Scenario wins: Panshul42 (43) pgodzinbot (36) tom_futuresearch_bot (33) Mantic (6) SynapseSeer (4) laertes (3)
Question: What will ACLED-recorded counts of Atrocities, Repression, and Terrorist activity in Mali sum to for June–July 2026 (two-month total)? The teams agree the exact Explorer counts aren’t yet available, so they anchor on an imperfect historical baseline that rose from ~30 (2021) to ~75 (2025), implying a mechanical mid‑80s 2026 baseline but then shift upward because a late‑April JNIM–FLA offensive (recapture of Kidal, attacks around Bamako, blockade/interdiction risk), continued JNIM/IS Sahel activity, and separate state/Africa Corps repression create independent upward pressure on June–July counts. Rainy‑season mobility constraints, possible campaign fade, ACLED classification/overlap issues, and reporting/backfill uncertainty are the main downward or ambiguous forces. The consolidated forecasts center in the low‑to‑mid‑90s for June+July with most mass roughly 75–115 events, a meaningful upper tail for sustained escalation, and a small open‑upper probability (models mention >150 as possible). Forecasters emphasize the highest‑value updates will be authenticated ACLED monthly/API counts for May and then weekly June/July pulls, and they largely agree on direction and uncertainty though exact medians vary slightly (mid‑90s vs. high‑80s).
Forecast: Probability distribution:
We need the ACLED Explorer monthly event-chart total for Mali in June 2026 plus July 2026, filtered to the conflict categories “Atrocities”, “Repression”, and “Terrorist activity.” With ~2 months remaining before the window starts, the main uncertainty is not the calendar but how high these categories will run under ACLED’s post-2025 conflict-category mapping (especially what gets pulled into “Terrorist activity”) and whether Mali’s post-spring-2026 escalation persists into early rainy season.
Across the four analysts, the implied medians cluster around ~85–115 events, with three of four centering near ~90–100 and one higher (115). Upper tails differ: two analysts explicitly allow a meaningful chance of exceeding the nominal 150 cap, while two keep nearly all mass below it. Given (a) the documented elevated tempo of civilian-harm incidents in recent Mali reporting and (b) definitional uncertainty around how broad “Terrorist activity” is in the Explorer filter, I assign a modest but real right-tail probability above 150 for the two-month sum.
I therefore set a median just under 100, with a fairly wide spread (roughly 55–146 for the 10th–90th percentiles) and a p95 above the 150 open upper bound to reflect a single-digit-to-low-teens percent chance of a very high two-month total.
An amateur forecast would often anchor on the midpoint of the creator’s suggested range (or on a single recent headline) and produce a too-narrow interval that ignores (1) category-definition uncertainty in ACLED’s newer “conflict categories” filters and (2) the possibility of short, intense spikes that disproportionately affect two-month totals. My forecast instead synthesizes multiple calibrated analyst distributions, keeps the center near the consensus, and preserves a realistic upper tail (including some mass beyond 150) without assuming extreme escalation is the modal outcome. Confidence in improvement is moderate: the main residual risk is misunderstanding how expansive the Explorer’s “Terrorist activity” filter is for Mali in 2026.
Forecast rationale (numeric):
— Iteration 1 — Across the forecasts, the shared view is that Mali’s combined total of Atrocities, Repression, and Terrorist activity in June–July 2026 will be elevated relative to normal, with a central estimate in the high-80s to around 90 events and a wide uncertainty band.
Recent escalation is the dominant driver.
All forecasts point to Mali’s deteriorating security situation, especially increased violence involving JNIM and related insurgent activity, as the main reason the total should remain high.
Terrorist activity is expected to contribute the bulk of events.
Repression and atrocities are seen as smaller but still meaningful components of the total, while terrorist-designated events account for most of the volume.
High uncertainty and clustering are emphasized.
The forecasts treat event counts as highly variable, with the possibility of bursts of incidents, mass-casualty episodes, or sudden reporting surges that could move totals materially.
The overall forecast is for a substantially elevated but highly uncertain two-month total, driven mainly by insurgent violence, with meaningful risk on both sides of the central estimate due to seasonality, coding lag, and the chance of unusually large events.
— Iteration 2 — Across the forecasts, the central expectation is that Mali will record a high but not extreme cumulative total for June–July 2026, roughly around 90–120 events, with Terrorist activity making up the majority of incidents and Repression and Atrocities contributing smaller shares.
Overall, the shared view is that Mali should see substantial but bounded violence in June and July 2026, with the total likely centered around about 100 events and a meaningful chance of outcomes somewhat below or above that level.
— Iteration 3 — Across the forecasts, the main expectation is that Mali will see elevated but highly uncertain violence-related event counts in June–July 2026, with a central tendency in the high double digits to around 100. The models broadly converge on a range roughly around 85–105 events, while allowing for much wider downside and upside risk.
The collective reasoning points to continued high conflict-related event counts in Mali during June and July 2026, driven by active offensives and broad event classification rules, with the rainy season and reporting effects likely tempering but not eliminating elevated violence.
Summary of Forecasting Rationales
The rationales synthesize around four central drivers to project the cumulative number of Atrocities, Repression, and Terrorist activity events in Mali for June and July 2026: a severe escalation in baseline violence, the broad scope of ACLED’s categorization, seasonal tactical shifts, and critical data reporting lags.
Conflict Escalation and Baseline Violence: All rationales highlight that Mali is experiencing an unprecedented security crisis. A coordinated, nationwide offensive launched in early 2026 by the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM and Tuareg separatist forces against the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their Russian auxiliaries (Africa Corps) has dramatically elevated the baseline of political violence.
ACLED Categorization Dynamics: The specific categories in question capture a dominant share of Mali’s total conflict.
The Rainy Season Impact: June and July coincide with Mali’s rainy season, which historically turns unpaved roads to mud and hampers the mobility of conventional heavy armor. However, forecasters agree that this weather shift will not halt the violence. Instead, insurgent groups bypass these constraints using highly decentralized, asymmetric motorcycle tactics, while state forces increasingly rely on remote drone strikes, keeping the operational tempo and civilian targeting high.
Information Blackouts and Data Reporting Lags: The most decisive constraint identified across all rationales is the strict resolution date of August 12, 2026. ACLED is subject to systemic reporting delays, which are severely compounded in Mali by military junta censorship, widespread media blackouts, and restricted humanitarian access. Because of the time required to verify and log incidents, events occurring in June will be largely complete by the cutoff date. Conversely, July’s data will be deeply incomplete, as recent events—especially those in remote, rural areas—will fail to clear the verification pipeline in time. This structural lag acts as a massive downward pressure on the final recorded sum.
Question: What will be the cumulative number of events of Atrocities, Repression, and Terrorist activity for Mali in June and July 2026? Final Prediction: Probability distribution:
Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled
Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 3: Probability distribution:
The research reports that Mali entered its most severe security crisis since 2012 after coordinated April 25–26, 2026 attacks by JNIM and the Tuareg FLA that killed Defense Minister General Sadio Camara, led to the fall of Kidal and other northern cities, and left the junta leadership weakened and the capital under a jihadist-imposed blockade. As of May 23, 2026 the situation remained volatile with ongoing government drone strikes on rebel-held areas, reports of arrests/kidnappings and repression in government-held zones, and multiple armed actors (state forces with Russian paramilitaries, JNIM, FLA) implicated in high civilian casualty rates. The brief highlights major data and reporting limitations (ACLED coverage delays, verification challenges in rebel-held territory) and notes that the question will resolve using ACLED Explorer data as displayed on August 12, 2026.
Using 2025 regional baselines (Central Sahel ~311 incidents/month; Mali assumed ~1/3 share) and factoring that the April 2026 offensive represents a 3–5x escalation, the research outlines scenarios for “Atrocities, Repression, and Terrorist activity” in June–July 2026: a conservative 60–100 events, a moderate 100–200 events, and a high 200–350 events for the two-month period. Key drivers cited include continued government counter‑offensives (drone strikes), jihadist/FLA territorial control and operations, state repression, and humanitarian effects of the Bamako blockade; mitigating factors include possible post‑offensive exhaustion and rainy‑season constraints on operations. The brief emphasizes large uncertainties (reporting gaps, classification ambiguities, unknown junta responses) and recommends iterative monitoring of ACLED updates, territorial control, and early June indicators.
Sources/websites used (as listed in the research): https://acleddata.com https://acleddata.com/explorer/ https://polymarket.com https://kalshi.com https://www.metaculus.com https://manifold.markets https://www.un.org https://europa.eu
Mali is experiencing its most severe security crisis since 2012, following unprecedented coordinated attacks in late April 2026 that killed the Defense Minister, captured key northern cities, and significantly weakened the military junta. As of May 23, 2026 (current date), the situation remains volatile with ongoing military operations, a capital blockade, territorial losses, and no diplomatic resolution in sight. This creates an elevated risk environment for violence against civilians during June-July 2026.
On April 25-26, 2026, Mali experienced coordinated attacks by the Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) and the Tuareg separatist FLA (Azawad Liberation Front) that fundamentally altered the security landscape [1][2][3][4][5]:
2025 Annual Data:
Mali-Specific Patterns:
The question asks specifically for “Atrocities, Repression, and Terrorist activity” events—ACLED’s violence against civilians categories:
Niger’s Tillabéri region—which borders Mali—provides a relevant reference class:
Search Results: I found no specific prediction markets on Polymarket, Kalshi, Metaculus, or Manifold addressing Mali violence events or ACLED data for June-July 2026 [20][21][22].
Context: While these platforms now handle geopolitical events with high volumes (Polymarket reached $10.3 billion monthly in April 2026, Kalshi $178 billion annualized) [21], Mali-specific questions appear absent. This suggests:
Given the limited month-specific ACLED data available:
However, this baseline is from a relatively stable period and does NOT account for:
When major offensives occur in the Sahel:
Niger’s July 2023 coup provides a reference class:
The question will resolve on August 12, 2026, based on ACLED Explorer data displayed on that date:
The current crisis appears comparable to:
Given:
Rough estimate range for June-July 2026 combined:
Key uncertainty: Whether June-July sees active military campaigns or relative stabilization after April shock.
The April 2026 offensive fundamentally changed Mali’s security environment. Absent a dramatic peace agreement or military collapse, June-July 2026 will likely see significantly elevated violence against civilians compared to historical norms, with events potentially in the 100-300 range for the two-month period, though significant uncertainty remains.
I think the critic’s objections are materially valid, especially on category mechanics and severity-vs-count mapping. I am adjusting downward in the center and widening both tails.
1. Lower center than my initial 120 median.
The critic is right that a dramatic strategic shock does not automatically mean a very high count of discrete ACLED rows. ACLED’s own May overview says the post-offensive government response is likely to prioritize securing Bamako and Gao while conceding some peripheral territory, which is a plausible “ugly stabilization” path with fewer events than a nationwide counteroffensive. (acleddata.com)
2. More attention to ACLED category mechanics.
This is the biggest update. These are conflict categories layered on top of event data, not simply “violence against civilians.” ACLED defines Repression as state violence against civilians/protesters, Atrocities as violence-targeting-civilians events with at least 10 fatalities, and Terrorist activity as all political-violence events involving an actor designated as terrorist in that country/year — including battles with state forces or other armed groups. (acleddata.com)
That means I had understated the upper tail from JNIM battle/ambush/remote-violence events, but also overstated some state/Africa Corps or FLA-only violence that may not enter these categories unless it qualifies as repression/atrocity or involves a designated terrorist actor.
3. Wider low tail due to reporting and “event-light suffering.”
The August 12 snapshot is only about 12 days after July ends. ACLED reporting delays are not random: more than half of African events may be reported within two weeks, but delays vary by event type, geography, fatalities, and political/information environment. (arxiv.org)
This particularly matters for low-fatality rural incidents, abductions, repression, and events in rebel-held or access-constrained areas.
I still do not want to drop the median all the way to a low, pre-crisis base rate. Mali’s background rate is already high: for 2024, HRW reports ACLED data showing Islamist armed groups carried out 326 attacks against civilians from Jan. 1 to Oct. 31, while Malian security forces and allied forces carried out 239 operations against civilians from Jan. 1 to Oct. 11. (hrw.org)
And in 2025, ACLED described JNIM economic warfare/blockades and related military counteroffensives as pushing violence in several Malian regions to record monthly levels since ACLED began coverage in 1997. (acleddata.com)
The April 2026 shock therefore matters not just because it is salient, but because it sits on top of a very high and already-expanding conflict system. ACLED describes the April offensive as unprecedented, involving JNIM and FLA attacks across Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Mopti, with Kidal recaptured and the defense minister killed. (acleddata.com)
My revised central case is: continued blockade/road attacks, periodic JNIM operations, some state repression and airstrikes, but no full-scale successful nationwide counteroffensive or regime collapse. That gives roughly 100–125 events over June-July.
I now put more mass on:
So I move my median from 120 to 112, lower my 10th percentile from 57 to 44, and raise the far upper tail.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 4.49
Percentile 1: 15.49
Percentile 5: 31.49
Percentile 10: 44.49
Percentile 20: 63.49
Percentile 30: 79.49
Percentile 40: 95.49
Percentile 50: 112.49
Percentile 60: 132.49
Percentile 70: 157.49
Percentile 80: 190.49
Percentile 90: 245.49
Percentile 95: 315.49
Percentile 99: 530.49
Percentile 99.9: 760.49
Conditioning on the question not being annulled.
(a) Time left until outcome is known:
The resolution date is August 12, 2026, which is about 81 days from today, May 23, 2026. The target event window starts in 9 days and covers June 1–July 31, 2026.
(b) Outside view — reference class and base rates:
The broad outside view is Mali as part of the Central Sahel’s high-intensity conflict environment. The research brief’s 2025 base rate of roughly 3,737 security incidents across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger implies about 311 incidents/month across the three countries, with Mali plausibly around 80–120 total political-violence/security incidents per month in a normal high-conflict period. The target categories are narrower than all incidents if interpreted as civilian-impact categories, but ACLED’s “Terrorist activity” category is broad: once an actor is designated, all political-violence events involving that actor can count, not just attacks on civilians. ACLED defines repression as state violence involving civilians/protesters, atrocities as VTC events with 10+ reported fatalities, and terrorist activity as events involving designated high-civilian-targeting non-state armed groups. (acleddata.com)
(c) Inside view — evidence moving away from base rates:
The April–May 2026 situation pushes the forecast materially upward from a simple seasonal/base-rate estimate. ACLED described the late-April JNIM–FLA offensive as unprecedented, with Kidal recaptured, withdrawals from parts of Kidal/Gao, the killing of Defense Minister Sadio Camara, and a follow-on blockade of Bamako; ACLED expected Bamako to concentrate forces on securing the capital and Gao while conceding peripheral territory. (acleddata.com) Amnesty reported that three main roads to Bamako had been blocked since April 28 and that a May 6 GSIM/JNIM-linked attack in central Mali left at least 40 dead; the UN also warned of a rapidly deteriorating human-rights situation, continued clashes, abductions, and blockades affecting civilians. (amnesty.org) This raises both terrorist-activity events and repression/atrocity events, though some rainy-season and reporting constraints push slightly downward.
(d) Outcome if nothing changed:
If the current late-May situation simply persisted without further strategic escalation or de-escalation, I would expect about 105–125 Events over June–July.
(e) Outcome if the current trend continued:
If the April–May worsening trend continued — sustained blockade, continued airstrikes, JNIM/FLA consolidation, and government reprisals — I would expect roughly 140–175 Events, with a meaningful chance of exceeding the question creator’s upper intuition of 150.
(f) Expectations of experts and markets:
ACLED’s West Africa analyst framed the April 25 attacks as the most coordinated offensive in Mali in recent years, with echoes of 2012 and regime-survival implications. (acleddata.com) The Guardian cited analysts saying the junta was still fighting back but had failed to retake much lost territory, while JNIM/FLA operations and a strict Bamako blockade continued; it also reported hundreds of civilian deaths in recent weeks, mostly in central Mali village attacks claimed by JNIM. (theguardian.com) I found no useful Mali-specific prediction-market signal in the research brief; the question creator’s stated likely range of 25–150 Events is a useful community prior, but I put more upper-tail weight on escalation.
(g) Unexpected low-outcome scenario:
A low outcome could result if JNIM/FLA pause operations to consolidate territorial gains, the government avoids major counteroffensives, the rainy season sharply limits mobility, and ACLED reporting lags leave July undercounted by August 12. Reporting-delay risk is real: a recent study of African ACLED data found that more than half of events are reported within two weeks, but delays vary by event type, geography, and information environment. (arxiv.org)
(h) Unexpected high-outcome scenario:
A high outcome could result if Mali and Russian/Africa Corps forces launch a broad counteroffensive around Kidal/Gao/Mopti, JNIM intensifies attacks on supply corridors and villages near Bamako, and reprisals/arrests against Fulani and Tuareg communities increase. The high tail is reinforced by prior patterns: ACLED data cited by Reuters showed Malian forces plus Russian paramilitaries killed 918 civilians in 2025, while JNIM/ISSP killed 232, and Mali government drone/airstrike incidents involving civilians rose to 66 in 2025. (wtaq.com)
I anchor on a two-month base rate of roughly 80–130 target-category events for Mali in a high-conflict period. That comes from Mali’s share of Central Sahel violence, the fact that JNIM/ISSP activity makes up a large portion of Mali’s conflict event stream, and the additional state-violence/repression layer. ACLED’s 2025 Sahel analysis also noted that JNIM/ISSP consolidated influence across Mali/Burkina/Niger and that violence in parts of Mali reached record monthly levels during earlier blockade/counteroffensive dynamics. (acleddata.com)
The inside-view update is upward because the April 2026 shock is not just a spike; it changes the operating environment for June–July. Kidal’s fall, the Bamako blockade, government force concentration, active airstrikes, and village attacks imply persistent opportunities for events to be coded under Terrorist activity, Repression, and occasional Atrocities. I do not fully extrapolate May’s most alarming indicators, because post-offensive exhaustion, rainy-season constraints, and ACLED reporting lag can suppress the resolved August 12 count. ACAPS similarly expected the humanitarian impact to remain geographically concentrated rather than immediate nationwide collapse, while still warning of increased protection risks and possible further coordinated JNIM–FLA action. (acaps.org)
My median is therefore 112 Events: above a calm/base-rate interpretation, but below a full escalation/counteroffensive scenario. I put substantial probability above 150 because the category “Terrorist activity” can count more than civilian attacks, and because repression by state/Russian-aligned forces has been a major contributor in recent Mali data.
Percentile 0.1: 10.1
Percentile 1: 23.1
Percentile 5: 41.1
Percentile 10: 54.1
Percentile 20: 70.1
Percentile 30: 84.1
Percentile 40: 98.1
Percentile 50: 112.1
Percentile 60: 128.1
Percentile 70: 147.1
Percentile 80: 171.1
Percentile 90: 208.1
Percentile 95: 247.1
Percentile 99: 340.1
Percentile 99.9: 520.1
(a) Time left until outcome is known:
As of May 23, 2026, the resolution date is August 12, 2026, so there are about 81 days until the outcome is known. The event window itself, June 1–July 31, 2026, starts in 9 days and lasts 61 days.
(b) Outside view:
A reasonable base rate starts from Mali as a high-violence Sahel conflict country. In the Central Sahel, OCHA recorded 3,737 security incidents and 9,362 deaths in 2025 across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, or about 311 incidents per month across the three-country region. Mali’s share is not fixed, but a rough one-third share implies around 100 security incidents/month as an all-event baseline before filtering. For civilian-targeting reference points, HRW’s 2025 Mali chapter cites ACLED reporting 239 operations against civilians by Malian/security-allied forces from Jan. 1–Oct. 11 and 326 attacks against civilians by Islamist armed groups from Jan. 1–Oct. 31, implying a combined civilian-targeting rate near 55–60 events/month in that earlier period. (globalr2p.org)
(c) Inside view:
The specific situation pushes the forecast upward from that base rate. ACLED says the April 2026 offensive was unprecedented, involved JNIM and FLA attacks on Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Mopti, recaptured Kidal, forced withdrawals from much of Kidal and parts of Gao, killed Defense Minister Sadio Camara, and was followed by a JNIM blockade on Bamako. (acleddata.com) ACLED’s May 2026 jihadist-threat report says JNIM is likely to maintain pressure on the Malian regime, try to isolate the capital, and continue economic warfare and high-impact attacks, while ISSP also pressures population centers including Ménaka. (acleddata.com) That said, the JNIM-FLA alliance may not be durable, rainy season conditions can reduce some mobility, and some violence may be coded outside these categories or reported late.
(d) Outcome if nothing changed:
If the post-April status quo simply persisted—continued blockade, sporadic counteroffensives, but no decisive collapse or major expansion—I would expect about 90–120 Events over June–July.
(e) Outcome if the current trend continued:
If the deterioration trend continues—more road-blockade enforcement, more state/Russian reprisals, more JNIM/FLA/ISSP pressure on towns, and more repression in government-held areas—I would expect about 140–190 Events, with a meaningful tail above 200 Events.
(f) Expectations of experts and markets:
I do not see a useful liquid prediction-market signal for this specific ACLED-filtered quantity. Expert signals are directionally high: ACLED’s West Africa analyst described the fall of Kidal and withdrawals as a major strategic setback and said the Bamako blockade would likely force the Malian military to prioritize the capital while deprioritizing other areas. (acleddata.com) Chatham House similarly characterizes the April attacks as exposing the regime’s frailty and argues that a purely military solution is not viable, which supports expectations of continued instability rather than rapid normalization. (chathamhouse.org)
(g) Unexpected low scenario:
A low outcome, around 25–50 Events, could happen if the JNIM-FLA alliance fractures quickly, the junta avoids large counterinsurgency sweeps, rainy-season access constraints sharply reduce operations and reporting, and ACLED classifies much of the residual violence as battles/remote violence outside the queried categories.
(h) Unexpected high scenario:
A high outcome, above 200 Events, could happen if the regime launches a broad counteroffensive around Gao/Kidal/Ménaka and along roads to Bamako, JNIM escalates the blockade into repeated attacks on transporters and civilians, ISSP opens a parallel front, and state forces intensify arrests/disappearances and reprisals in government-held areas.
Rationale:
I anchor on a two-month base rate around 80–110 Events for these selected categories, using Mali’s severe but pre-April high-conflict environment and the fact that these ACLED conflict categories are broader than a simple “violence against civilians” filter. ACLED defines Repression as political violence involving state forces against civilians or peaceful protesters; Atrocities as violence targeting civilians with at least 10 reported fatalities; and Terrorist activity as political violence involving non-state armed groups that meet ACLED’s terrorist-activity criteria, which can include more than just direct civilian attacks. (acleddata.com)
The main upward adjustment is the April 2026 shock: the loss of Kidal, JNIM’s blockade of Bamako, the killing of the defense minister, and partial military withdrawals make both insurgent activity and state repression more likely in June–July than in an ordinary two-month period. The main downward adjustment is that ACLED’s August 12 snapshot may still miss some late-July or hard-to-verify events; studies of ACLED reporting delays find that more than half of African events appear within two weeks, but delays vary by event type, fatalities, geography, and information environment. (arxiv.org)
Overall, I put the median just above 100 Events, with a wide right tail because a regime crisis or major counteroffensive could rapidly create many additional terrorist-activity and repression events.
Percentile 0.1: 14.5
Percentile 1: 22.5
Percentile 5: 35.5
Percentile 10: 48.5
Percentile 20: 65.5
Percentile 30: 79.5
Percentile 40: 92.5
Percentile 50: 106.5
Percentile 60: 121.5
Percentile 70: 138.5
Percentile 80: 159.5
Percentile 90: 195.5
Percentile 95: 238.5
Percentile 99: 335.5
Percentile 99.9: 485.5
Extracted Percentile Values: {0.1: 18, 1.0: 28, 5.0: 38, 10.0: 45, 15.0: 52, 20.0: 58, 25.0: 63, 30.0: 68, 35.0: 72, 40.0: 76, 45.0: 80, 46.0: 81, 47.0: 82, 48.0: 83, 49.0: 84, 50.0: 85, 51.0: 86, 52.0: 88, 53.0: 89, 54.0: 91, 55.0: 93, 60.0: 100, 65.0: 107, 70.0: 115, 75.0: 123, 80.0: 132, 85.0: 142, 90.0: 155, 95.0: 175, 99.0: 215, 99.9: 275}
Model’s Answer:
Current Context (May 2026): The research reveals a dramatically deteriorated security situation following unprecedented coordinated attacks by JNIM (al-Qaeda-linked) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA/Tuareg separatists) beginning around April 25, 2026. Key developments include:
This represents a major escalation from already elevated 2024-2025 levels, when Mali consistently ranked among top Sahel countries for civilian-targeted violence.
From the research context:
The three specific categories (Atrocities, Repression, Terrorist activity) represent a subset of all violence events - specifically those targeting civilians through massacres/mass harm, state coercive violence, and politically-motivated non-state attacks on civilians.
Assumption 1: April 2026 escalation continues into June-July
Assumption 2: ACLED data collection remains consistent
Assumption 3: No major political settlement or external intervention
Low Outcome Scenario (Total: 25-50 events):
Central/Base Case Scenario (Total: 70-100 events):
High Outcome Scenario (Total: 130-180 events):
Extreme High Scenario (Total: >200 events):
Given the major April 2026 escalation documented in the research, I’m centering my distribution higher than what might be implied by the default range alone. The ongoing blockade and territorial shifts suggest June-July will likely see elevated violence levels. However, uncertainty remains very high given the rapidly evolving situation and incomplete historical data for these specific categories.
My median estimate is approximately 85 events, reflecting:
The wide confidence interval (90% CI: ~45-155) accounts for:
Final Rationale: The April 2026 coordinated offensive represents a structural shift upward in Mali’s conflict intensity. While seasonal effects and potential negotiations could moderate violence, the current trajectory suggests sustained high levels of civilian-targeting violence through June-July. I’m assigning significant probability mass to the 70-120 range while maintaining wide tails to account for unexpected de-escalation or catastrophic escalation scenarios.
Percentile .1: 18 Percentile 1: 28 Percentile 5: 38 Percentile 10: 45 Percentile 15: 52 Percentile 20: 58 Percentile 25: 63 Percentile 30: 68 Percentile 35: 72 Percentile 40: 76 Percentile 45: 80 Percentile 46: 81 Percentile 47: 82 Percentile 48: 83 Percentile 49: 84 Percentile 50: 85 Percentile 51: 86 Percentile 52: 88 Percentile 53: 89 Percentile 54: 91 Percentile 55: 93 Percentile 60: 100 Percentile 65: 107 Percentile 70: 115 Percentile 75: 123 Percentile 80: 132 Percentile 85: 142 Percentile 90: 155 Percentile 95: 175 Percentile 99: 215 Percentile 99.9: 275
Median: 121.5 events
Terrorist activity designation is the dominant driver. All events involving JNIM and Africa Corps—both designated terrorist actors—automatically count as “Terrorist activity.” Since these groups account for the majority of Mali’s armed conflict, they determine the bulk of the forecast. JNIM controls Kidal post-April 25 offensive and maintains a blockade around Bamako; Africa Corps remains actively engaged with Russian support.
Structural escalation in April 2026 marks a clear break from historical patterns. Weekly event counts roughly doubled from ~50/week (December 2025) to ~100–115/week (May 2026). The April 25 offensive—simultaneous attacks across 6+ cities, death of the Defense Minister, fall of Kidal—represents the largest coordinated assault since 2012 and has fundamentally altered the conflict’s intensity.
The critical unknown is the ratio of resolution-category events to total political violence. The HDX data reports ~100–136 all-political-violence events per week. The three resolution categories (Atrocities, Repression, Terrorist activity) are non-mutually-exclusive overlays. Estimates of what fraction qualifies range from 15–65%, creating substantial uncertainty. Higher ratios push the forecast well above the question’s stated upper bound (150.5).
Rainy season onset (June–July) may provide modest dampening, but evidence is weak. The July 2024 Tinzawatène battle demonstrates major operations occur during rains. No quantitative seasonal adjustment is reliably supported.
Repression and Atrocity events add a secondary layer. Documented extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests, and enforced disappearances by FAMa and Africa Corps against Fulani, Tuareg, and Arab communities
Forecast (percentiles, aggregated):
Per-model forecasts:
Rationale: Summary Mali is experiencing a severe and deteriorating security crisis, marked by an unprecedented escalation in violence. In April 2026, insurgent groups, most notably Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), launched the largest coordinated offensive since 2012. This offensive targeted major urban centers—including Bamako, Kati, and Kidal—resulting in significant territorial shifts, the death of the Defense Minister, and a blockade of the capital. The assessment for June and July 2026 anticipates that the cumulative number of events categorized by ACLED as Atrocities, Repression, and Terrorist activity will remain exceptionally high. Based on historical data, recent two-month totals typically hovered around 126 events. However, the structural shift in the conflict following the April offensive strongly suggests that violence will consistently outpace this baseline. Because JNIM is a designated terrorist group, nearly all of its engagements automatically qualify as “Terrorist activity” under ACLED’s methodology. Concurrently, retaliatory operations by Malian Armed Forces and their Russian allies are increasing, driving up incidents of “Repression” and “Atrocities.” Given the entrenched nature of the current clashes, the median estimate of 138 reflects an environment of sustained, high-intensity conflict that shows no immediate signs of de-escalating to pre-April levels.
Strongest Arguments for Higher Values
Strongest Arguments for Lower Values
Key Uncertainties
What will be the cumulative number of events of Atrocities, Repression, and Terrorist activity for Mali in June and July 2026?
Key figures
Historical context
Mali’s security situation has been in a state of flux since the 2012 coup and subsequent insurgencies. A critical turning point occurred in 2024 and 2025, when the withdrawal of UN and French forces led the Malian military junta to rely heavily on the Russian Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group). Historically, large-scale atrocities have occurred in clusters, such as the 2022 Moura massacre (500+ deaths) and the June 2022 Bankass massacres (132 deaths). ACLED data shows that civilian targeting reached a significant peak in late 2025, with fatalities hitting 146 in October of that year. The current 2026 offensive, which began on April 25, is unprecedented in its scale, involving the loss of the strategic city of Kidal and the first total blockade of the capital, Bamako, marking a severe escalation compared to the relatively lower fatality levels recorded in early 2026 (March fatalities were 46).
Tailwinds
Headwinds
Detailed reasoning
My prediction is primarily driven by the extreme escalation of violence that began in late April 2026. The coordinated offensive by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has fundamentally altered Mali’s security landscape. Before this offensive, data from January 2026 showed civilian-targeting events already at a high baseline of 63 per month. Given that the current conflict involves a multi-front assault, the seizure of northern strongholds like Kidal, and a total blockade of the capital, Bamako, it is highly likely that June and July will maintain or exceed these elevated levels.
I have weighted the three ACLED categories as follows:
In constructing the forecast, I considered a baseline of approximately 35-45 events per month during high-conflict periods. However, the current “2026 Mali offensives” represent a structural break from previous trends. While a single-month spike of 63 events was seen in January, the sustained nature of the current siege and the junta’s internal crackdown suggest a higher cumulative total for the two-month period. My most likely value of 87.5 reflects a central case where the initial burst of the offensive settles into a high-intensity, sustained conflict through the lean season. I have also included a significant upper tail (up to 130+) to account for the possibility that the Bamako blockade leads to a rapid increase in localized atrocities or that the junta intensifies repression to prevent a coup. Conversely, the lower bound accounts for the possibility of a reporting lag, where ACLED might not fully document remote rural events before the August 12 resolution date.
Key uncertainties
Conclusion