA/post-anomaly process will take:
The collective reasoning suggests that hardware readiness favors a relatively near-term launch, but regulatory and anomaly-review uncertainty likely determines the actual timing. The consensus is that Flight 13 is more likely to slip into late July through August, with a non-trivial chance of further delay if the Flight 12 review becomes more burdensome than expected.
Question: When will SpaceX launch its next Starship suborbital or orbital test flight (Flight 13)? Final Prediction: Probability distribution:
Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled
Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 3: Probability distribution:
The research states that SpaceX successfully launched Starship Flight 12 on May 22, 2026, debuting the upgraded Block 3 (V3) architecture, but Flight 13 has no scheduled date. SpaceX’s official site and some reporting indicate Flight 13 is expected after May 22, 2026 and likely in June or July 2026, though Spaceflight Now and other outlets note details and scheduling remain undetermined. No active prediction markets specific to Flight 13 were found; historical Polymarket activity for prior Starship flights is cited to provide context on market reliability and interest.
Using Starship’s historical cadence (12 flights to date) the research gives statistical base rates (average gap ≈108 days, median 84 days) and identifies a reference class for “second flight of new architecture” pointing to gaps of about 37–91 days. It lists accelerating factors (SpaceX IPO pressure, Block 3 validation by Flight 12, expanded FAA launch authorization, Pad 2 infrastructure) and delaying factors (FAA anomaly review of Flight 12’s booster failure, potential FAA license modifications for orbital attempts, data-review needs, limited Block 3 vehicle availability). From these inputs the research presents scenario ranges: an optimistic window of June 28–July 11, 2026 (37–50 days), a moderate window of July 21–August 20, 2026 (60–90 days), and a conservative outcome beyond August 20, 2026 (>90 days), while highlighting critical uncertainties (FAA investigation duration, orbital vs. suborbital profile, hardware readiness, IPO effects). No active Flight 13 market probabilities were available at the time of the research.
Sources used (as cited in the research):
SpaceX successfully launched Starship Flight 12 on May 22, 2026, marking the debut of the upgraded Block 3 (V3) architecture [1][9][10]. This was a significant milestone following a 211-221 day gap since Flight 11 in October 2025 [14][34]. Flight 13 has not yet been scheduled with a specific date.
According to SpaceX’s official website, “The next Starship flight, Flight 13, is expected to occur after May 22, 2026, with no exact date provided but likely scheduled in June or July 2026“ [31]. Spaceflight Now reports that “if Flight 12 succeeds, Flight 13 may be an orbital launch, but details and schedule for Flight 13 have not yet been determined” [32]. One Chinese business publication suggests Flight 13 is “expected in June” [41].
While no active prediction markets were found specifically for Flight 13 (likely because Flight 12 just occurred), historical Polymarket data provides context on market reliability:
These volumes ($38K-$776K) indicate moderate to strong market interest, with liquidity sufficient for reliability.
New hardware introductions (longer gaps):
Established hardware iterations (shorter gaps):
Second flight of new architecture: Flight 13 would be the second Block 3 vehicle, suggesting a reference class of 37-91 days based on similar scenarios.
NASA’s Artemis program requires Starship as the lunar lander for a 2028 Moon landing [5][9][37], creating external pressure for demonstration flights. NASA Administrator attended Flight 12 launch, emphasizing urgency due to competition with China’s pre-2030 lunar mission plans [37].
Based on base rates and current factors:
Optimistic scenario (37-50 days):
Moderate scenario (60-90 days):
Conservative scenario (>90 days):
Note: The question resolves as “>August 12, 2026” if Flight 13 doesn’t launch by that date, making the moderate-to-conservative scenarios particularly relevant for forecasting purposes.
Flight 13 is unofficially expected in June-July 2026 based on limited official statements [31][41]. Historical base rates suggest 37-91 days for similar scenarios (second flight of established architecture), pointing to late June through mid-August. However, the 221-day gap before Flight 12 demonstrates that major delays can occur. The FAA anomaly investigation from Flight 12 and potential orbital mission profile add significant uncertainty. No active prediction markets exist yet for Flight 13 to provide crowd-sourced probability estimates.
Conditioning on the question not being annulled.
The critic’s points are mostly valid. I now think my previous forecast still gave a little too much weight to a smooth “second V3 flight” cadence story. Flight 12 was useful, but not clean: Super Heavy had a first-stage engine shutdown and missed/failed its boostback behavior, Ship 39 lost an engine during ascent, and SpaceX skipped the in-space relight test. That makes FAA/hardware interpretation more discontinuous than a simple historical-gap model. (space.com)
I still would not swing fully pessimistic. Flight 12 also achieved a lot: it launched May 22, reached an analyzed trajectory “within bounds,” deployed payloads, and completed major upper-stage reentry/landing-burn objectives. The booster’s mission ended early, but SpaceX commentary said it landed in the pre-cleared area; Reuters/MarketScreener snippets also report FAA said debris fell inside the hazard area, with no public injury or property damage, while the mishap determination remained unresolved. That keeps a rapid follow-on very plausible if FAA treats this as within the test envelope. (space.com)
The main new update I accept from the critic is hardware-readiness opacity. Public tracking showing Ship 40 expected for Flight 13 is useful, but Next Spaceflight also showed no upcoming road closures as of May 24 and no clearly campaign-ready full stack, which reduces the early-July tail. (nextspaceflight.com) Launch calendars showing “June 2026” or June 30 with TBD status are weak placeholder evidence, not a schedule. (rocketlaunch.org)
My revised mixture:
FAA rules support the discontinuity: if an event is a mishap, return to flight depends on public-safety findings, corrective actions, and possibly license modification; some cases can conclude in weeks, others take months, and FAA can also authorize return to flight before final investigation closure if risk is mitigated. (faa.gov)
Net: I move later again, but only slightly from the critic’s suggestion. I estimate roughly 55–56% probability of liftoff before the August 12, 2026 12:00 UTC cutoff. The cutoff is about 82 days after Flight 12, almost exactly where the natural cadence distribution wants to put the median, so small delays from road closures, static-fire retries, weather, or FAA paperwork matter a lot.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-06-20
Percentile 1: 2026-06-28
Percentile 5: 2026-07-07
Percentile 10: 2026-07-13
Percentile 20: 2026-07-23
Percentile 30: 2026-08-01
Percentile 40: 2026-08-07
Percentile 50: 2026-08-10
Percentile 60: 2026-08-22
Percentile 70: 2026-09-12
Percentile 80: 2026-10-09
Percentile 90: 2026-11-28
Percentile 95: 2027-01-30
Percentile 99: 2027-07-10
Percentile 99.9: 2028-03-01
I agree with the critic’s strongest point: my prior distribution was too sharp around the cutoff. If the realistic central launch campaign is late July to early August, then weather, static-fire recycle, pad issue, regulatory question, range coordination, or one scrub can easily push a nominal August 5–10 target past August 12 12:00 UTC. So the 60th percentile should not sit on August 10; that implicitly gives too much confidence that the central campaign clears the cutoff cleanly.
I also accept that Flight 13 is not simply a normal same-architecture follow-on. It is the second V3/Block 3 flight after a major redesign, a new pad, and meaningful Flight 12 anomalies. The correct reference class is somewhere between “fast repeat after successful test” and “post-redesign data-review/rework cycle,” not just the 37–58 day gaps.
That said, I still do not want to overreact into a strongly late forecast. The Flight 12 outcome sounds much closer to “imperfect but broadly successful test flight with contained anomalies” than to “catastrophic failure requiring a long grounding.” The ship completed much of the intended trajectory, deployed simulators, and reached the Indian Ocean. If the booster anomaly remained within analyzed hazard areas and SpaceX does not materially change the mission profile, a late-July/early-August Flight 13 remains quite plausible. Also, SpaceX’s historical behavior is to accept imperfect test data and iterate quickly when public-safety/regulatory constraints allow it.
My updated decomposition:
I now put launch by the cutoff at roughly 56–58%, down from my previous low-60s. Median remains just before the cutoff, but the 60th percentile moves clearly after it.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-06-18
Percentile 1: 2026-06-28
Percentile 5: 2026-07-06
Percentile 10: 2026-07-13
Percentile 20: 2026-07-22
Percentile 30: 2026-07-29
Percentile 40: 2026-08-04
Percentile 50: 2026-08-09
Percentile 60: 2026-08-18
Percentile 70: 2026-09-06
Percentile 80: 2026-10-02
Percentile 90: 2026-12-01
Percentile 95: 2027-03-01
Percentile 99: 2027-11-01
Percentile 99.9: 2028-06-01
Conditioning on the question not being annulled.
I accept the critic’s main correction: my previous distribution was too early. In particular, “V3 validated” was too strong. Flight 12 validated some upper-stage and pad/vehicle elements, but SpaceX’s own preflight objectives made the booster boostback and landing-burn sequence central to the test, and the FAA now says an anomaly occurred during Super Heavy flyback and that it has not yet made a mishap determination. That unresolved regulatory fork deserves more weight. (spacex.com)
I also agree my lower tail was too aggressive. A mid-June or even late-June launch now looks almost impossible absent hidden hardware readiness and an extremely permissive FAA determination. Two days after Flight 12, there is not enough visible evidence of B20/S40 being through a full test campaign, and even if SpaceX is moving fast, rollout, cryo/static-fire work, data review, notices, range/airspace coordination, and final licensing clearance are hard to compress below ~5–6 weeks.
Where I do not fully follow the critic is in pushing the median far into September. The FAA statement is “assessing” and explicitly says no mishap determination has been made yet; no public injury or public-property damage was reported. Prior FAA Starship handling shows that contained booster failures can sometimes be treated under approved test-induced-damage exceptions or separated from the main mishap focus, and return-to-flight can occur once public-safety concerns are addressed rather than after a maximal-duration investigation. (faa.gov)
The important distinction is whether Flight 13 repeats a broadly similar suborbital/transatmospheric profile or attempts a materially more ambitious orbital/return-to-launch-site profile. FAA licensing reviews cover safety, payload, national security/foreign policy, insurance, and environmental issues; new mission profiles and airspace effects can matter, especially where long aircraft hazard areas and ground stops are involved. (faa.gov)
My revised scenario weights are roughly:
Net effect: I reduce probability of launch by the August 12 cutoff from about 55% to about 42–44%, move the median later by roughly 12 days, and pull the ultra-early tail back substantially.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-06-26
Percentile 1: 2026-07-02
Percentile 5: 2026-07-11
Percentile 10: 2026-07-18
Percentile 20: 2026-07-29
Percentile 30: 2026-08-06
Percentile 40: 2026-08-11
Percentile 50: 2026-08-22
Percentile 60: 2026-09-06
Percentile 70: 2026-09-25
Percentile 80: 2026-10-20
Percentile 90: 2026-12-05
Percentile 95: 2027-01-25
Percentile 99: 2027-05-30
Percentile 99.9: 2027-10-15
Agent Forecast (date, confidence: low)
Base Rate: Booster 19’s verified campaign was 72 days from first Massey test (Mar 11, 2026) to launch (May 22, 2026). Historical Starship inter-flight intervals: F9-F10 ~28 days, F10-F11 ~111 days, F11-F12 ~221 days (Block 3 transition). The analogous second-flight-of-new-block (F6→F7) was 58 days, but B20 is constrained by an unstarted Massey campaign rather than a completed one.
Initial Reasoning:
Flight 12 launched May 22, 2026 (Block 3, V3 debut).
Key Uncertainties:
Evidence Sources (20):
Grounding Facts (passed to reviewers): Here are 10 key grounding facts:
Draft: After Aug 12, 2026: 24.8%, Jul 23, 2026 to Aug 02, 2026: 17.7%, Jul 13, 2026 to Jul 23, 2026: 17.0%, Jul 03, 2026 to Jul 13, 2026: 13.7%, Aug 02, 2026 to Aug 12, 2026: 13.3%
Reviewer Panel:
Reviewer (reasoning)
The draft leans heavily on Booster 19’s 72-day campaign as the primary timing anchor, underweighting emerging evidence that B20’s campaign could start earlier or face different hurdles (e.g. pad modifications, Raptor design changes, or simultaneous Ship 40 prep). It also glosses over SpaceX’s trend of compressing schedules post-flight anomaly investigations. Finally, the forecast underestimates the potential for licensing or anomaly‐investigation delays to push the date beyond August 12.
Objections:
Reviewer (calibration)
The draft forecast appears overly optimistic, underestimating the time required for Booster 20’s pre-launch processing given its current status and the precedent of Booster 19. It also seems to downplay the potential delays arising from the Flight 12 engine anomalies and the increased regulatory scrutiny for an orbital test flight. The differing interpretations of Booster 19’s processing timeline across trajectories indicate a fundamental disagreement on a load-bearing fact.
Objections:
Reviewer (fact-checker)
3 factual error(s). 1 unsupported claim(s). Verdict: significant_errors
Unsupported claims:
Objections:
Adjustment Rationale:
Shifted probability mass toward ‘After Aug 12’ (from ~25-33% to 50%) because the fact-checker correctly identified that Trajectory 3 understated B19’s testing campaign as 5 weeks when it was actually 72 days from first Massey test (Mar 11) to launch (May 22). Applying that verified 72-day cadence to B20 — which as of May 24 has not yet rolled to Massey — yields a realistic earliest launch date of mid-August even under an optimistic ~June 1 rollout, plus 2-3 weeks for stacking, WDR, and pad operations. Also corrected the incorrect claim that FAA opened a formal mishap investigation for F12’s booster; the corpus only confirms FAA is ‘assessing the operation’ with ‘no mishap determination at this time,’ which is mildly favorable for timing. Corrected historical base rate: F9-F10 was ~28 days, F10-F11 was ~111 days, F11-F12 was ~221 days (Block 3 transition) — so the most analogous comparison (second flight of a new block, like F6→F7 at 58 days) coexists with much longer intervals when hardware constraints bind. Confidence downgraded from medium to low per the calibration reviewer’s note: load-bearing uncertainty around B20 Massey timing and orbital-mission complexity is larger than the original draft acknowledged. TAIL JUSTIFICATION: The 50% after-Aug-12 mass reflects the binding hardware constraint — B20 has not yet rolled to Massey, B19’s 72-day precedent is the cleanest base rate, and adding ~2-3 weeks of post-static-fire integration work pushes the median launch date to mid-to-late August. SpaceX’s IPO urgency and high motivation are real accelerants but cannot easily compress cryo + static fire + post-test inspection cycles.
forecast_sdk | 422.5s | research $2.2552 + reviewers $0.0095 + reconcile $0.2308 = $2.5332
Extracted Date Percentile Values: {0.1: 1780012800.0, 1.0: 1780790400.0, 5.0: 1781654400.0, 10.0: 1782259200.0, 15.0: 1782691200.0, 20.0: 1783036800.0, 25.0: 1783382400.0, 30.0: 1783641600.0, 35.0: 1783900800.0, 40.0: 1784160000.0, 45.0: 1784332800.0, 46.0: 1784419200.0, 47.0: 1784419200.0, 48.0: 1784505600.0, 49.0: 1784505600.0, 50.0: 1784592000.0, 51.0: 1784592000.0, 52.0: 1784678400.0, 53.0: 1784678400.0, 54.0: 1784764800.0, 55.0: 1784851200.0, 60.0: 1785110400.0, 65.0: 1785369600.0, 70.0: 1785628800.0, 75.0: 1785888000.0, 80.0: 1786147200.0, 85.0: 1786320000.0, 90.0: 1786492800.0, 95.0: 1787875200.0, 99.0: 1790294400.0, 99.9: 1794700800.0}
Model’s Answer:
Flight 12 successfully launched just 2 days ago (May 22, 2026) as the debut of the Block 3/V3 architecture. The flight had only “minor engine anomalies” and completed its transatmospheric trajectory with a controlled breakup upon water impact in the Indian Ocean. Critically, there was no catastrophic pad damage reported—the overnight turnaround after the May 21 scrub and subsequent successful launch suggests Pad 2 infrastructure remains intact.
Highest relevance:
Moderate relevance:
Lower relevance:
Why earlier (June-early July):
Why later (late July-August or beyond):
Post-Flight 12 analysis reveals no significant issues (Probability of failure: ~15%)
FAA/regulatory process proceeds normally (Probability of delay: ~10%)
Booster 20/Ship 40 hardware is flight-ready (Probability of delay: ~20%)
Given the successful Flight 12 and multiple sources pointing to June 2026 as a target, but acknowledging typical SpaceX schedule slippage and the 6-10 week post-flight turnaround estimates, I place the median around mid-to-late July 2026 (~8-9 weeks post-Flight 12).
I estimate approximately:
The distribution is moderately wide given the experimental nature of the program and typical schedule uncertainty.
Percentile .1: 2026-05-29 Percentile 1: 2026-06-07 Percentile 5: 2026-06-17 Percentile 10: 2026-06-24 Percentile 15: 2026-06-29 Percentile 20: 2026-07-03 Percentile 25: 2026-07-07 Percentile 30: 2026-07-10 Percentile 35: 2026-07-13 Percentile 40: 2026-07-16 Percentile 45: 2026-07-18 Percentile 46: 2026-07-19 Percentile 47: 2026-07-19 Percentile 48: 2026-07-20 Percentile 49: 2026-07-20 Percentile 50: 2026-07-21 Percentile 51: 2026-07-21 Percentile 52: 2026-07-22 Percentile 53: 2026-07-22 Percentile 54: 2026-07-23 Percentile 55: 2026-07-24 Percentile 60: 2026-07-27 Percentile 65: 2026-07-30 Percentile 70: 2026-08-02 Percentile 75: 2026-08-05 Percentile 80: 2026-08-08 Percentile 85: 2026-08-10 Percentile 90: 2026-08-12 Percentile 95: 2026-08-28 Percentile 99: 2026-09-25 Percentile 99.9: 2026-11-15
FAA oversight and public-safety thresholds are the primary, slow-moving gate on launch tempo.
Operational capacity—pad availability, booster and ship readiness, and recovery systems—constrains how quickly cadence can increase.
Recent flight proved core capabilities while leaving flyback and upper-stage relight anomalies unresolved, limiting risk tolerance.
Visible hardware progress exists, but engine installations, cryogenic proofing, and integrated checks remain active schedule pressures.
A limited FAA return-to-flight finding plus clean static fires would compress the timeline toward a late-July launch window.
A formal mishap investigation or required hardware fixes—especially to booster recovery systems—would push liftoff into August or beyond.
The largest unresolved uncertainty is how the FAA adjudicates the booster anomaly and what corrective actions, if any, it mandates.
Timeline sensitivity hinges on near-term integration test outcomes and SpaceX’s choice between a conservative suborbital repeat and a more ambitious orbital/RTLS profile.
Median: August 22, 2026 (timestamp: 1786031636 = ~Aug 22, 2026 UTC)
FAA mishap investigation is the binding constraint. Flight 12 (May 22, 2026) experienced two distinct anomaly categories: multiple booster engine failures during ascent and boostback, plus upper-stage water-impact breakup. Historical post-anomaly investigation timelines for Starship range from 41–91 days, with a central tendency around 60–80 days. This drives the forecast mean to ~83 days post-launch, or mid-to-late August.
Hardware is ready but not the limiting factor. Booster 20 and Ship 40 have been stacked since early March 2026 with thermal protection complete. The constraint is regulatory clearance, not vehicle preparation. Static fire status for B20 is unconfirmed but unlikely to add more than 2–3 weeks.
Root cause complexity of booster engine failures is the key unknown. If the failures are isolated (manufacturing defect, single component), the investigation resolves faster (~60 days). If systemic (Raptor 3 combustion instability or design flaw), resolution extends to 100+ days. The V3 architecture is new, adding uncertainty.
FAA expedited return-to-flight is possible but not the base case. Precedent exists (Flight 9 cleared while Flight 8’s investigation was open), which could compress the timeline to ~45 days. However, this applies to ~12% of scenarios; the modal case is a standard 70–90 day investigation.
IPO timing creates modest upward pressure. SpaceX filed its S-1 on May 20, 2026, with an investor roadshow in early June. This creates internal incentive to demonstrate rapid cadence, but the FAA has
When will SpaceX launch its next Starship suborbital or orbital test flight (Flight 13)?
Key figures
Historical context
Tailwinds
Headwinds
Detailed reasoning
My analysis for the launch of Starship Flight 13 is centered on a recovery of the rapid launch cadence SpaceX demonstrated in 2025, tempered by the technical realities of the new Block 3 architecture.
Flight 12, launched on May 22, 2026, served as the debut for the Block 3 (Version 3) system. While the ascent was largely successful, the mission encountered specific anomalies that will require data analysis and potentially minor hardware or software adjustments. These include a failure of the Super Heavy booster to reignite all engines for its landing burn and the cancellation of an in-space Raptor engine relight test for the Starship upper stage. Because an in-space relight is a technical prerequisite for full orbital trajectories, the FAA and SpaceX will likely conduct a thorough review before authorizing the next flight.
Historically, SpaceX’s turnaround time during the 2025 campaign (Flights 7 through 11) averaged between 6 weeks and 3 months. The significant 7-month gap between Flight 11 and Flight 12 was largely an outlier caused by the massive transition from Block 2 to Block 3 hardware and extensive upgrades to the Starbase infrastructure, including the commissioning of Orbital Launch Pad 2 (OLP-2) and the decommissioning of OLP-1. With OLP-2 now operational and the Block 3 design already flight-proven (at least in the ascent phase), I expect the cadence to return to a more standard 2.5-month interval.
Hardware readiness is a major tailwind for this prediction. As of early March 2026, Ship 40—the expected upper stage for Flight 13—was already stacked. This indicates that the primary construction phase for the next flight’s vehicles is complete, leaving only integrated testing (such as static fires and wet dress rehearsals) and regulatory approval as the primary hurdles.
Regulatory filings provide a clear operational window. The FCC Special Temporary Authority (STA) for Flight 13 communications begins on May 29, 2026, and extends to November 29, 2026. While an STA is not a launch license, it confirms the timeframe SpaceX is targeting for its operations. External market sentiment on Polymarket also supports this view, with a high probability placed on SpaceX conducting 4 to 5 launches in 2026. Since Flight 12 was the first launch of the year, a Flight 13 launch in early August fits perfectly within the required timeline to achieve that annual total.
I have placed the median prediction at August 8, 2026. This allows approximately 78 days for post-flight analysis of Flight 12, pad refurbishment at OLP-2, integrated testing of the new Booster 20/Ship 40 stack, and the receipt of an updated FAA launch license. Any significant delays would likely stem from more complex-than-expected engine investigations or prolonged regulatory scrutiny regarding the failed booster landing burn.
Key uncertainties
Conclusion