When will Hungary next promulgate a constitutional amendment?

• My median prediction for the next promulgation of a constitutional amendment in Hungary is 4th August 2026.
• The Tisza party, led by Prime Minister Péter Magyar, holds a 141-seat supermajority, granting it the power to amend the Fundamental Law without opposition support.
• A critical deadline of 31st August 2026 exists for a “political agreement” with the European Commission to unlock €17 billion in frozen funds, which likely necessitates constitutional changes to rule-of-law standards.
• Tensions with President Tamás Sulyok, who has been asked to resign by May 31, may lead to a targeted amendment in June to force a change in the presidency.
• As of 19th May 2026 (Magyar Közlöny issue 55), no 16th amendment has been promulgated, leaving the window open for the new government’s first constitutional action.
• The forecast accounts for the mandatory 10-day procedural window between parliamentary passage and official publication in the gazette.

Key figures

Historical context

The Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011) replaced the 1949 Constitution and has been amended 15 times as of early 2026. Under the previous Fidesz administration (2010–2026), the constitution was used as a flexible tool for governance, with amendments often promulgated shortly after political shifts or to bypass court rulings. For example, the 15th amendment was adopted in April 2025 and took effect in January 2026. The 2026 election represents the first “regime change” since the Fundamental Law’s inception. Historically, Hungarian constitutional amendments follow a strict procedural path: adoption by the National Assembly (two-thirds), signature by the Speaker (within 5 days), and signature/promulgation by the President (within 5 days). The current tension between a Tisza-led parliament and a Fidesz-era President (Sulyok) mirrors historical “cohabitation” friction, where the presidency acts as a check on the legislative majority.

Tailwinds

• The 141-seat supermajority allows the government to bypass all parliamentary opposition, significantly shortening the debate phase.
• The stated goal to reach an agreement with Brussels by August 31, 2026, acts as a hard “forcing function” for legislative action over the summer.
• High public support (60%) for the President’s resignation provides the government with political cover to pursue aggressive constitutional changes.
• The termination of the state of emergency on May 14, 2026, necessitates the transition of various decrees into formal law or constitutional standing.

Headwinds

• President Sulyok may exercise his right to send any passed amendment to the Constitutional Court for procedural review, adding weeks or months to the timeline.
• The Tisza party might prioritize “cardinal laws” (which also require two-thirds support but are easier to draft) over formal constitutional amendments in their first months.
• A political decision to bundle all reforms into a single, comprehensive “New Basic Law” would significantly delay the next promulgation as it would require much longer drafting and consultation phases.
• The Constitutional Court remains largely composed of Orbán-era appointees who may attempt to obstruct the procedural validity of new amendments.

Detailed reasoning

My analysis is centered on the intersection of legislative capability, political deadlines, and procedural requirements. Following the April 12, 2026, elections, Péter Magyar’s Tisza party holds 141 of 199 seats. This 70.8% share exceeds the two-thirds (133 seats) requirement to amend the Fundamental Law. Historically, a new government with a supermajority moves to consolidate power through constitutional changes within its first 100 days.

I have identified three primary pathways to the next promulgation:

1. The Presidential Showdown (Short-term): PM Magyar has demanded President Tamás Sulyok’s resignation by May 31, 2026. Sulyok, a Fidesz-era appointee, represents a procedural bottleneck. He can delay amendments by sending them to the Constitutional Court for a procedural review. If Magyar attempts to force Sulyok out via a targeted amendment (e.g., changing the grounds for presidential removal), we could see a flashpoint in June. However, the President’s 5-day signature window and potential for court referral make a June promulgation tight.

2. The EU Funding Compliance Package (Medium-term): This is the most weighted factor in my forecast. PM Magyar has publicly set an August 31, 2026, deadline to resolve rule-of-law disputes with the European Commission to unlock €17 billion in frozen funds. Negotiating these “milestones” typically requires constitutional “tweaks” regarding judicial independence or rejoining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. To meet an August 31 deadline for a signed agreement, the legal framework (the amendment) must be promulgated in the official gazette, Magyar Közlöny, slightly before that date to demonstrate “concrete steps” to Brussels. This points strongly to a late July or early August promulgation.

3. The Structural Reform Package (Longer-term): Magyar has also promised broader reforms, such as two-term limits for Prime Ministers and direct presidential elections. These are more complex and require social consultation. If the government prioritizes a “clean” and thorough drafting process over a “quick fix,” these could slip into the autumn legislative session (September–October).

My median prediction of 4th August 2026 accounts for the necessary sequence: drafting (May), parliamentary debate and three readings (June), passage (late June/early July), and the 10-day combined window for the Speaker to transmit and the President to sign/promulgate. This date aligns with the pre-August 31 pressure point while allowing for typical parliamentary and gazette publication lags. It also accounts for the 45% probability currently priced into prediction markets regarding a presidential vacancy by June 30, which would remove the primary obstacle to signature.

Key uncertainties

• The outcome of the May 31 ultimatum: If President Sulyok resigns voluntarily, the path to a June/July promulgation is much smoother.
• Procedural vs. Substantive Review: While the Constitutional Court currently only reviews procedural aspects, a legal challenge could still freeze the process for 30-60 days.
• EU Negotiation Progress: If the European Commission signals that simple statutes (rather than constitutional amendments) are sufficient, the government may delay amending the Fundamental Law.
• Parliamentary Recess: Typical summer recess patterns could delay the final vote unless an extraordinary session is called (which is likely given the supermajority).

Conclusion

• The most likely window for promulgation is late July to early August 2026, driven by the government’s need to show progress to Brussels.
• Decision-makers should closely monitor the National Assembly’s bill tracker for “Bill T/13350” or new constitutional proposals starting in June.
• A resignation by President Sulyok before June 30 would be the single strongest signal that an amendment is imminent.

Question: will Hungary promulgate a post‑2025 amendment to the Fundamental Law in the Magyar Közlöny before 2026‑08‑12? Forecasters agree the procedural bottleneck is getting a TISZA government bill adopted by a two‑thirds parliament (filing→adoption) rather than gazette publication, since recent amendments show adoption→promulgation happens very quickly (0–9 days) and filing→promulgation typically ~30–34 days (one slower 63‑day case). Key pro signals are reports that TISZA holds a two‑thirds majority, the amendment being on the new cabinet agenda, and the concrete catalyst of a 2026‑05‑31 deadline/ultimatum for Orbán‑era officeholders (with President Sulyok reportedly refusing to resign). Key negatives—shared across teams—are that no government‑backed amendment bill was publicly filed as of 2026‑05‑20, uncertain summer parliamentary scheduling and budget work, and government messaging that constitutional change may be part of a broader, slower constitution‑making process. Forecasters’ probabilities cluster around a modest majority chance (roughly 60–62%) concentrated in late June–July, with substantive tail risk that no qualifying promulgation occurs by August 12. Recommended monitoring emphasis is on Országgyűlés filings/agenda items and the Magyar Közlöny publication line “Alaptörvény … módosítása,” with special attention to developments immediately after the May 31 resignation deadline.

Forecast and Reasoning

Forecast: Probability distribution:

• 5.00% chance of value below 2026-06-02 12:00:00 UTC
• 10.00% chance of value below 2026-06-08 12:00:00 UTC
• 20.00% chance of value below 2026-06-18 12:00:00 UTC
• 30.00% chance of value below 2026-06-29 12:00:00 UTC
• 40.00% chance of value below 2026-07-09 12:00:00 UTC
• 50.00% chance of value below 2026-07-19 12:00:00 UTC
• 60.00% chance of value below 2026-07-29 12:00:00 UTC
• 70.00% chance of value below 2026-08-09 12:00:00 UTC
• 80.00% chance of value below 2026-08-16 12:00:00 UTC
• 90.00% chance of value below 2026-08-26 12:00:00 UTC
• 95.00% chance of value below 2026-09-02 12:00:00 UTC

Forecast Reasoning

All four analysts agree the key driver is political control: Tisza reportedly holds a two‑thirds parliamentary majority, so the binding constraints are mainly (i) when the new governing majority chooses to spend agenda time on a Fundamental Law amendment, and (ii) the procedural path to promulgation (Speaker forwarding + President signature/referral + Magyar Közlöny publication). Compared with ordinary legislation, Hungary has a demonstrated capability to promulgate amendments quickly once adopted, but the President can trigger a procedural Constitutional Court review that can add on the order of weeks.

Across forecasts, the central tendency clusters in mid‑July (Forecasters 1–3 medians ~July 15–18; Forecaster 2 slightly later; Forecaster 4 notably earlier). I discount the very-early tail in Forecaster 4 (and partly Forecaster 1) because it implicitly assumes near-immediate drafting/introduction right after government formation; that is possible but not the base case. I also discount Forecaster 2’s very high confidence that promulgation occurs well before the deadline, because it underweights the chance that the new government prioritizes other reforms first, or that institutional/legal friction slows the first amendment package.

Net: I place the median in the third week of July, with a meaningful chance (roughly ~20–30%) that no qualifying promulgation occurs by 2026-08-12 (represented by percentiles that fall after the open upper bound).

An amateur forecast would likely anchor on “supermajority ⇒ quick amendment” and compress most probability into June/early July, often ignoring (a) startup/drafting time for a new government and (b) the possibility of a Constitutional Court procedural review delaying promulgation. This forecast keeps a mid‑July center (reflecting speed once decided) while explicitly preserving a substantial right tail past the deadline to stay calibrated under political/agenda uncertainty. Confidence is moderate: the procedural timeline is fairly stable, but the political decision of whether/when to amend is the dominant uncertainty.

Forecast rationale (numeric):

— Iteration 1 — Across the forecasts, the dominant view is that Hungary’s next constitutional amendment will likely come relatively soon after a new Tisza-led government takes office, because the party is described as having or seeking the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to amend the constitution and strong political incentives to undo the Fidesz-era framework.

Key reasoning patterns:

• Political capacity is the main driver: The forecasts repeatedly emphasize that a two-thirds majority makes constitutional change procedurally feasible.
• Strong reform incentives: Tisza is seen as likely wanting early constitutional changes to remove Fidesz loyalists, reshape institutions, or establish governing control.
• Fast legislative process: Hungary’s amendment process is treated as capable of moving quickly once the political decision is made, so promulgation could follow adoption soon after.
• Timing is shaped by practical constraints: The main reasons for delay are the time needed for a new government to organize, the summer recess, and possible procedural or constitutional obstacles.
• Strategic uncertainty remains: Even with the power to amend, the government could delay for a broader constitutional package or focus first on ordinary legislative reforms.

Areas of consensus and disagreement:

• Consensus: The next amendment is judged likely in 2026, probably early in the new term rather than far in the future.
• Disagreement: The forecasts differ on confidence and exact timing:
  • Some expect a move by mid-summer 2026.
  • Others assign only a modest chance before a near-term deadline, with the median shifting to late 2026 or early 2027.
• Tail risk: All acknowledge a longer delay into 2027 or later remains possible if political, procedural, or strategic barriers intervene.

Overall, the shared logic is that a new constitutional amendment is more likely to be driven by new parliamentary power plus urgent political incentives, while the main uncertainty is how quickly the government chooses to act and whether early procedural or strategic delays slow the process.

— Iteration 2 — Across the forecasts, the core logic is that Hungary has both the political capacity and the strategic incentive to amend its constitution soon, but the exact timing depends on how quickly the new government moves and how much procedural friction emerges.

Main factors driving the forecasts

• Supermajority power: Tisza’s two-thirds majority means it can legally pass constitutional amendments without needing opposition support.
• Political motivation: The likely goal is to reverse entrenched Fidesz-era provisions and reshape institutions.
• EU deadline pressure: Several rationales emphasize the August 2026 rule-of-law / funds deadline as a strong incentive to act quickly.
• Procedural constraints: Even with a majority, the process still requires drafting, tabling, debate, and final promulgation.
• Potential delay mechanisms: The president may refer amendments to the Constitutional Court, adding roughly a month, and the summer recess narrows the available legislative window.

Areas of consensus

• All models agree that an amendment is plausible and politically feasible under the current parliamentary balance.
• They also agree that timing is not immediate, because the legislature has only recently convened and no bill was yet clearly introduced.
• There is broad agreement that mid-2026 to late-2026 is the relevant window, with the EU deadline acting as an important anchor.

Main point of disagreement

• The optimistic forecasts expect prompt action, with promulgation likely in mid-July to early August 2026, possibly before the EU deadline.
• The more cautious forecast argues that summer recess, drafting time, and constitutional review make it more likely that promulgation slips to autumn 2026, with a relatively low chance of happening by mid-August.

Overall synthesis

The collective reasoning points to a front-loaded but uncertain timeline: there is a strong institutional and political case for a constitutional amendment in 2026, especially given the EU deadline, but procedural delay and political caution could push the date later than the most aggressive estimates.

— Iteration 3 — Across the forecasts, the main reasoning is that Hungary’s next constitutional amendment is now politically feasible because Tisza reportedly has the two-thirds majority required, and there is a clear incentive to use it to reshape Orbán-era institutions. That creates a baseline expectation that an amendment is likely at some point soon rather than far in the future.

Areas of consensus

• Majority makes amendment possible: All rationales treat Tisza’s supermajority as the key enabler.
• Political motivation exists: There is broad agreement that the new majority has reason to pursue constitutional change, especially against Orbán-era officials/institutions.
• Timing is the main uncertainty: The forecasts diverge less on whether an amendment will happen than on how quickly it will be promulgated.

Main timing arguments

• Fast-track / early summer 2026 scenario: One view centers on a June–July 2026 promulgation, with a point estimate in mid-July. This assumes the government moves quickly for symbolic or strategic reasons.
• Delayed 2026 scenario: Another view places the median after the August 12, 2026 deadline, arguing that as of May 2026 there is no publicly filed amendment bill, and that summer recess plus normal legislative steps reduce the odds of rapid passage.
• Late 2026 to 2027 tail risk: Several rationales keep substantial probability mass into late 2026 and 2027, citing:
  • procedural review or Constitutional Court involvement,
  • presidential resignation or other institutional complications,
  • political caution,
  • EU-related considerations,
  • a possible decision by Tisza to delay major constitutional restructuring.

Overall synthesis

The collective view is that a constitutional amendment is plausible and potentially imminent, but the absence of a concrete bill and the procedural/political constraints of summer 2026 make the exact timing uncertain. The forecasts cluster around mid-2026 to late-2026, with some emphasizing an early July outcome and others expecting the first promulgation to slip beyond the August deadline.

Summary of Forecasting Rationales

The rationales share a strong consensus on the political and procedural dynamics that will dictate the timing of Hungary’s next constitutional amendment. The central tension lies between the new government’s capability to swiftly pass legislation and the outgoing establishment’s constitutional power to stall it.

The Political Catalyst and Legislative Speed Prime Minister Péter Magyar and his Tisza party hold a two-thirds supermajority, granting them unilateral power to amend the Fundamental Law. Magyar has prioritized urgent constitutional reforms to unfreeze EU funds and remove Fidesz-era officials. A primary trigger for legislative action is Magyar’s ultimatum demanding the resignation of President Tamás Sulyok by May 31, 2026. Because Sulyok has refused to resign, forecasters expect the Tisza party to introduce and fast-track constitutional amendments targeting entrenched officials in early June. Using exceptional parliamentary procedures, the government can easily pass an amendment through the National Assembly within days to a couple of weeks.

Institutional Friction and Procedural Roadblocks While parliamentary passage will likely be swift, all rationales emphasize that the actual promulgation will face severe institutional friction. After passage, the legislative text faces a predictable bottleneck:

• The Signature Window: The Speaker of the National Assembly and the President each have up to five days to act on the legislation.
• Constitutional Court Referral: Because President Sulyok is a target of the reforms, he is fully expected to use his authority to refer the amendment to the Constitutional Court for procedural review rather than sign it.
• The 30-Day Delay: The Constitutional Court—staffed largely by Fidesz loyalists who are incentivized to obstruct Magyar’s agenda—has a legal maximum of 30 days to review the amendment. Forecasters agree the Court will weaponize this provision and exhaust the full 30 days to maximize delay.

Expected Scenarios Combining the legislative timeline with the anticipated institutional roadblocks, forecasters generally agree on a built-in delay of roughly 35 to 40 days following parliamentary passage.

• The Central Scenario: An amendment introduced and passed in early-to-mid June will endure the maximum institutional delays, resulting in a likely promulgation in mid-to-late July.
• The Fast-Track Scenario: If the government introduces a highly popular or non-threatening amendment (such as prime ministerial term limits), the President may opt not to refer it to the Constitutional Court, allowing for rapid promulgation in June.
• The Obstruction Scenario: Forecasters also account for the risk of a prolonged constitutional standoff. If the Constitutional Court finds a procedural pretext to strike down the initial legislation, Parliament would be forced to reconvene, fix the draft, and pass it again. This would trigger a second 30-day review cycle, pushing promulgation into late August or the autumn parliamentary session.

SUMMARY

Question: When will Hungary next promulgate a constitutional amendment? Final Prediction: Probability distribution:

• 10.00% chance of value below 2026-06-21 00:00:00 UTC
• 20.00% chance of value below 2026-07-02 12:00:00 UTC
• 40.00% chance of value below 2026-07-21 12:00:00 UTC
• 60.00% chance of value below 2026-08-04 12:00:00 UTC
• 80.00% chance of value below 2026-12-02 12:00:00 UTC
• 90.00% chance of value below 2027-06-16 00:00:00 UTC

Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled

Report 1 Summary

Forecasts

Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:

• 10.00% chance of value below 2026-06-19 00:00:00 UTC
• 20.00% chance of value below 2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC
• 40.00% chance of value below 2026-07-19 00:00:00 UTC
• 60.00% chance of value below 2026-08-03 00:00:00 UTC
• 80.00% chance of value below 2026-10-20 00:00:00 UTC
• 90.00% chance of value below 2027-03-01 00:00:00 UTC

Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:

• 10.00% chance of value below 2026-06-23 00:00:00 UTC
• 20.00% chance of value below 2026-07-04 00:00:00 UTC
• 40.00% chance of value below 2026-07-24 00:00:00 UTC
• 60.00% chance of value below 2026-08-06 00:00:00 UTC
• 80.00% chance of value below 2027-01-15 00:00:00 UTC
• 90.00% chance of value below 2027-10-01 00:00:00 UTC

Research Summary

The research summarizes that Péter Magyar’s Tisza party won a two‑thirds majority in Hungary’s April 12, 2026 election and Magyar became prime minister in early May 2026, and his government has publicly committed to beginning a constitutional amendment process leading to a new constitution approved by referendum. Hungary’s Fundamental Law has been amended frequently since 2011 (about 15 amendments in ~15 years, averaging roughly one per year and several amendments every 4–12 months under the prior government), and the formal amendment procedure requires a two‑thirds parliamentary vote, presidential signature within five days (if no procedural violations), and a roughly 30‑day Constitutional Court procedural review—yielding a minimum ~35–40 day timeline from adoption to promulgation.

The research also notes key substantive priorities reported for Magyar’s reforms (judicial and Constitutional Court changes, prosecutorial appointment rules, electoral rules including a two‑term PM limit, EU‑law reservations and emergency‑power limits) and highlights external timing pressures: an EU funding milestone schedule with late‑August 2026 deadlines for rule‑of‑law benchmarks that could accelerate institutional changes. As of mid‑May 2026 no constitutional amendment bills had been introduced, Magyar appears to favor a measured, two‑phase approach (immediate repairs plus a broader referendum process), and experts cautioned against rushing amendments—leaving timing uncertain despite the government’s two‑thirds majority and the technical minimum promulgation timeline.

Sources/searches used (verbatim queries and API calls captured during the research; no specific article URLs were recorded in the research log):

• asknews_search: {“query”: “Hungary 2026 election Péter Magyar Tisza party constitutional amendment Orbán Fidesz”, “hours_back”: 168, “n_articles”: 10, “countries”: [“HU”], “return_type”: “string”}
• google_search: {“google_keywords”: “Hungary constitutional amendments history Fundamental Law frequency timeline Magyar Közlöny”, “lookback”: 720}
• google_search: {“google_keywords”: “Hungary Fundamental Law amendments list 2011-2026 promulgation dates Magyar Közlöny base rate frequency”, “lookback”: 8760, “return_type”: “dicts”}
• google_search: {“google_keywords”: “Hungary Péter Magyar constitutional amendment timeline plans June July August 2026 Tisza party reform schedule”, “lookback”: 168, “return_type”: “dicts”, “strict”: true}
• google_search: {“google_keywords”: “Hungary constitutional amendment prediction market Manifold Metaculus Polymarket betting odds Magyar 2026”, “lookback”: 720, “return_type”: “dicts”}
• asknews_search: {“query”: “Hungary Péter Magyar constitutional reform referendum new constitution timeline June July August 2026”, “hours_back”: 240, “n_articles”: 10, “return_type”: “dicts”}

Note: the research referenced multiple news articles, expert commentary (e.g., Centre for European Reform), and EU milestone reporting; the research log did not include direct article URLs to copy verbatim.

RESEARCH

Report 1 Research

I’ll help you gather comprehensive research on Hungary’s constitutional amendment timeline. Let me conduct several searches to find relevant news, historical base rates, and any prediction markets.

Agent Forecast (date, confidence: low)

• After Aug 12, 2026: 28.0%
• Jul 01, 2026 to Jul 11, 2026: 16.0%
• Jul 11, 2026 to Jul 22, 2026: 15.0%
• Jul 22, 2026 to Aug 01, 2026: 12.0%
• Jun 20, 2026 to Jul 01, 2026: 12.0%

Base Rate: Hungary has promulgated ~15 constitutional amendments in ~14 years (≈1/year average), with clustering at the start of new parliamentary terms. Same-day promulgation is procedurally possible (15th Amendment, April 2025). Maximum post-vote delay under adversarial president + full CC referral = 35 days. Under Fidesz’s first-term supermajority (2010-2014), the Fundamental Law was amended 5 times in 3 years (~1.67/year). Over an 83-day window, base rate of ≥1 amendment is ~25-38%, adjusted upward to ~72% given the explicit May 31 trigger, supermajority, and stated constitutional reform agenda.

Initial Reasoning:

• Trajectory 1 reasoning

  Tisza holds a firm 141/199 constitutional majority.
• The PM term limit amendment was publicly committed to ‘among the first government steps’ (Index.hu, April 13, 2026).
• The May 31 Sulyok resignation deadline — which Sulyok publicly rejected on May 18 — creates a hard trigger for amendment action in early June.
• Historical precedent (Fidesz’s 10th amendment came ~5-6 weeks after the 2022 election) suggests a late June modal promulgation, with a possible 30-day CC procedural delay pushing it toward mid-July.
• The EU’s €10B recovery fund expiry (August 31) adds external urgency.
• The main tail risk is that Tisza deliberately adopts a more deliberative constitutional process (as academic experts urge) or that 150-160 emergency decrees and parliamentary recess friction push the first amendment past August 12.

Trajectory 2 reasoning

The Tisza government (PM since May 9) has a supermajority (141/199 seats) and an explicit constitutional reform agenda.

• Magyar gave President Sulyok (who has already rejected resignation as of May 18-19) a May 31 deadline; after that he pledged to ‘begin establishing the legal framework for removal.’ Constitutional amendments require ~10 days from vote to promulgation absent CC review; with CC procedural review (which Fidesz can trigger), up to 45 days.
• The EU’s €18bn frozen funds tied to rule-of-law milestones by August 2026 add additional urgency.
• The most likely path: drafting begins June 1, amendment introduced mid-June, voted by late June, promulgated late June-early July.
• The tail risk is a CC procedural review pushing a late-July vote past the August 12 deadline.
• Base rate: ~1.67 amendments/year in early years of Hungarian supermajority government, adjusted upward for the explicit political trigger and EU financial incentive.

Trajectory 3 reasoning

Tisza holds 141/199 seats (well above the 133 needed for two-thirds), making any constitutional amendment passage mathematically certain once introduced.

• The key

Key Uncertainties:

• Whether Sulyok exhausts the full 5-day referral + 30-day Constitutional Court review window (most likely) or signs quickly to avoid escalation
• Whether Hungarian Parliament holds plenary sessions in late July/August 2026 or goes into traditional summer recess that would block promulgation past mid-July
• How long Magyar’s government takes to draft, table, and move an amendment through multiple readings — under expedited procedure historically 2-3 weeks, but ordinary procedure can take 4-6 weeks
• Whether Magyar prioritizes a politically risky Sulyok-removal amendment first or starts with cleaner amendments (PM term limit, EU rule-of-law milestones, judicial reforms)
• Whether back-channel negotiations or a Sulyok resignation between now and end-June changes the political calculus entirely

Evidence Sources (25):

• 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election - Wikipedia
• Fundamental Law of Hungary - Wikipedia
• With or Without You? The Constitutional Fate of Tamás Sulyok - Hungarian Conservative
• Hungarian president resists Magyar’s calls to quit, news site reports - Reuters
• Euractiv - ‘You must leave’: Hungarian PM intensifies campaign against Orbán-era president
• Legislative Surge Marks End of Hungary’s Parliamentary Term - Hungarian Conservative
• Hungary 2011 (rev. 2016) Constitution - Constitute Project
• Hungarian President Says No Legal Grounds Exist for His Resignation - Hungarian Conservative
• Hungary’s Magyar outlines plans (PBS/AP)
• Hungary’s Constitutional Boomerang – A Recommendation for the Commission
• Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe - Springer
• Magyar proposes constitutional reform aiming at modernising the Hungarian state - European Interest
• Hungary passes bill reinforcing president’s post - DW
• Tisza Party of Hungary Expands Parliamentary Majority - Eurotoday
• Hungarian Pride parade ban - Wikipedia
• Constitution for a new Hungary - OSW
• Hungary’s new PM Magyar sworn in after landslide victory over Orbán - BBC
• Index.hu: Orbán Viktor cannot be PM again after amendment - April 13, 2026
• Reuters/AOL: Hungarian president resists Magyar’s calls to quit - May 18, 2026
• ConstitutionNet: The 15th Amendment of the Hungarian Fundamental Law
• JogiForum: Six constitutional amendments and 447 bills - 2022-2026 cycle - April 24, 2026
• Telex: After six years, special legal order ends in Hungary - May 14, 2026
• Verfassungsblog: Two-Thirds Majority Is Essential but Not Enough - April 13, 2026
• AInvest: Hungary to rewrite constitution to limit executive power - May 9, 2026
• Infostart: New Tisza-majority parliament starts up - May 11, 2026

Grounding Facts (passed to reviewers):

1. Péter Magyar was sworn in as Prime Minister of Hungary on May 9, 2026.
2. The Tisza Party won 141 of 199 seats in the April 1

Draft: Jun 20, 2026 to Jul 01, 2026: 20.7%, Jul 01, 2026 to Jul 11, 2026: 20.0%, Jul 11, 2026 to Jul 22, 2026: 15.0%, Jun 10, 2026 to Jun 20, 2026: 12.0%, Jul 22, 2026 to Aug 01, 2026: 10.0%

Reviewer Panel:

Reviewer (reasoning)

The draft places too much weight on PM Magyar’s May 31 deadline and Fidesz’s supermajority, underestimating the procedural complexity and legal constraints around amending the Fundamental Law—especially for a presidential‐removal amendment. It also misreads the EU funds conditions as a hard constitutional‐amendment deadline rather than a soft incentive, and relies heavily on the 2022 amendment precedent despite different contexts. As a result, the forecast is overly optimistic about a June/July promulgation.

Objections:

• The forecast ignores Hungary’s minimum legislative timetable—multiple readings and committee stages often extend drafting well beyond 1–2 weeks.
• It assumes any amendment—even one to remove President Sulyok—can proceed like a routine amendment, overlooking constitutional scope limits and potential referendum or court challenges.
• It treats the EU’s recovery‐funds release as a binding deadline for constitutional change, when disbursement hinges on broader rule‐of‐law assessments, not a single amendment’s passage.

Reviewer (calibration)

The forecast overestimates the speed of constitutional amendment promulgation, particularly by underplaying the guaranteed procedural delays associated with a presidential referral to the Constitutional Court. It also appears to underestimate the risk of parliamentary recess pushing any amendment past the August 12 deadline, especially given the current date of May 20. The probability mass allocated to June seems overly optimistic.

Objections:

• The forecast downplays the 5-day presidential referral window and the 30-day Constitutional Court review period, which, even if the outcome is certain, represent a significant and likely delay pushing promulgation into late July or early August.
• The forecast does not adequately account for the typical Hungarian parliamentary summer recess schedule, which could easily push any amendment not promulgated by mid-July past the August 12 deadline.
• The probability mass allocated to June (approx. 39%) seems overly optimistic given that drafting, introduction, debate, vote, and potential CC review all need to occur after May 20, and the President has already signaled resistance.

Reviewer (fact-checker)

2 factual error(s). 3 unsupported claim(s). Verdict: significant_errors

Unsupported claims:

• The PM term limit amendment was publicly committed to ‘among the first government steps’ (Index.hu, April 13, 2026).
• Historical precedent (Fidesz’s 10th amendment came ~5-6 weeks after the 2022 election) suggests a late June modal promulgation
• or that 150-160 emergency decrees and parliamentary recess friction push the first amendment past August 12.

Objections:

• [critical] The EU’s €10B recovery fund expiry (August 31) adds external urgency. — Corpus says: The European Commission holds at least €18 billion in frozen funds, conditional on Hungary meeting 27 rule of law milestones by August 2026.
• [moderate] Constitutional amendments require ~10 days from vote to promulgation absent CC review; with CC procedural review (which Fidesz can trigger), up to 45 days. — Corpus says: Under Hungarian constitutional procedure: the Speaker signs the adopted amendment within 5 days and sends it to the President; the President signs within 5 days and orders promulgation. Total post-vote time to promulgation: minimum ~10 days. The President has precisely 5 days upon receipt of a constitutional amendment to refer it to the Constitutional Court on procedural grounds, and the Court has only 30 days to decide.

Adjustment Rationale:

Adjusted downward from ~93% within-window to ~72% in response to three reviewer objections I judge valid: (1) the calibration reviewer correctly noted I underweighted the near-certain 5-day presidential referral + 30-day CC procedural review delay, since Sulyok is openly adversarial and will likely use all available procedural tools; (2) the reasoning reviewer is right that Hungarian House Rules require multiple readings (general debate, detailed debate, final vote), which even under expedited procedure typically take 2-3 weeks — my draft’s ‘1-2 weeks’ was too aggressive; (3) the fact-checker correctly flagged that the EU funds figure is €18B with 27 milestones (not €10B), and that EU rule-of-law conditionality is a soft incentive rather than a hard amendment deadline. I also lowered June probability mass significantly (from ~39% to ~22%) because the government is only 11 days old, no amendment text has been published, and the Hungarian Parliament conventionally goes into summer recess mid-July through early September — risking that any amendment voted late June would face a 35-day CC review concluding in early August, while a vote slipping past mid-July could push promulgation past August 12 if no extraordinary session is convened. Holding firm on: (a) the narrow interpretation reading, (b) Tisza’s 141/199 supermajority making passage mathematically certain once tabled, (c) the May 31 Sulyok deadline as a real political trigger Magyar has explicitly committed to. Confidence lowered from medium to low to reflect timeline uncertainty around drafting pace, presidential procedural choices, recess scheduling, and whether Magyar prioritizes the PM-term-limit amendment or other reforms first.

forecast_sdk | 532.8s | research $2.2539 + reviewers $0.0082 + reconcile $0.4948 = $2.7984

Extracted Date Percentile Values: {0.1: 1780099200.0, 1.0: 1781049600.0, 5.0: 1782345600.0, 10.0: 1783468800.0, 15.0: 1784332800.0, 20.0: 1784937600.0, 25.0: 1785542400.0, 30.0: 1786320000.0, 35.0: 1787616000.0, 40.0: 1788825600.0, 45.0: 1789862400.0, 46.0: 1790035200.0, 47.0: 1790294400.0, 48.0: 1790553600.0, 49.0: 1790812800.0, 50.0: 1791158400.0, 51.0: 1791417600.0, 52.0: 1791763200.0, 53.0: 1792022400.0, 54.0: 1792281600.0, 55.0: 1792627200.0, 60.0: 1793836800.0, 65.0: 1794960000.0, 70.0: 1796428800.0, 75.0: 1798416000.0, 80.0: 1802649600.0, 85.0: 1809129600.0, 90.0: 1818288000.0, 95.0: 1831507200.0, 99.0: 1859241600.0, 99.9: 1893456000.0}

Model’s Answer:

Analysis of Hungary Constitutional Amendment Timing

Key Factors to Consider

Political Situation (as of May 20, 2026):

• Tisza holds 141 of 199 seats (two-thirds supermajority for constitutional amendments)
• Péter Magyar became Prime Minister on May 12, 2026
• Magyar has explicitly pledged constitutional reforms, including PM term limits
• No draft constitutional amendment has been formally tabled yet
• Last amendment was the 15th Amendment in April 2025

Procedural Constraints:

• Amendment requires two-thirds of all MPs (133/199)
• President Sulyok can delay via: (1) returning to Parliament or (2) Constitutional Court referral
• Constitutional Court is still Fidesz-aligned, may scrutinize procedural compliance closely
• Magyar Közlöny publication is required for promulgation (typically prompt once signed)
• Historical precedent: 2-6 weeks from decision to promulgation under Fidesz

Timing Considerations:

• Summer recess typically begins July/August
• Resolution window is ~84 days (May 20 to August 12)
• Government currently focused on ordinary legislation
• Telex reports a “first constitutional package” is being prepared for summer session

Scenario Analysis

Earlier Outcome (Before August 12):

• Government prioritizes quick constitutional amendment (e.g., PM term limits)
• Draft introduced by early June
• Parliament adopts within 2-3 weeks
• President uses minimal delay tactics
• Promulgation possible late June to late July
• Likelihood: ~25-35%

Later Outcome (After August 12):

• Government prioritizes ordinary legislation first
• President Sulyok uses maximum delay powers (referral + Constitutional Court review)
• Summer recess interrupts process
• First constitutional package pushed to autumn session
• Likelihood: ~65-75%

Critical Assumptions

1. No draft amendment tabled yet: Significant time needed for drafting, committee work, and parliamentary process. If draft isn’t introduced within next 3-4 weeks, August 12 deadline becomes very difficult. (70% confidence)

2. Presidential obstruction: Sulyok has explicitly rejected calls to resign and is likely to use all procedural delay tools available. Each return/referral adds 2-4 weeks. (60% probability of maximum delay)

3. Government sequencing: Current focus on ordinary legislation suggests constitutional changes may be saved for autumn when more groundwork is laid. (55% probability of autumn prioritization)

Probability Distribution

Given:

• No concrete draft introduced yet
• Strong political intent but institutional resistance
• Limited time window (84 days)
• Summer recess approaching

I estimate approximately 30% probability of promulgation by August 12, with the remaining 70% extending into autumn 2026 or beyond.

The distribution reflects that if an amendment occurs before August 12, it would most likely be in late July, with earlier dates being increasingly unlikely due to procedural requirements.

Percentile .1: 2026-05-30 Percentile 1: 2026-06-10 Percentile 5: 2026-06-25 Percentile 10: 2026-07-08 Percentile 15: 2026-07-18 Percentile 20: 2026-07-25 Percentile 25: 2026-08-01 Percentile 30: 2026-08-10 Percentile 35: 2026-08-25 Percentile 40: 2026-09-08 Percentile 45: 2026-09-20 Percentile 46: 2026-09-22 Percentile 47: 2026-09-25 Percentile 48: 2026-09-28 Percentile 49: 2026-10-01 Percentile 50: 2026-10-05 Percentile 51: 2026-10-08 Percentile 52: 2026-10-12 Percentile 53: 2026-10-15 Percentile 54: 2026-10-18 Percentile 55: 2026-10-22 Percentile 60: 2026-11-05 Percentile 65: 2026-11-18 Percentile 70: 2026-12-05 Percentile 75: 2026-12-28 Percentile 80: 2027-02-15 Percentile 85: 2027-05-01 Percentile 90: 2027-08-15 Percentile 95: 2028-01-15 Percentile 99: 2028-12-01 Percentile 99.9: 2030-01-01

TL;DR

I put a 69.5% probability on Hungary promulgating a Fundamental Law amendment by 2026-08-12 12:00 UTC, with the modal window after the 2026-05-31 resignation deadline and before mid-July.

Context

Tisza has the votes. Péter Magyar was sworn in as prime minister on 2026-05-09, and Euronews reported Tisza with 141 of 199 National Assembly seats, above the 133-seat two-thirds threshold for amending the Fundamental Law (Euronews). His ministers were appointed on 2026-05-12 (hirado.hu).

The live issue is timing, not formal capacity. Magyar demanded that President Tamás Sulyok and other Orbán-era officeholders resign by 2026-05-31 (Euronews). Sulyok rejected resignation on 2026-05-18, saying there was no justification for it (Reuters via MarketScreener). Magyar then said that if the officeholders did not leave voluntarily by 2026-05-31, they could be removed relatively simply by amending the Fundamental Law, and that the government would do it (Infostart).

Evidence

The historical backbone is a high but bursty amendment rate. The official Constitutional Court page lists 15 formal amendments from 2012-06-18 through 2025-04-14; the unit here is calendar days between listed amendment dates, the coverage window is 2012-06-18 to 2025-04-14, and the sample size is N=15 amendments with N=14 gaps (Constitutional Court). The mean gap is 334.5 days and the median gap is 187 days. The table uses the official amendment dates in that list; for publication timing, I separately account for the fact that some Magyar Közlöny issues publish an amendment days after the title/adoption date, as with the 12th amendment appearing in Magyar Közlöny 2023/185 dated 2023-12-21 while its title date is 2023-12-12 (Magyar Közlöny 2023/185).

The legal procedure is fast after the political choice is made. Article S says an amendment can be proposed by the president, the government, a committee, or any MP; adoption needs two-thirds of all MPs; the Speaker has five days to sign and send it to the president; and the president has five days to sign and order publication unless he seeks procedural review (NJT English text, Article S). Article 24 says the Constitutional Court may review a Fundamental Law amendment only for procedural requirements and must decide as a priority within 30 days (NJT English text, Article 24). So a clean June adoption can still be published by the deadline even if Sulyok uses the full procedural-review route.

The forward-looking evidence is stronger than the base rate. The incoming justice minister said on 2026-05-12 that the government would launch a constitutional-amendment process, submit a new election law, join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, and treat a two-term prime-minister limit as an institutional guarantee against concentration of power (Telex English). Magyar also put amendments on the first cabinet agenda and tied them directly to the Sulyok fight (Infostart).

The current-status check is still negative for an already-completed event. Magyar Közlöny’s current page showed the latest issues as 2026/54 and 2026/55, both dated 2026-05-19 (Magyar Közlöny list). Issue 55 contains only a prime-ministerial decree on a deputy prime minister, not a Fundamental Law amendment (Magyar Közlöny 2026/55); issue 54 contains prime-ministerial decisions on deputy state secretaries (Magyar Közlöny 2026/54). A public bill mirror synced to parliament on 2026-05-13 listed a T/9 proposal titled Hungary’s sixteenth Fundamental Law amendment, but it was submitted by Mi Hazánk, not by Tisza or the government, and was still only in submitted status (Törvényfigyelő).

My model puts 69.5% in range. I assign an 85% chance that the Sulyok/holdover-officeholder conflict remains live after 2026-05-31, a 74% chance of publication by 2026-08-12 conditional on that conflict staying live, and a 44% chance conditional on voluntary resignations or strategic deferral, because the term-limit and rule-of-law agenda would still create a constitutional path. That gives 0.85 × 0.74 + 0.15 × 0.44 = 69.5%. The timing distribution gives 3.4% cumulative probability by 2026-05-31, 23.5% by 2026-06-15, 44.3% by 2026-06-30, 56.2% by 2026-07-15, 66.4% by 2026-07-31, and 69.5% by the deadline.

What’s non-obvious

Sulyok is less of a blocker than ordinary coverage implies. For an amendment to the Fundamental Law, the president’s practical lever is procedural review, not a substantive veto. That can move publication from June into July, but it should not stop a procedurally clean amendment supported by 141 MPs.

The absence of a public Tisza amendment text matters more than the supermajority headline. Tisza can move fast, but a first amendment aimed at named officeholders risks looking like the same two-thirds majoritarianism it campaigned against. The Guardian quoted a Hungary analyst saying that rushing constitutional change without consultation would look too much like the previous administration (The Guardian). I treat that as a delay force, not a veto force.

Limitations

The largest gap is the formal bill text. I could verify no promulgation through Magyar Közlöny 2026/55, and I could see only a non-government Mi Hazánk sixteenth-amendment bill in the accessible public mirror, but absence of a public Tisza bill is not proof that no government draft exists.

The public bill mirror has data-quality limits. It was synced on 2026-05-13 and its date formatting is unreliable, so I used it only for sponsor and status, not for fine timing. Official parliamentary pages were not fully accessible in the same check.

The main political uncertainty is whether Magyar treats 2026-05-31 as a real trigger or as bargaining pressure. A quick narrow amendment points to June or early July. A broader legitimacy-first package, a Sulyok procedural referral, or a decision to prioritize EU-fund milestones and ordinary legislation pushes the first publication past 2026-08-12.

Forecast: July 12, 2026 (median)

Rationale

• Political trigger is set but contingent. Prime Minister Magyar has explicitly threatened constitutional amendments if officials (particularly President Sulyok) refuse to resign by May 31, 2026. Sulyok has firmly rejected this demand as of mid-May. However, if Sulyok resigns voluntarily (~30% probability based on Polymarket decline), the primary stated trigger disappears, potentially delaying or eliminating an amendment within the August 12 window.

• Procedural timeline is tight but feasible. Hungarian constitutional procedure requires 5 days for the Speaker to sign, then 5 days for the President to sign—a 10-day minimum from parliamentary vote to promulgation. If the President refers the amendment to the Constitutional Court (likely, given Fidesz’s 52 seats and control of the Court), an additional 30-day review window applies. This creates a 40-day maximum timeline, which fits within the 84-day window only if an amendment is introduced by early July.

• No bill has been introduced yet. As of May 20, no constitutional amendment bill is publicly confirmed in parliament, suggesting Magyar has not yet prioritized this action despite his May 31 deadline. This introduces a 5–20 day lag between the deadline and actual introduction, pushing the vote to mid-to-late June at earliest.

• Historical precedent suggests speed is possible but not certain. Fidesz passed constitutional amendments within weeks in 2010 and 2022, but those faced no institutional resistance. Magyar faces a hostile president and Fidesz-controlled courts, which will likely use the Constitutional Court referral to delay. The weighted scenarios suggest ~25% probability of fast-track promulgation (late June), ~30% probability of Constitutional Court-delayed promulgation (late July), and ~33% probability of no promulgation within the window.

• EU funding deadline creates secondary pressure. An August 31,