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The question asks whether Israel will issue a fresh, state-directed broad suspension of commercial aviation (a closure of >50% of the Tel Aviv FIR) by 12 Aug 2026. Forecasters agree the defining trigger would be direct Iran-linked missile/drone escalation or interstate war, while Hizbollah/Lebanon or Houthi/Yemen activity alone rarely produces a nationwide FIR shutdown unless it threatens central Israel; airline self-suspensions or foreign bans do not qualify. As of 10 May 2026 the aviation picture is “open but emergency‑conditioned” after the April ceasefire, so risk is elevated versus peacetime but not imminent absent a strategic trigger. Individual estimates range from a low ~15% (accounting for a recent major closure and an expected cooling-off) up to ~33–35% (Poisson/statistical and model-based estimates); most teams cluster around 25–31%, so a consolidated mid‑range probability is roughly 25–33%. Analysts emphasize monitoring Israeli sources (IAA/CAAI/NOTAM/AIS) and Reuters/AP corroboration for firm qualifying language like “closed to civil flights” or “all flights canceled until further notice.”
Forecast: Probability distribution:
We need the next Israel-initiated, publicly verifiable, broad commercial-aviation shutdown affecting >50% of the Tel Aviv FIR, with the “initiation” time being when it physically takes effect (not when issued). As of 2026-05-10, multiple analysts independently report no current FIR-wide closure in official NOTAM/AIS listings, so the event has not already happened.
Key uncertainty is geopolitical “shock risk”: qualifying closures appear to occur mainly during acute escalations (e.g., credible expectation of large inbound salvos), and can be implemented quickly, but they are not continuous. Over the ~94 days until 2026-08-12T12:00Z, I weight (a) a meaningful chance of at least one new major escalation that forces a broad commercial shutdown, against (b) the possibility that Israel manages ongoing risk with localized restrictions/route management that do not exceed the >50% FIR threshold.
Across the team, Forecasters 1/2/4 imply roughly ~60–70% chance of a qualifying closure by the deadline, while Forecaster 3 is a low outlier and also structurally mishandles the open upper bound by piling at it. I synthesize to ~60–65% in-window probability, with timing skewed toward mid/late June through July (enough time for an escalation to develop) but still allowing a non-trivial near-term chance. I then represent the remaining ~35–40% as “no qualifying closure by the deadline” using dates strictly after 2026-08-12 (per the open-upper guidance).
An amateur forecast often (1) ignores the >50% FIR / “generally applicable to commercial flights” threshold and overcounts routine localized restrictions, pushing dates unrealistically early, or (2) anchors on the latest flare-up and assigns near-certainty of an in-window closure, failing to represent the substantial chance of no qualifying closure by the cutoff.
This forecast improves by (a) explicitly separating ‘qualifying major closure’ from partial/local restrictions, (b) using the analysts’ checks that no such closure is active as of 2026-05-10, (c) centering on a calibrated ~60–65% in-window probability (rather than 90%+), and (d) honestly encoding the open-upper tail with percentiles strictly past the deadline rather than clustering at the bound.
Defining the Threshold The rationales uniformly emphasize that the resolution criteria require a closure of more than 50% of the Tel Aviv Flight Information Region (FIR). Localized border skirmishes and routine proxy rocket fire do not meet this high threshold; authorities typically manage those with dynamic rerouting. A qualifying major closure strictly requires massive preemptive military operations or direct state-on-state ballistic missile exchanges (primarily with Iran) that threaten broad geographic areas and high-altitude commercial corridors.
Historical Base Rates Since the escalation of the regional conflict in late 2023/early 2024, Israel has initiated major airspace closures at regular intervals. However, projecting solely based on historical averages suggests the next qualifying closure would naturally fall well into late 2026, outside the immediate summer window.
Escalatory Risks (The Case for a Near-Term Closure) Despite historical base rates, forecasters identify an extremely volatile short-term geopolitical environment. The fragile ceasefires established in early 2026 are actively fraying. Several acute flashpoints threaten to spark immediate state-on-state escalation:
Restraining Factors (The Case for a Delayed Closure) Conversely, several structural and logistical restraints may delay a major escalation, allowing the region to avoid a blanket closure in the near term:
Synthesis Overall, the forecast hinges on the tension between two opposing forces: the severe, immediate risk of diplomatic collapse and dense calendar flashpoints in the early summer, versus the logistical exhaustion, depleted munitions, and adapted aviation policies that actively deter both sides from engaging in the massive state-on-state exchanges required to trigger a total airspace closure.
Question: When will Israel next close its airspace? Final Prediction: Probability distribution:
Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled
Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:
The research outlines the current status and complexities surrounding Israel’s airspace as of May 10, 2026, highlighting a contradictory situation where different sources provide varying assessments. The Tel Aviv FIR is classified as “closed” with a “Moderate Risk - No Fly” assessment, while the Israeli Civil Aviation Authority (CAAI) claims operations have resumed at Ben Gurion Airport, reporting over 400 daily flights. However, operations are heavily restricted, with limited capacity and most major international airlines still suspended. The airspace is functionally restricted, leading to a classification as effectively closed for normal commercial aviation despite being technically open for limited traffic.
The research also discusses the historical context of airspace closures in relation to the ongoing US-Israel-Iran conflict, noting that significant escalations have consistently triggered full airspace closures. Key risk factors for future closures include the fragility of the current ceasefire, potential resumption of hostilities, and active military engagements with Hezbollah. The research indicates a high conditional probability of a full closure if hostilities resume, based on recent precedents and the current geopolitical climate. The assessment emphasizes the uncertainty surrounding the definition of a “major closure” and the potential for rapid changes in the situation.
Sources used in the research include:
Israel’s airspace status is complex and somewhat contradictory across sources:
Assessment: Israeli airspace appears to be in a state of partial operation — technically open for limited commercial traffic (primarily Israeli carriers), but functionally restricted to a degree that many outside observers and risk databases classify it as effectively closed or near-closed for normal commercial aviation. The question is whether the current status already meets the >50% FIR closure threshold, or whether a new, formal NOTAM-based closure would be required.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Feb 28, 2026 | US and Israel launch “Operation Epic Fury” / “Roar of the Lion” against Iran, striking nuclear and military targets. Supreme Leader Khamenei killed. [5][7] |
| Late Feb–March | Iran retaliates with sustained missile/drone strikes on Israel, US assets, and Gulf states. Multiple regional airspace closures. 11,000+ flights cancelled in first days. [1][2][10] |
| March 8 | Iran’s Assembly of Experts appoints Mojtaba Khamenei as new Supreme Leader. [7] |
| April 7-8 | Ceasefire brokered with Pakistani mediation. [7][25] |
| April 13 | US imposes naval blockade on Iranian ports. [7] |
| April 16 | Lebanon-Israel ceasefire. [30] |
| April 21 | Iran’s Tehran FIR partially reopens (eastern overflights only). [20] |
| April 24 | Kuwait FIR reopens after full closure since Feb 28. [20] |
| May 1 | Trump notifies Congress the war with Iran is “concluded.” [31] |
| May 2 | UAE fully reopens airspace. [1] |
| May 4-5 | Israel raises alert level in anticipation of ceasefire breakdown. Iran fires 15 ballistic/cruise missiles at UAE. UAE partially re-closes airspace. [8][23][29] |
| May 5-8 | US strikes Iranian targets in Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliates. Both sides claim ceasefire remains in effect. [27][29][30] |
| May 9 | Israel orders evacuation of 9 villages in southern Lebanon, conducts 85 strikes on Hezbollah in 24 hours. [24] |
Ceasefire fragility: The April 7 ceasefire is barely holding. Both sides accuse each other of violations. US-Iran naval clashes in the Strait of Hormuz have intensified. [26][27][29]
Imminent resumption of hostilities: According to Axios, Trump may order resumed military operations against Iran if negotiations remain stalled. Israeli military leadership has publicly stated readiness to deploy “all Israeli air power eastward” against Iran. [23][25][31][32]
Israel’s state of emergency extended to May 19, 2026: Israel raised its alert level in early May in anticipation of ceasefire collapse. [25]
Active Hezbollah escalation: Israel is actively striking Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, with Hezbollah retaliating with rockets and drones at Israeli military bases. This multi-front threat increases the probability of airspace closure. [24][26]
Iran’s demonstrated capability: Iran has continued launching missiles at regional targets (including 15 missiles at UAE on ~May 6), demonstrating willingness and ability to strike. [29]
Ben Gurion vulnerability: A missile impact near Ben Gurion Airport occurred on May 4, 2025 (in the earlier phase); the airport operates under an “emergency model to minimize ground time due to a lack of adequate fortification.” [12][21]
Israel airspace closures — recent history:
Pattern: Every significant missile/drone exchange between Iran and Israel has triggered a full airspace closure. Temporary closures during individual attacks typically last hours. Major escalations (like Feb 28) triggered extended closures lasting weeks.
Frequency during active conflict: During the Feb-April 2026 war phase, Israel’s airspace was closed for the majority of the time (roughly 5+ weeks of full closure). Since the ceasefire, it has been in a semi-open state with temporary closures during security incidents.
Key observation: Given the current pattern where every major escalation triggers closure, and the ceasefire appears to be actively deteriorating (May 5-9 events), the conditional probability of a full closure given a resumption of hostilities is very high (essentially ~100% based on all recent precedents).
I was unable to find specific prediction markets on this exact question (“When will Israel next close its airspace?”). However, related markets and indicators include:
Factors favoring closure before August 12, 2026:
Factors against closure:
Key uncertainty: Whether the current state of Israeli airspace already qualifies as a “major closure” (>50% FIR area). If the Safe Airspace classification of “closed” is accurate at the NOTAM level, a qualifying closure may already be in effect or may have been in effect very recently. The CAAI’s own characterization is more optimistic, emphasizing operational status. This distinction is critical for resolution.
Time horizon note: The 3-month window (May 10 – August 12, 2026) is long relative to the pace of events. Given the volatility, even a brief period of calm could be interrupted by a new escalation cycle at any point.
Conditioning on non-annulment, and assuming the current ambiguous/partial “closed” status does not itself count.
The critic’s main points are valid. I was too willing to translate “regional aviation danger” into a qualifying Israeli-initiated FIR closure. The resolution threshold is stricter: official Israeli action, broad commercial suspension, and >50% of the Tel Aviv FIR. I also agree that Safe Airspace-type “closed/no-fly” labels should be treated mostly as risk signals, not as dispositive resolution evidence, while CAAI/IAA/NOTAMs deserve more weight.
That said, I still think the critic may underweight the active-crisis base rate. This is not a normal post-2023 background period; it follows a direct US/Israel-Iran war, with ceasefire violations, Gulf clashes, Israeli alert posture, and Hezbollah escalation. If Iran launches another substantial direct attack on Israel, or if Israel/US resume major strikes in a way that creates immediate retaliation risk, a qualifying closure remains very likely based on recent precedent.
My revised model separates:
Net: I reduce my probability of a qualifying closure by Aug. 12 from roughly three-quarters to the low 60s. The hazard remains front-loaded, especially through late May/June, but less extremely so than before; if no closure occurs by early summer, that is evidence the ceasefire/muddling-through equilibrium is more durable.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-05-10
Percentile 1: 2026-05-12
Percentile 5: 2026-05-18
Percentile 10: 2026-05-26
Percentile 20: 2026-06-10
Percentile 30: 2026-06-24
Percentile 40: 2026-07-08
Percentile 50: 2026-07-23
Percentile 60: 2026-08-09
Percentile 70: 2026-10-20
Percentile 80: 2027-02-15
Percentile 90: 2027-09-15
Percentile 95: 2028-05-15
Percentile 99: 2030-03-01
Percentile 99.9: 2033-03-01
Agent Forecast (date, confidence: medium)
Base Rate: Prior major closures (Oct 2023, Apr 2024, Oct 2024, Feb-Apr 2026) were clustered within active conflict episodes, not independent arrivals. Conditional probability framework (P(major Iranian retaliation) × P(closure | retaliation) + baseline) yields ~24%, consistent with reviewer ensemble of 22%.
Initial Reasoning:
Key Uncertainties:
Evidence Sources (13):
Grounding Facts (passed to reviewers):
Draft: After Aug 12, 2026: 62.0%, May 10, 2026 to May 22, 2026: 10.0%, May 22, 2026 to Jun 03, 2026: 7.0%, Jun 03, 2026 to Jun 14, 2026: 5.0%, Jun 14, 2026 to Jun 26, 2026: 5.0%
Reviewer Panel:
Reviewer (reasoning)
The forecast leans heavily on a crude base‐rate of four closures in 31 months without accounting for the fact that most occurred in a single conflict episode, and it treats each future period as if independent events in a stationary process. It also overlooks that both US strikes on Iran on May 7 and repeated Hezbollah attacks since April have not triggered any closure, suggesting Israel’s closure threshold is currently higher than assumed. Finally, it fails to consider lower-impact mitigation options (partial restrictions or rerouting) and diplomatic imperatives to keep the FIR open.
Objections:
Reviewer (calibration)
The draft forecast’s base rate calculation of ‘~4 major closures in 31 months’ appears inconsistent with the verified grounding facts, which explicitly detail only one such recent event. This likely overstates the historical frequency. Furthermore, the forecast doesn’t fully differentiate between US strikes on Iran and direct Iranian retaliation against Israel, which is a critical distinction for triggering an Israeli airspace closure.
Objections:
Reviewer (fact-checker)
Verdict: clean
Adjustment Rationale:
Adjusted downward from 38% to ~24.5% based on reviewer feedback. (1) The reasoning reviewer correctly noted that prior closures cluster within active war cycles rather than arriving as independent Poisson events — we are currently post-war in a fragile ceasefire, so a stationary base rate overstates instantaneous risk. (2) The calibration reviewer correctly distinguished US offensive actions on Iran (May 7 strikes — did not close Israeli airspace) from direct Iranian retaliation against Israel (the actual closure trigger), which my draft conflated. The naval blockade is maritime, not aviation-relevant. (3) Recent multiple escalations without closure suggest Israel is preferring partial restrictions/rerouting over full FIR closure to avoid repeating the costly 40-day shutdown. New decomposition: P(major Iranian retaliation in window) ~25-30% × P(qualifying closure | retaliation) ~70% + ~5% other-trigger baseline ≈ 24-26%. Front-loaded near-term (May 15 Lebanon ceasefire expiry, Iran post-strike threats), tapering through summer.
forecast_sdk | 353.2s | research $0.7622 + reviewers $0.0086 + reconcile $0.1554 = $0.9261
Extracted Date Percentile Values: {0.1: 1778371200.0, 1.0: 1778630400.0, 5.0: 1779235200.0, 10.0: 1779926400.0, 15.0: 1780617600.0, 20.0: 1781568000.0, 25.0: 1782777600.0, 30.0: 1784419200.0, 35.0: 1786579200.0, 40.0: 1786579200.0, 45.0: 1786579200.0, 46.0: 1786579200.0, 47.0: 1786579200.0, 48.0: 1786579200.0, 49.0: 1786579200.0, 50.0: 1786579200.0, 51.0: 1786579200.0, 52.0: 1786579200.0, 53.0: 1786579200.0, 54.0: 1786579200.0, 55.0: 1786579200.0, 60.0: 1786579200.0, 65.0: 1786579200.0, 70.0: 1786579200.0, 75.0: 1786579200.0, 80.0: 1786579200.0, 85.0: 1786579200.0, 90.0: 1786579200.0, 95.0: 1786579200.0, 99.0: 1786579200.0, 99.9: 1786579200.0}
Model’s Answer: Step one is separating the binary core of the question from the timing question. The strongest and most recent evidence is that, as of 2026-05-10, Israel does not have an active qualifying major closure in force: IAA/NOTAM sources show only targeted restrictions, Ben Gurion is operating, and there is no current broad suspension across most of the Tel Aviv FIR. That pushes heavily toward the default outcome of no qualifying closure before the resolution deadline.
Step two is adjusting for the unusually elevated regional risk. A full or near-full closure did happen recently in late February and March 2026, which proves the threshold is reachable under severe escalation. Current conflict conditions, Safe Airspace/EASA warnings, and continuing Lebanon/Iran-linked tensions all keep the hazard materially above peacetime baseline. But the market signal and official posture both suggest that a new major closure is still meaningfully less likely than continued partial openness with localized restrictions.
My central estimate is roughly a one-third chance of a qualifying major closure before 2026-08-12T12:00:00Z, and roughly a two-thirds chance of no qualifying closure by then. Conditional on a closure happening, I expect the hazard to be front-loaded into the next several weeks rather than evenly spread: if a closure is going to happen, it is most likely to come from a sudden military escalation in May or June. If that does not happen, the chance persists but decays into July and early August.
The main assumptions doing the most work are these. The first is that Israeli authorities continue preferring localized or route-specific restrictions over a broad commercial shutdown; I think there is about a 25% chance this assumption fails, and if it does, the distribution shifts earlier. The second is that no major Iran/Hezbollah-triggered escalation compels an immediate aviation-wide response in the next month; I think there is about a 20% chance this is wrong, and that would also shift sharply earlier. The third is that the resolution criteria will indeed be applied strictly to “more than 50% of the FIR” and broad commercial suspension rather than looser practical disruption; I think there is about a 10% chance market/commentary overstates what will count, which would shift probability later and toward no-resolution-by-deadline.
An earlier outcome would most likely result from a sudden regional escalation, especially missile/drone exchanges or a wider Iran/Hezbollah confrontation that makes a broad commercial suspension unavoidable. I put the chance of such an earlier-than-my-median qualifying closure at about one-third overall, with most of that concentrated in May and June.
A later outcome would result from the current pattern persisting: high threat, airline caution, occasional route restrictions, but no official broad shutdown covering most of the FIR. I put the chance of this no-qualifying-closure-by-deadline path at about two-thirds, which is why the median is after the resolution cutoff.
Percentile 0.1: 2026-05-10 Percentile 1: 2026-05-13 Percentile 5: 2026-05-20 Percentile 10: 2026-05-28 Percentile 15: 2026-06-05 Percentile 20: 2026-06-16 Percentile 25: 2026-06-30 Percentile 30: 2026-07-19 Percentile 35: 2026-08-13 Percentile 40: 2026-08-13 Percentile 45: 2026-08-13 Percentile 46: 2026-08-13 Percentile 47: 2026-08-13 Percentile 48: 2026-08-13 Percentile 49: 2026-08-13 Percentile 50: 2026-08-13 Percentile 51: 2026-08-13 Percentile 52: 2026-08-13 Percentile 53: 2026-08-13 Percentile 54: 2026-08-13 Percentile 55: 2026-08-13 Percentile 60: 2026-08-13 Percentile 65: 2026-08-13 Percentile 70: 2026-08-13 Percentile 75: 2026-08-13 Percentile 80: 2026-08-13 Percentile 85: 2026-08-13 Percentile 90: 2026-08-13 Percentile 95: 2026-08-13 Percentile 99: 2026-08-13 Percentile 99.9: 2026-08-13
Forecast: Israel is likely to close its airspace around May 2026.
Overall, the situation is evolving towards a higher likelihood of airspace closure in the near term, particularly as diplomatic efforts falter.
Forecast (percentiles, aggregated):
Per-model forecasts:
Rationale: Summary As of mid-May 2026, the security environment in Israel remains highly volatile following the February to April conflict with Iran. Although commercial aviation has resumed and major airspace restrictions were eased in April, the current ceasefire remains exceptionally fragile. Military exchanges in early May, including US strikes on Iranian military sites and ongoing Israeli operations in Lebanon, sustain a heavily elevated baseline risk of sudden escalation. Market indicators suggest roughly a one-in-four chance of a major airspace closure before the end of May. Factoring in a gradual stabilization if the immediate ceasefire holds, the cumulative probability of a qualifying closure crosses the 50% threshold in late July. However, there is a substantial 40% to 45% probability that diplomatic efforts succeed and the situation avoids a major, sweeping closure—defined strictly as affecting more than 50% of the Tel Aviv Flight Information Region—before the mid-August horizon. This pushes the later percentile estimates sequentially into 2027.
Strongest Arguments for Sooner
Strongest Arguments for Later
Key Uncertainties
When will Israel next close its airspace?
Key figures
Historical context
Tailwinds
Headwinds
Detailed reasoning
Key uncertainties
Conclusion