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Question: will UNHCR/IOM’s “Total Forcibly Displaced (Sudan)” portal fall below 11.4 million by 12 Aug 2026? As of 4 May 2026 the portal stood at 11,521,788, so the total must decline by only ~122,000 (≈1.1%). Forecasters agree the key uncertainty is not steady erosion but whether the largest, stale component—“IDPs in Sudan” (6.72m), last updated 31 Mar 2026—is refreshed to reflect the large gross return reporting (IOM/UN cite ~3–4m returns, ~80% IDPs, with ~1.5–1.7m to Khartoum). If the next IDP reload (likely mid‑June, with another possible refresh in July/August) counts enough returns as durable, a one‑time downward revision could push the headline below 11.4m. Countervailing points—ongoing fighting producing new displacement in Darfur/Kordofan/Blue Nile, continued refugee outflows to Chad/South Sudan/Egypt, and UN/IOM caution that many returns are fragile and may not be coded as durable—mean the drop is far from certain. Quantitatively, teams’ point estimates range: some place crossing probability ≈55%, others ~42–50%, while one model leans toward ~60% chance of remaining above 11.4m; all recommend close monitoring of the IDP refresh, component decomposition, and methodology notes as the decisive signals.
Forecast: Probability distribution:
All four analysts agree the UNHCR Operations Data Portal (Sudan situation) currently shows Total Forcibly Displaced at about 11.52M (last update cited as 2026-05-04), implying a needed drop of ~122k (≈1.1%) to go below 11.4M. The key forecasting variables are (1) the net balance of returns vs. new displacement (conflict volatility), and (2) how/when the portal incorporates batch IDP revisions versus more frequently changing refugee/outflow components (step-like updates).
On timing, the analysts’ medians range from ~2026-07-01 to ~2026-07-30, with an average/consensus around mid-July. Forecaster 3’s time-slope estimate (from UNHCR snapshot levels) supports a mid/late-July crossing if the recent multi-month decline persists, but their distribution is likely overconfident about happening before the 2026-08-12 bound (and also places percentiles too close to/at the open bound). Forecasters 1, 2, and 4 all include a meaningful right tail past 2026-08-12, consistent with (a) recent small increases in late April/early May and (b) the possibility the reversal was partly methodological or could stall if violence displaces more people.
Synthesis: I center the distribution on mid-July 2026, but keep substantial probability that the threshold is not reached by 2026-08-12 (expressed by putting p80+ strictly past the open upper bound). This corresponds to roughly ~70–80% probability of crossing by the bound, with ~20–30% beyond, reflecting both the relatively small remaining gap (~122k) and the real risk of stalling/reversal plus discrete update timing.
A typical amateur forecast would either (a) extrapolate a recent short-run decline linearly and place near-certain resolution in June/early July, or (b) anchor too heavily on the most recent week-to-week uptick and push everything beyond the deadline—both patterns tend to be miscalibrated. This forecast instead triangulates (1) the size of the remaining gap to 11.4M, (2) the multi-month drift implied by the analysts’ cited historical snapshots, and (3) stepwise/batch update dynamics plus conflict-driven tail risk, yielding a mid-July median with a clearly represented post-2026-08-12 tail. Confidence in improvement is moderate: the threshold is close, but the data-update process and conflict trajectory create meaningful irreducible uncertainty.
The rationales broadly agree that the remaining numerical gap to cross the threshold is relatively small, making the resolution highly dependent on the intersection of humanitarian data reporting lags, seasonal shifts, and ongoing conflict dynamics.
Factors Favoring a Near-Term Drop
Factors Favoring a Delayed Drop or Reversal
Question: When will the number of Total Forcibly Displaced Sudanese fall below 11.4m Final Prediction: Probability distribution:
Total Cost: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Time Spent: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled LLMs: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled Bot Name: extra_metadata_in_explanation is disabled
Forecaster 1: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 2: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 3: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 4: Probability distribution:
Forecaster 5: Probability distribution:
The research examines the displacement crisis in Sudan, which has escalated due to the ongoing civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that began in April 2023. As of mid-April 2026, approximately 11.6 million Sudanese are forcibly displaced, including around 6.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 4.4-4.5 million refugees in neighboring countries. The study analyzes trends in displacement, noting a significant decline in IDP numbers from a peak of about 11.58 million in January 2025 to approximately 8.94 million by April 2026. However, the total number of forcibly displaced individuals remains high due to a continuing increase in cross-border refugees, particularly in Chad and Egypt.
Factors that could lead to a decline in the total number of forcibly displaced Sudanese below 11.4 million include a notable return of displaced individuals to their homes, improved security conditions, and the recapture of Khartoum by SAF. Conversely, ongoing conflict, new displacements, and rising refugee numbers in neighboring countries present significant challenges to achieving this decline. The research highlights that historical patterns in similar displacement crises suggest sustained declines in total displacement figures are rare without a ceasefire or peace agreement, indicating uncertainty regarding the timeline for falling below the specified threshold.
Sources used in the research include:
(Note: Specific links were not provided in the original text.)
The Sudan civil war, which began April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has created the world’s largest displacement crisis. As of early-to-mid April 2026, multiple sources cite approximately 11.6 million total forcibly displaced Sudanese, comprising roughly 6.8 million internally displaced and 4.4-4.5 million cross-border refugees [3][4][6].
The question asks whether this number (as tracked on the UNHCR Operations Data Portal) will fall below 11.4 million by August 12, 2026.
The IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) provides the most granular tracking of displacement trends:
However, the “Total Forcibly Displaced” figure on the UNHCR portal combines IDPs + cross-border refugees. While IDPs have declined substantially, cross-border refugee numbers continue to grow:
This means the net decline in “Total Forcibly Displaced” is much slower than the decline in IDPs alone, because cross-border refugee growth partially offsets IDP returns.
The gap from ~11.6M to 11.4M is only ~200,000, which could theoretically be closed in 1-3 months at recent rates of decline.
No specific prediction markets were found for this exact question on Metaculus, Polymarket, or other platforms.
Historical precedents for displacement crises:
Key base rate insight: In major civil wars without a ceasefire, sustained multi-month declines in total displacement below prior thresholds have historically been uncommon. Returns typically accelerate only after sustained cessation of hostilities, and the Sudan conflict shows no signs of approaching that stage.
The “Total Forcibly Displaced” figure on the UNHCR portal was approximately 11.6 million as of mid-April 2026 [3][4]. To reach 11.4 million by August 12, 2026 (~3 months), the total needs to decline by ~200,000 net.
Key considerations:
The margin is tight (~200K decline needed over ~3 months), but the slowing rate of decline, ongoing new displacements, and still-growing cross-border refugee population suggest this is uncertain but more likely than not that the number will NOT fall below 11.4M by August 12. The recent trend of returns could continue, but multiple destabilizing factors could reverse it at any time.
Rate deceleration emphasis: The critic correctly highlights that the research explicitly states IDP decline “slowed to <1%/month as of January 2026, while increasing in 8 states.” This documented deceleration trend deserves heavier weighting than my single March→April observation.
Survivorship bias in returns: The “easy returns” point is compelling. The 1.5M Khartoum returns represented people with surviving homes and resources. Future returns may face more challenging conditions and proceed more slowly.
P40 adjustment: The critic’s argument that ~35-37% probability by August 12 is more defensible than ~40% given documented rate deceleration and asymmetric reversal risk is persuasive.
Left tail mechanics: Pushing P0.1 to May 26 properly accounts for the realistic constraint that the next portal update is likely around May 27-30.
Observed data matters: The March→April decline of 125K in 6 weeks is real data. Even with deceleration, this informs reasonable expectations.
The gap is genuinely small: ~117K is less than 1% of total displacement, making threshold-crossing achievable in relatively short timeframes if conditions don’t deteriorate significantly.
Right tail appropriateness: Without a peace deal, years-long delays remain genuinely possible given historical base rates from Syria and South Sudan.
The critic’s observation about bimodal dynamics is apt—either resolution happens in the next few updates, or the conflict dynamics could extend timelines considerably. The 60% of returnees in damaged homes creates fragility that could rapidly reverse progress.
I’ll adopt most of the critic’s well-reasoned adjustments, reflecting:
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-05-26 Percentile 1: 2026-06-02 Percentile 5: 2026-06-12 Percentile 10: 2026-06-22 Percentile 20: 2026-07-10 Percentile 30: 2026-07-28 Percentile 40: 2026-08-15 Percentile 50: 2026-09-30 Percentile 60: 2026-12-03 Percentile 70: 2027-03-18 Percentile 80: 2027-10-05 Percentile 90: 2028-09-20 Percentile 95: 2030-07-25 Percentile 99: 2033-07-25 Percentile 99.9: 2039-05-15
Acknowledging Valid Criticisms:
Anchoring on August 12: The critic is absolutely right. Having my P50 land precisely on August 12 looks like anchoring on the question creator’s date rather than independent analysis. This was a methodological error I should correct.
Deceleration signal: The research explicitly states IDP decline has slowed to <1% month-over-month and was “increasing in 8 states.” I underweighted this documented deceleration.
Question creator’s prior: Fair point that creators design questions to be uncertain and interesting, not because they have special predictive insight.
Net decline calculation: The math is important. If new displacements (~60K/month) plus cross-border outflows (~50K/month) are partially offsetting returns, net decline could be much slower than I assumed. At only 15-25K/month net decline, closing a 117K gap takes 5-8 months, suggesting October-December rather than August.
Aspects I Still Defend:
Early tail compression is appropriate: With only 117K to threshold (~1% of total), data lag uncertainty, and potential batch updates, P0.1-P5 should remain compressed in late May/early June.
Long right tail remains justified: Historical precedent from Syria, South Sudan, and Afghanistan shows displacement crises lasting years without ceasefires. Sudan’s conflict remains active with no peace deal in sight.
Meaningful probability of pre-August resolution: The gap is genuinely small, returns are documented, and data lag means we don’t know the current number. ~40% pre-August probability isn’t unreasonable.
New Insights:
Data methodology differences matter: UNHCR shows 4.79M IDPs while IOM shows 8.94M - these use different counting methodologies. I should focus solely on UNHCR portal trends.
Cross-border growth is the key headwind: Refugees continue flowing to Chad, Egypt, and elsewhere. This persistent outflow partially offsets IDP returns.
Avoiding round-number anchoring: My P50 should derive from the math (117K gap ÷ estimated monthly decline rate), not from psychologically salient dates.
Final Assessment:
Accepting the deceleration critique and avoiding August 12 anchoring, I’m shifting P50 to approximately August 20. This gives ~40-42% probability of pre-August 12 resolution, which balances:
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-05-08 Percentile 1: 2026-05-14 Percentile 5: 2026-05-28 Percentile 10: 2026-06-12 Percentile 20: 2026-07-02 Percentile 30: 2026-07-18 Percentile 40: 2026-08-03 Percentile 50: 2026-08-20 Percentile 60: 2026-10-01 Percentile 70: 2027-01-01 Percentile 80: 2027-05-20 Percentile 90: 2028-04-01 Percentile 95: 2029-04-01 Percentile 99: 2031-04-01 Percentile 99.9: 2035-01-01
Math vs. median mismatch - The critic is absolutely right. My August 4 median implied a decline rate of only ~25-30K/month, which is far below even the documented “slowed” rate of ~115K/month. I need to trust the verified data more.
Portal data lag - The data is now 10+ days old. With such a small gap (117K), we might already be very close to threshold in reality.
The resolution mechanics insight - The critic’s observation that “this is essentially asking when does the portal update?” is valuable. With only 117K to close, the question becomes more about data publication timing than displacement dynamics.
Net vs. gross decline matters - If gross IDP returns are ~150K/month but cross-border growth is ~50K/month and new displacements are ~60K/month, net decline could be only ~40-50K/month. This reconciles the math with slower resolution.
Right tail handling - Historical base rates for conflicts without ceasefires justify extended scenarios. No ceasefire is imminent.
Rate slowdown trend - The documented deceleration from ~190K to <1% monthly is real and could continue.
Looking at the net calculation more carefully: at ~40-50K/month net decline (accounting for offsets), the 117K gap closes in 2.5-3 months - pointing to a median around late July. This is faster than my previous forecast but accounts for offsetting factors the critic may have underweighted.
I’m shifting my distribution earlier, accepting that the small gap makes June-July resolution quite likely. The median around late July implies ~45-50K/month net decline, which accounts for cross-border growth and new displacements offsetting gross returns. This represents approximately 55% probability of resolution before August 12.
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-05-13 Percentile 1: 2026-05-19 Percentile 5: 2026-05-29 Percentile 10: 2026-06-08 Percentile 20: 2026-06-22 Percentile 30: 2026-07-04 Percentile 40: 2026-07-16 Percentile 50: 2026-07-27 Percentile 60: 2026-08-17 Percentile 70: 2026-10-05 Percentile 80: 2026-12-28 Percentile 90: 2027-05-12 Percentile 95: 2027-10-22 Percentile 99: 2028-08-15 Percentile 99.9: 2030-03-01
Looking at the critic’s analysis, let me check if there’s been any recent update to the UNHCR data since the research was compiled.
This is very helpful! I now have the most current official data. Let me acknowledge the critic’s valid points and update my forecast.
Valid criticisms I acknowledge:
Math inconsistency: The critic correctly identified that at 20-40K/month net decline, my median at 4 months was inconsistent with the 5-10 month math. This was a significant error.
Optimistic left tail: The P10-P30 range was indeed too compressed. Resolving by early July would require 100K+/month net decline with no identified catalyst.
Cross-border refugee growth: At ~40-50K/month growth, this substantially offsets IDP returns. The net effect on Total Forcibly Displaced is much smaller than IDP-only trends suggest.
Data source clarity: The UNHCR portal now shows 11,517,505 (updated April 27, 2026), which is more precise than the ~11.6M estimate.
Key updated calculation:
New insight from fresh data: The gap is only ~117K, not ~200K. At 20-40K/month net decline:
This changes the calculus somewhat - the threshold is closer than initially estimated.
Points I maintain:
Probability assessment: With only ~117K needed and ~3 months to August 12, resolution by the deadline requires ~40K/month net decline - which is at the optimistic end of my estimated range. I’d now estimate ~30-35% probability of resolution by August 12 (slightly higher than my initial estimate given the smaller gap).
Distribution adjustments:
Updated prediction:
Percentile 0.1: 2026-05-25 Percentile 1: 2026-06-05 Percentile 5: 2026-06-22 Percentile 10: 2026-07-08 Percentile 20: 2026-07-25 Percentile 30: 2026-08-08 Percentile 40: 2026-08-25 Percentile 50: 2026-09-18 Percentile 60: 2026-10-28 Percentile 70: 2026-12-15 Percentile 80: 2027-04-01 Percentile 90: 2027-09-15 Percentile 95: 2028-04-01 Percentile 99: 2029-01-15 Percentile 99.9: 2030-04-01
Looking at this forecasting question, I need to analyze when the Total Forcibly Displaced Sudanese will fall below 11.4 million according to the UNHCR Operations Data Portal.
(a) Time left until outcome is known: Approximately 97 days from today (May 7, 2026) until August 12, 2026. If not resolved by then, the question continues indefinitely.
(b) Outside view - reference class and base rates: Historical displacement crises in ongoing civil wars without ceasefires show:
(c) Inside view - specific evidence: Favoring decline: IDP count dropped 23% from peak; ~4 million returnees; Khartoum recaptured; 92% returnees intend to stay; gap is only ~200,000.
Against decline: Monthly IDP decline slowed to <1%; cross-border refugees still growing (~4.5M and rising); ~350,000 new displacements Oct 2025-March 2026; no ceasefire imminent; 60% returnees in damaged homes; humanitarian funding at only 16%.
(d) Outcome if nothing changed: If the ~11.6M figure remained static, the number would NOT fall below 11.4M by August 12, 2026.
(e) Outcome if current trend continued: With <1% monthly decline in IDPs and continued refugee growth partially offsetting returns, the net decline is very slow. At ~50-70K net decline per month, reaching 11.4M would take approximately 3-4 months (August-September 2026).
(f) Expectations of experts and markets: No specific prediction markets identified. Research assessment suggests “more likely than not that the number will NOT fall below 11.4M by August 12.”
(g) Low (earlier) outcome scenario: A sudden breakthrough ceasefire agreement or unexpected large-scale organized returns, possibly triggered by decisive military victory. Alternatively, a UNHCR data methodology revision that adjusts the count downward.
(h) High (later) outcome scenario: New major offensive in Darfur or Kordofan triggers mass displacement wave; humanitarian aid collapse causes secondary displacement; regional instability from Middle East tensions spreads; conflict becomes protracted multi-year stalemate with no sustained returns.
Rationale:
Starting from the base rate: in ongoing civil wars without ceasefires, displacement numbers historically remain elevated for years. This would suggest a low probability (~20-25%) of meeting the threshold by August 12.
However, specific evidence adjusts this upward:
But I’m moderated by:
I estimate approximately 35% probability of falling below 11.4M by August 12, 2026. If it doesn’t happen by then, the ongoing (but slowing) decline trend suggests eventual resolution within 6-18 months is likely, with tail risk of multi-year delays if conflict intensifies.
“ Percentile 0.1: 2026-05-08 Percentile 1: 2026-05-13 Percentile 5: 2026-05-28 Percentile 10: 2026-06-12 Percentile 20: 2026-07-05 Percentile 30: 2026-07-22 Percentile 40: 2026-08-25 Percentile 50: 2026-09-20 Percentile 60: 2026-11-01 Percentile 70: 2027-01-15 Percentile 80: 2027-05-15 Percentile 90: 2028-01-01 Percentile 95: 2028-10-01 Percentile 99: 2030-06-01 Percentile 99.9: 2032-06-01 “
Agent Forecast (date, confidence: low)
Base Rate: Observed April 10 (11,597,588) → May 4, 2026 (11,521,788) = −75,800 over 24 days, ~22,100/week or ~3,160/day. Extrapolating linearly from May 4 (11,521,788), the 11,400,000 threshold would be crossed in ~39 days, around June 12, 2026. Half-pace scenario (1,500/day) puts crossing around late July; trend stall puts it after August 12.
Initial Reasoning:
Key Uncertainties:
Evidence Sources (9):
Grounding Facts (passed to reviewers):
Draft: After Aug 12, 2026: 65.0%, Jul 19, 2026 to Jul 31, 2026: 7.0%, Jul 31, 2026 to Aug 12, 2026: 7.0%, Jul 07, 2026 to Jul 19, 2026: 6.0%, Jun 24, 2026 to Jul 07, 2026: 5.0%
Reviewer Panel:
Reviewer (reasoning)
The draft forecast’s weakest link is its reliance on projected IOM returns without showing those returns registered in the UNHCR Operations Data Portal metric, which has trended flat to upward. It underestimates the inertia of ongoing new displacements and data‐reporting lags and overestimates the portal’s sensitivity to return movements. Overall, the analysis ignores the lack of any sustained weekly decline in the portal’s Total Forcibly Displaced series and misinterprets a one‐off IDP decrease as evidence of a broader downtrend.
Objections:
Reviewer (calibration)
The draft forecast overemphasizes the recent weekly increase in the UNHCR metric while seemingly downplaying the significant projected returns. It acknowledges the discrepancy between UNHCR’s portal numbers and IOM’s IDP data (including a 22% decrease from peak and 2M+ projected returns), but doesn’t adequately explore how these factors might influence the ‘Total Forcibly Displaced’ figure, which is the resolution criteria. The required drop of ~122,000 is relatively small compared to the 2M additional returns IOM projects for 2026.
Objections:
Reviewer (fact-checker)
Verdict: clean
Adjustment Rationale:
Adjusted upward after a follow-up search produced a third data point: April 10, 2026 = 11,597,588. The April 10 → April 27 change was −80,083 (~22K/week), with May 4 a small +4,283 noise tick. Net 24-day trajectory is −75,800 (~3,160/day). My draft incorrectly inferred a flat trend from a single weekly observation — Reviewer 2 (calibration) was right that I under-weighted IOM’s 2M+ projected Khartoum returns, which appear to be flowing through to the portal metric. At the observed April pace, the 122K gap to 11.4M closes around mid-June 2026, placing the modal week in the May 31–Jun 12 or Jun 12–Jun 24 bucket. Tail probability remains substantial because: (a) the May 4 uptick shows the trend is volatile and not monotonic; (b) ongoing RSF conflict in Darfur/Kordofan generates new displacement that can offset returns; (c) rainy season (June-Sept) historically disrupts movement; (d) only ~24 days of data drive my pace estimate. Overall: ~53% resolution before August 12, ~47% after.
forecast_sdk | 511.6s | research $0.7188 + reviewers $0.0063 + reconcile $0.4921 = $1.2172
Extracted Date Percentile Values: {0.1: 1778544000.0, 1.0: 1779408000.0, 5.0: 1780444800.0, 10.0: 1781481600.0, 15.0: 1782259200.0, 20.0: 1782950400.0, 25.0: 1783641600.0, 30.0: 1784332800.0, 35.0: 1785024000.0, 40.0: 1785801600.0, 45.0: 1786665600.0, 46.0: 1786838400.0, 47.0: 1787011200.0, 48.0: 1787184000.0, 49.0: 1787356800.0, 50.0: 1787616000.0, 51.0: 1787875200.0, 52.0: 1788134400.0, 53.0: 1788480000.0, 54.0: 1788825600.0, 55.0: 1789257600.0, 60.0: 1790812800.0, 65.0: 1792886400.0, 70.0: 1795132800.0, 75.0: 1797724800.0, 80.0: 1802649600.0, 85.0: 1809129600.0, 90.0: 1818288000.0, 95.0: 1832976000.0, 99.0: 1861920000.0, 99.9: 1893456000.0}
Model’s Answer:
Based on the research, the UNHCR Operations Data Portal shows 11,521,788 Total Forcibly Displaced Sudanese as of May 4, 2026. This is approximately 121,788 above the 11.4 million threshold.
The IOM DTM data shows clear IDP decline:
However, the UNHCR “Total Forcibly Displaced” metric has been more stable:
Estimated monthly decline in total metric: 50,000-100,000
Assumption 1: Return momentum continues
Assumption 2: No major conflict escalation
Assumption 3: Methodological consistency in reporting
Early Outcome (crossing by mid-June): If decline rate is ~100,000/month, threshold reached in ~5 weeks. This requires sustained return momentum and no major new displacement events. Likelihood: ~15-20%
Late Outcome (crossing near August 12 or later): If decline rate slows to ~30-50,000/month due to conflict complications, funding shortfalls, or new displacement, the threshold might not be reached by deadline. Likelihood: ~55-60%
Given:
I estimate approximately 40% probability that the total falls below 11.4M by August 12, 2026, and 60% probability it remains above the threshold through the resolution date.
Strong return momentum (4 million already returned) could accelerate if security improves in Khartoum area or if external refugees repatriate faster than projected.
Ongoing conflict creates new displacement offsetting returns; external refugee populations in Egypt, Chad may be slower to return; funding shortfalls for humanitarian programs could slow organized returns.
The median estimate places the crossing date shortly after August 12, reflecting slight pessimism about meeting the threshold within the window given persistent conflict conditions.
Percentile .1: 2026-05-12 Percentile 1: 2026-05-22 Percentile 5: 2026-06-03 Percentile 10: 2026-06-15 Percentile 15: 2026-06-24 Percentile 20: 2026-07-02 Percentile 25: 2026-07-10 Percentile 30: 2026-07-18 Percentile 35: 2026-07-26 Percentile 40: 2026-08-04 Percentile 45: 2026-08-14 Percentile 46: 2026-08-16 Percentile 47: 2026-08-18 Percentile 48: 2026-08-20 Percentile 49: 2026-08-22 Percentile 50: 2026-08-25 Percentile 51: 2026-08-28 Percentile 52: 2026-08-31 Percentile 53: 2026-09-04 Percentile 54: 2026-09-08 Percentile 55: 2026-09-13 Percentile 60: 2026-10-01 Percentile 65: 2026-10-25 Percentile 70: 2026-11-20 Percentile 75: 2026-12-20 Percentile 80: 2027-02-15 Percentile 85: 2027-05-01 Percentile 90: 2027-08-15 Percentile 95: 2028-02-01 Percentile 99: 2029-01-01 Percentile 99.9: 2030-01-01
The total is a mixed accounting stock driven by infrequently updated IDP counts and more current cross‑border tallies.
Slow administrative updates create stepwise changes that dominate short‑term movements.
Return flows from cities and recorded refugee returns are exerting steady downward pressure on the stock.
Ongoing fighting and between‑update new displacements have produced a modest upward drift in recent weeks.
A single large downward IDP revision of the size seen in prior updates would plausibly push the reported total below 11.4 million.
If the next IDP update is small or delayed, or if violence spikes, the total can remain above the threshold through August.
Timing and magnitude of the next IDP revision are the pivotal uncertainties that shape near‑term outcomes.
Methodological or retrospective revisions and sudden conflict‑driven reversals are the biggest sensitivities that could overturn current expectations.
Forecast: The number of Total Forcibly Displaced Sudanese will fall below 11.4 million around early July 2026.
Overall, while the trend is positive, the complexities of displacement dynamics and data updates suggest a cautious approach to forecasting the exact timing.
Forecast (percentiles, aggregated):
Per-model forecasts:
Rationale: Summary As of May 4, 2026, the total number of forcibly displaced Sudanese stands at approximately 11.52 million, requiring a drop of roughly 122,000 to reach the 11.4 million threshold. Between February and mid-April 2026, displacement figures experienced a steady decline of around 60,000 to 75,000 per month, largely driven by massive waves of internally displaced persons returning to their homes out of desperation. However, this downward trend stalled in late April, and figures even slightly increased by early May. In an active, escalating conflict zone with no ceasefire in sight, massive continuous returns are inherently unsustainable. Ongoing fighting inevitably generates new waves of displacement that counterbalance returns. The median expectation is that the threshold is crossed in early August, but there is a significant probability that the drop will take much longer, pushing well past August and into late 2026 or early 2027.
Strongest Arguments for Sooner
Strongest Arguments for Later
Key Uncertainties
When will the number of Total Forcibly Displaced Sudanese fall below 11.4m
Key figures
Historical context
The Sudanese civil war, which began on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), created the world’s largest displacement crisis. Internal displacement reached an unprecedented peak of 11,585,384 individuals in January 2025. Since that peak, a notable reversal has occurred. By late April 2026, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) had dropped by approximately 23% as roughly 3.99 million people attempted to return to their places of origin. Historically, such returns are often ‘spontaneous’ rather than organized, driven by desperate conditions in displacement camps and a desire to protect property. The current trend mirrors patterns seen in other protracted conflicts where ‘returns’ begin as frontlines stabilize, even in the absence of a final peace agreement. However, these returns are often unstable and subject to sudden re-displacement if the security situation deteriorates or basic services fail to materialize.
Tailwinds
Headwinds
Detailed reasoning
My analysis is centered on the current gap between the reported ‘Total Forcibly Displaced’ figure and the 11.4 million threshold. As of May 4, 2026, the Operations Data Portal (ODP) recorded 11,521,788 displaced persons. This leaves a margin of 121,788 individuals. To reach the threshold, the displaced population must decrease by this amount.
I weighted the recent weekly data heavily. Between April 20 and May 4, 2026, the total dropped from approximately 11.54 million to 11.52 million—a net decline of roughly 20,000 people over 14 days, or 10,000 per week. If this linear trend remains constant, it will take approximately 12.2 weeks (85 days) to reach the 11.4 million mark. Starting from the May 4 update, this calculation points directly to late July or early August 2026.
Several factors support the sustainability of this downward trend. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has identified nearly 4 million returnees by late April 2026 and projects that an additional 2 million people could return to Khartoum alone by the end of the year. This surge in returns is driven by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) retaking control of the capital and parts of Al Jazirah in early 2025, providing a perceived, if fragile, improvement in security. Furthermore, economic pressures in host countries like Egypt (high inflation) and South Sudan (funding gaps) are pushing many Sudanese to return home despite the lack of infrastructure.
However, I have adjusted the forecast to account for significant headwinds. New displacements are still occurring; for example, fighting in North Kordofan in late April 2026 displaced 2,600 people in just two days. These ‘spikes’ in displacement act as a brake on the net decline. Additionally, the sustainability of returns is questionable, with 60% of returnees finding their homes destroyed and famine conditions persisting in Darfur. If these returns stall due to renewed fighting or humanitarian collapse, the date could easily slip into late 2026 or 2027.
The resolution criteria rely on the ODP, which typically publishes updates on Mondays. Therefore, the actual day the threshold is crossed will likely coincide with a Monday update. My median prediction of 9th August 2026 reflects the intersection of the 85-day linear drift with the ODP’s weekly reporting cycle, while leaving room for the high volatility inherent in active conflict data.
Key uncertainties
Conclusion